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About Waves, Particles, 
Events, Computer 
Simulation, and Ethics  
in Quantum Physics
Anne Dippel and Martin Warnke
When Max Planck in 1874 asked one of his teachers, Philipp von Jolly, 
whether to choose physics as his discipline of academic study, he received 
the response that there was not much to be gained there. This trivia about 
Planck’s life and the course of the history of science he himself influenced 
so much tells us: we never should be too sure that the gaining of knowledge 
is ever finished.
Despite von Jolly’s opinion the beginning of the twentieth century brought 
about several surprises: with the appearance of Herman Minkowski’s con-
cept of space-time and Albert Einstein’s annihilation of the ether that in 
the end led to the special and later the general theories of relativity, a first 
radical new branch of physics appeared. It was counterintuitive and yet 
scientifically highly successful at the same time. It revealed insights to the 
concepts of space and time and to problems of cosmology, to the very big 
of what we call “nature”. But the high hopes that humankind would also 
soon know how to get hold of the world of very small were disappointed 
initially. The radiation of atoms and the behavior of subatomic particles 
that were discovered by that time seemed so strange that it was utterly 
unexplainable by contemporary physics of that period of time.
Then, as a second scientific surprise to the young century, that was about to 
shock humanity with an abundance of violent events in its further course, 
quantum mechanics entered the realm of physics.
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Quantum mechanics, originally a theory developed by Planck to describe 
the black-body radiation problem, soon helped to explain atomic and 
subatomic phenomena. It had been evolving alongside experimental 
setups to a point of completion at the beginning of the 1930s. Thus, it 
provided new possibilities in describing the material world with a precision 
that was not achievable before. Nevertheless, it encoded into physics 
a rich collection of riddles and paradoxes, like the simultaneity of wave 
and particle perspectives, of “spooky actions at a distance,” known as 
quantum entanglement, the decline of determinism, and the impossibility 
of simultaneously and exactly measuring well-known quantities like the 
location and velocity of a particle.
Physicists like Einstein were not satisfied with this situation of logical and 
conceptual inconsistencies—he once wrote “God doesn’t play dice with the 
world”—and throughout the 20th century for beginners and lay people, 
as well as for experts such as the famous inventor of the diagrams for the 
interaction of subatomic particles named after him, Richard Feynman, the 
bewilderments of quantum theory are hard to accept on the one side and 
an invitation to esoteric speculation on the other. How can a thing be at the 
same time a wave and a particle? How can the state of one thing influence 
another instantaneously even though they are in two different, distant 
places? On the other hand, today, quantum mechanics proves to be the 
best tested theory in the history of physics. Therefore, experimentalists 
and theoreticians simply get used to the formalism that yields excellent 
predictions through the course of their education, and have to suppress 
the logical problems, since it works in the lab, and the lab has to work. The 
presuppositions about the behavior of nature turn into facts.
In the quantum world particles interact at a distance, and numerous exper-
iments show, that they act as if under a spell of contagion cast by a witch. 
But science is not magic, and how can we understand nature to the fullest, 
when we’re part of the system? The subatomic world seems to be formally 
describable, but from a logic perspective ungraspable for modern human 
beings. Even more when they are relying on logical devices such as the 
computer itself.
Physics students learn to deal with the ungraspable aspects of their dis-
cipline; many succumb at one point or another to the slogan “Shut up 
and calculate!” to cope pragmatically with the open problems of quantum 
mechanics, and even more so as their military and industrial applications 
require ever more young people being trained in it. Others try to overcome 
the theoretical problems by building experiments. This seems to suggest 
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that pondering the philosophical implications and logical problems of 
quantum mechanics might be superfluous, since the math works and the 
experiments are producing results. The common attitude towards a math-
ematical apparatus that works so well reminds us of Martin Heidegger’s 
prejudice about the sciences as disciplines that seem not be able to “think”, 
because they “do”, we might add. 
Since the beginnings of quantum theory, thought experiments especially 
served as tools to work out the contradictions and peculiarities between a 
reasonable Newtonian world in which humans would live, and a theory of 
microscopic cabinet of wonder where nature shows its magic side. Of these 
experiments the one about the double slit is the most famous, the simplest 
and the one in which experimentation, theory, and computer simulations 
still meet with vivid intensity. It observes how particles behave if shot onto 
a twofold opening that allows for alternatives in their trajectory. Sur-
prisingly enough, single particles produce interference patterns that are 
known, since then, to be phenomena of waves alone. 
This experiment is usually attributed to the fundamental idea that 
individual elementary particles behave like waves, because the inter-
ference patterns on a screen far from the double slit only emerge if we 
do not know which of the slits they passed through, one by one. Since the 
introduction of the de Broglie wavelength and Schrödinger’s matter wave 
equation, there is even the strong suggestion that seemingly indivisible 
particles pass through both slits at the same time. 
The logical difficulty arises when an interpretation of the double-slit exper-
iment tries to theorize individual particles that behave on their way through 
the experiment as if they were smeared out in space, although they are 
detected at distinctive places in the end. The concept of a matterwave and 
its inherent idea of self-interference of particles is hard to reconcile with 
measurements that in the end take place event by event. The notion of the 
event itself does not appear in traditional quantum theory, and at the end 
and the beginning of the experiment, in its Newtonian moment, matter 
shows itself as solid, not wavy, while in-between, the jiggly aspect of matter 
itself seems to appear; without that it can’t be theorized.
Although the predictions of quantum theory show excellent exper-
imental confirmation, quantum theory is not capable of describing the 
measurement process itself on the mathematical level. It is said that the 
wave function “collapses” at the event of the measurement, indicating the 
end of the quantum formalism. In the lab this normally takes place through 
the experimental observation of individual events, for example, the click of 
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a detector. Quantum theory only allows for statistical predictions that can 
be tested by large numbers of measurements, never to statements about 
single events.
Now enter computer simulations! 
With the development of event-based computer simulations new oppor-
tunities arise to describe the behavior of singular molecules as observed 
in quantum optical experiments of the double slit type. At the Institute for 
Advanced Study on the Media Cultures of Computer Simulation (MECS) in 
Lüneburg, Germany, we held a conference on the 20th and 21st of January 
2016 to explore the contradictory phenomena of interferences and events 
from a logical perspective, as well as the dichotomy of the wave and 
particle images that quantum physics demands we deal with. We invited 
distinguished scientists and scholars from the fields of computational, 
theoretical, and experimental physics, and of the history and philosophy 
of science, in order to explore the potential of concepts and technologies 
emerging out of computer simulations to tackle unsolved problems at the 
theoretical heart of contemporary quantum mechanics. Can simulations 
not only provide descriptions and predictions for physics behavior, but also 
produce theories in their own right, which could compete with traditional 
theoretical concepts such as a differential equation-based theory of 
quantum mechanics? 
In the interdisciplinary audience there were physicists, computer scientists, 
philosophers, game theorists, and scholars of literature, who would 
critically examine the presentations and contribute to the intense dis-
cussions that brought fresh perspectives on the epistemological role of 
computer simulations in physics and science in general, but also showed 
the robustness of contemporary quantum mechanical experimentation 
and theory.
By metaphorically using a quantum physics notation in the title of the 
conference, the <bras| and the |kets> of Paul Dirac, we illustrated our 
attempt to find out how much interference could be found in its opposing 
notion of events— and vice versa— by projecting them onto one another 
as: <interferences|events>, pronounced as “bra interferences ket events.” 
In quantum mechanics such a term computes to what extent the state 
on the right, the |ket>, could be projected onto the state on the left, the 
<bra|. Arianna Borrelli wrote about this in her paper in this book. If there 
is a nonzero result for this quantum mechanical term—to use the slang of 
the discipline—then we would know more about the relationship between 
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those contradictory concepts and could then calculate the probability that 
one turned into the other. 
Indeed, we found much more than just the void! This book documents the 
enlightening presentations and intense discussions we had during those 
two days. The table of contents follows the conference proceedings by 
thoroughly picturing the concurrent streams of thought that the sub-
ject ignites in people’s minds. All the material and arguments are com-
prehensible to a wider audience and provide explanations that do not need 
a scientific education as a prerequisite. Formulas only appear as subjects 
of methodological investigation, and the arguments are made plausible 
without using the language of math.
Our first speakers, Kristel Michielsen and Hans De Raedt, both theoretical 
and computational physicists at the Jülich Research Centre talked about 
their approach to theory building and description of the aforementioned 
double-slit thought experiment—also actually performed in a lab later on—
through the use of event-based computer simulations. Differently from the 
traditional approach of quantum mechanics, they model the whole process 
using events. A messenger is emitted by a source and processed by the 
experimental apparatus in a way that can be described by simple rules. At 
the end a sequence of individual events triggers a detection device that 
stands in for the measuring detectors in a laboratory. Instead of using the 
matrix- or differential equation-based mathematics developed by Werner 
Heisenberg, Erwin Schrödinger, Dirac and others that does not explain 
the behavior of single events but of collectives alone, a computer piles up 
results of discrete processes modeled by algorithms that then look similar 
to, if not indistinguishable from, laboratory data. In Michielsen and De 
Raedt’s approach, everything is deterministic and there are no logical odd-
ities in the whole process, unlike with the formalism of quantum physics 
that is normally applied without exception throughout the discipline. At the 
same time the results of the experimental quantum mechanical setups are 
perfectly reproduced. The tradition of logical reasoning based on computer 
simulations is put to an extreme perfection, ruling out all “spookiness” of 
quantum mechanics through media technology.
This marks the fascinating aspect of an event-based simulation attempt 
like the one described here: it only considers undoubtable properties of 
particles like their mass or spin, makes reasonable assumptions about 
experimental devices and does not rely on the so-called first principles 
used everywhere else, like the uncertainty principle or quantum states 
that can exist in superpositions as solutions to the Schrödinger equation 
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in quantum theory. These principles are known as such because they are 
claimed to be the all-encompassing laws of a field that always hold true and 
from which all phenomena can be deduced. First principles have a similar 
grounding role as axioms in mathematics, but still have to stand an exper-
imental test. The event-by-event approach is unparalleled in the hundred 
years of quantum research up to now, and only became possible because 
of the computing solutions available since the last three decades. This also 
means that physicists do not know through experience how far they can 
trust this method in cases where they do not have data from the lab. The 
only strategy to confirm the approach is to play a Turing’s imitation game 
on the microscopic level, to judge just by the data what is a simulation and 
what is a lab process. If one cannot tell them apart, one may have to con-
cede some credibility to this novel approach and place it as a computational 
solution alongside the existing mathematical approaches to describe the 
phenomena traditionally called “quantum.” 
At stake is the epistemological question of what relation exists between any 
formalism, be it traditional mathematics or novel computer simulations, 
and “nature” itself. Or, how cultural are the physical approaches to defining 
nature? Do mathematical theories of any kind say anything about nature 
itself or are they conceptual metaphors we learned to “live by” (Lakoff and 
Johnson [1980] 2003)? 
The discussion after the presentation raised questions on the inclusion 
of the measurement event into quantum mechanics that in its current 
condition cannot deal with events at all, e. g. could not include the 
measurement operation itself. Subsequently was a debate about the 
collapse of the wave function, indicating the very border of the quantum 
formalism. Is there a “classical” world where the event of a measurement 
takes place and a separate “quantum” world where we have interferences 
from individual particles? The views on that differed across the audience.
Lukas Mairhofer, currently based in the Lukas Arndt-Group at Vienna 
Center for Quantum Science and Technology of Vienna University, gave the 
next presentation, on observing the unobservable and the quantum inter-
ference of complex macromolecules. Not only does Mairhofer reflect his 
work as a philosopher, he also does so as a passionate experimentalist. He 
provides a reflected glimpse into the contemporary practices of quantum 
mechanics, using multiple-slit experiments in the lab, where theoretical 
perspectives guide experimental work at any time. In a quantum 
mechanical experiment the logical problems of quantum theory turn into 
those of “practical” labor: the physicists fill one side of a complex technical 
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apparatus with a grainy material consisting of visible particles—and never-
theless are forced to assume that it behaves like a matter wave on the 
way through the experimental system, passing optical grids where every 
molecule interferes with itself. At the end the detector counts discrete 
clicks that sum up to an interference patterns of a wave phenomenon. 
Contrary to the event-by-event simulative approach of the speakers before 
is the use of traditional quantum mechanics as the grounding theory. But 
Mairhofer and the whole Vienna Quantum Optics group go well beyond 
what could be done theoretically nowadays: they measure in regions where 
theoretical calculation is still impossible. Experimental verification is at the 
very core of the epistemic process in physics, and so the quantum optical 
setups in Vienna provide crucial indications of what could be known in the 
science of physics.
In the discussion experimental details were explored and philosophical 
questions were debated, such as the translation of subatomic behavior 
into the “classical world”: What would it mean to be delocalized as a human 
being, as during the quantum mysteries of matter spread out in space as a 
matter wave? Mairhofer ends his talk with a prospect: What would it mean 
if living matter, like viruses, was subject to self-interference in the double-
slit experiment?
Since in a contemporary quantum optical laboratory an experimental setup 
without computers is impossible, theoretical questions about media arose: 
What is the contribution of contemporary simulations to quantum optical 
experiments? Is what Mairhofer does in his experiments in itself already a 
simulation? What relationship exists between experiment and computer 
simulation in general? Is experimentation more of a simulation than science 
believed it to be up to now?
The next speaker, Mira Maiwöger, works as an experimental physicist in the 
Atomchip group of Jörg Schmiedmayer at the Atominstitut in Vienna. In her 
experiments the concept of matter waves also takes an important role. Her 
experiment investigates so-called Bose–Einstein condensates (BECs), which 
come into being, according to quantum theory, when big lumps of matter, 
say a spoonful, assemble in one big quantum state. This happens when 
matter is cooled down to extremely low temperatures. The speciality of her 
experiment is to prepare matter under extreme conditions, creating states 
that are also interesting theoretically, and then drawing conclusions for 
other materials that cannot be forced into these modes of existence in the 
same way. Experimentation becomes a kind of simulation of one system by 
another.
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Maiwöger explains how one simulates magnetic material by observing 
BECs in rubidium. This analog simulation does not use algorithms to mimic 
a system of interest, but exploits the concept of similitude, of vicarious 
relationships.
Since all that work is embedded into a theoretical context, one which claims 
that particular systems are similar in a conceptual respect, the experiments 
not only probe physical systems but also physical theory, all this by analog 
simulation. To take one example, there is the theoretical concept of the 
superposition of states, say a right turning and a left turning one, essential 
to quantum mechanics and yet absolutely impossible from the perspective 
of classical physics, where something cannot turn right and left at the same 
time. To directly deal with these phenomena is like bringing the disturbing 
aspects of quantum physics into a material, directly observable being, all 
without taking resort to computers.
In the vivid discussion on the work currently done at the Viennese Atomin-
stitut, philosophical aspects of the onto-epistemology of the quantum 
world explored by Karen Barad were elucidated. The framework of “agential 
realism” (Barad 2007) delivers a fruitful approach to also understanding 
why event-based simulations could equally explain the seemingly con-
tradictory subatomic world of the from a classical perspective. Maiwöger 
showed what “non-natural nature,” or natureculture (Law 2010), itself could 
actually be if put under the conditions of experimental physics: obviously 
it is not the privilege of computer simulations to create artificial realities, 
but as has been stated throughout the last decade by researchers from 
different fields in the realm of science and technology studies, physics itself 
produces realities that are neither pure nature, nor culture.
One goal of the conference was to clarify the relationship between 
event-based computer simulations and physical theory. As trained 
theoretical physicist and expert in building, as well as simulating robots 
with computers, Frank Pasemann from Osnabrück University seemed 
to be the right person to ponder about a possible need for new kinds of 
theory with the presence of computer simulations in theoretical physics. 
He showed some criteria of sound physical theories to discuss whether 
computer simulations themselves could be thought of as theories on their 
own, but remains undecided on the matter and expects further evidence 
in the future. Nevertheless, he states the obvious influences of computer 
simulations on theory building in physics, the full consequences of which 
are not yet known.
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In the discussion afterwards comparisons with other disciplines such as 
biology helped to question whether researchers are used to describing 
phenomena without having something that could be called a theory 
altogether, and how theoretical trends and habits emerge and vanish over 
time.
The next speaker, Arianna Borrelli, a historian of physics and a trained 
physicist herself, working at the MECS as well as at the Technical University 
of Berlin, gave us impressions from the history of quantum physics about 
how contemporary computer simulations might be regarded as a type of 
theory. She did that by pointing us to the creative functions of notation; 
how the notions of a theoretical framework are actually written down 
normally slips our attention. She described the eminent role that a specific 
form of the expression of abstract concepts plays in the development of a 
physical theory, for example, notational systems as media that influence 
our thinking. Interestingly enough even the concrete forms of such expres-
sions seem to have haptical and sensual sides to them and can be regarded 
as “embodied theories.” She showed this by recalling that the algebraic 
terms for the atomic spectra of radiation entered science unexpectedly by 
the way of perspective drawings, and that Dirac and others bent math-
ematical concepts far beyond the areas justified by mathematical proof in 
order to invent physically “interesting” notations, done so by using infinite 
or even continuous matrices.
From that perspective, computer simulations could be seen as another way 
of embodying theoretical concepts into a different material form, equally as 
valid as mathematical notations.
In the following discussion the close resemblance between creative 
notational methodologies and computer simulations became much clearer. 
The stage was now set for an even broader perspective on the vicarious 
relationships between different areas of scientific research. Having started 
<interferences|events> with the question about in which way event-based 
computer simulations could be producing physical theories in their own 
right, the conference now realized that this was not the only structure for 
exploiting the similitude between different parts of physical science. Not 
only computer simulations stand in for physical systems: One physical 
system mimics another, notational formalisms are precursors to math-
ematics, and, as we will see, one theory can stand in for another.
Leuphana-based media theorist Wolfgang Hagen gave a historiographical 
account of how Heinrich Hertz was simulating electromagnetism using elas-
ticity theory. He explored the transitions between those fields and showed 
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a historical example of a very conscious and skeptical use of parallelisms 
between fields of knowledge. The similitude and the analogy didn’t need to 
be perfect in every aspect; the incompleteness of any formalism describing 
nature was much clearer in Hertz’s times than it is nowadays, when theory 
becomes so successful that it seems to be without alternative.
Again Barad’s concept of agential realism served as a discursive spring-
board to discussing the ethics of “not knowing” and the impact of media 
on scientific interventions and representations, as well as the relationship 
between nature and culture. Finally, the discussion turned again to the cen-
tral topic pursued at MECS, which is the influence of computer simulations 
on scientific thinking, of how to think of them as “inneres Scheinbild” 
(mental images) in the way Hertz used the term.
The last presentation of the conference was an intervention by his-
torian of science and biologist Hans-Jörg Rheinberger, who emphasized 
the special epistemological status and role of experimental systems. He 
asked stimulating questions, such as: Would it be possible for computer 
simulations to produce new knowledge about nature as explorative exper-
iments do? What is the relation between computer simulations and thought 
experiments? And if, like Niels Bohr put it, theory is on what we know about 
nature and not about nature itself, what then are computer simulations? 
Finally, could quantum theory be seen as an experimental way of knowing?
The general discussion led us back to the work of Michielsen and De Raedt, 
reiterating the questions about ontology and the realm of theoretical 
description overall.
This last roundtable served to sum up the thoughts of the participants. 
Computer simulations as creators of a new type of theory could open up 
the discovery of new phenomena unseen by traditional theories and should 
be included by the experimentalists in their research. A glimpse into the 
history of science and of disciplines other than physics, such as biology, 
shows that different relations between theory and experimentation or 
discovery in general evolve during the course of the history of an academic 
discipline. A great deal of complexity and richness is lost if the only guide 
to discovery is what traditional theory is pointing us to and what published 
scientific papers reveal from the research process. Also inspired by biology 
the question arose of what life is if it gets into the computer? How does 
mathematics relate to the state of being alive?
The discussion touched on the plurality of today’s approaches in physics 
and how by mutual inspiration different fields such as computational 
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and quantum physics could end up finding new insights by testing 
computational-based hypotheses on the one hand and analyzing exper-
imental data thrown away before—because they were thought of as 
“useless”, that is, not complying to traditional theories—on the other.
The crucial loop between theory and experiment, the quest for reproduci-
bility, the whole epistemological apparatus of a positive, exact science, now 
seemingly enter into a crisis because of experiments that are very difficult 
or even impossible to reproduce.
At the end of the conference the importance of ethics with regard to the 
impact of computer simulations in science brought together all the dis-
ciplines assembled here, asking for an interdisciplinary approach that 
would lead to the establishment of ethics of design in simulation—thoughts 
that are related to discussions already led by Bertolt Brecht and Hans 
Reichenbach in the early era of quantum mechanics.
The times when it was enough to “shut up and calculate” are over. While 
computer-simulations contributed to the climate of “philosophobia” in 
physics in the first place, new modes of doing simulations are opening 
long-time black-boxed topics of how this discipline conceptualizes nature 
and the relation of the observer to what can be observed. Go ahead and 
start to think anew by reading yourself what the participants of <inter-
ferences|events> had to say. 
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Discrete-Event 
Simulation of Quantum 
Physics Experiments
Kristel Michielsen and Hans De Raedt
In one of his review articles Anton Zeilinger mentioned in 1999 that in 
former times one could only rely on Gedanken (thought) experiments 
to discuss the foundations of quantum physics, but that because of the 
tremendous experimental progress in recent years it became possible to 
base this discussion on actually performed experiments (Zeilinger 1999). 
Apart from these two options there is a third option to help contribute to 
this debate, namely performing computer simulations emulating thought 
and laboratory experiments. For the foundations of quantum physics, 
this requires a change of paradigm. In traditional, theoretical modeling 
the behavior of physical systems is described in terms of mathematical 
models. Usually differential equations, probability theory and so on are 
used to describe the system and its behavior. In this paper we replace this 
traditional modeling with a discrete-event simulation in which we model 
physical phenomena as chronological sequences of events. Although in 
the discrete-event approach we describe the behavior of systems in terms 
of simple rules, collectively these systems may exhibit complex behavior. 
Well-known examples of this approach are the Lattice Boltzmann model, 
used to simulate the flow of complex fluids, and the cellular automata from 
Stephen Wolfram (Wolfram 2002).
The community “Collective Evolution,” which promotes thinking outside of 
the box, published on their website their top three mind-boggling quantum 
experiments (Walia 2015). The first experiment on their list is the double-slit 
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experiment with electrons, photons, atoms, molecules, etc., in which the 
interference pattern is built up event by event. Quantum theory explains 
this experiment by introducing the concept of particle–wave duality: the 
property of particles behaving as waves and waves behaving as waves 
and particles. The second experiment on their list is the delayed choice/
quantum eraser experiment. It is often said that this experiment illus-
trates how what happens in the present can change what happened in 
the past. The third experiment is an experiment for measuring quantum 
entanglement, such as the Einstein–Podolsky–Rosen–Bohm experiment for 
example. In such an experiment it appears that one particle of an entan-
gled pair ”knows” what measurement has been performed on the other 
one and what the outcome of that measurement is, even though there is no 
known means of information exchange between the particles. Explanations 
of the observations are sometimes formulated in terms of Einstein’s 
“spooky action at a distance.”
[Fig. 1] Fraunhofer interference pattern  I(p) for a source emitting monochromatic light with 
wavelength  λ and angle of incidence  θ  0    thereby illuminating a plate with two line-shaped 
slits with width  a and center-to-center distance  d . Here  p = sin θ – sin  θ  0     where  θ denotes the 
angle of refraction. The solid line comes from the two-slit interference and the dashed line 
comes from the single-slit diffraction (see footnote 2). 
The single-particle double-slit experiment is one of the most fundamental 
experiments in quantum physics and thus our focus for this paper. The 
structure of the paper is as follows. In the first section we briefly recall how 
to calculate the interference pattern for a two-slit experiment with classical 
light. We discuss the event-by-event buildup of the interference pattern 
in two-slit experiments with massive objects (electrons, neutrons) in the 
second section. As we review in section three, usually quantum theory is 
used to describe these experiments in terms of single particles, single wave 
packets or an ensemble interpretation of quantum mechanics. Except for 
the latter interpretation which is silent on the issue of events, all other 
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descriptions suffer from some logical inconsistencies. In the fourth section 
we use a different approach to explain the event-by-event buildup of the 
interference pattern, namely the discrete-event simulation approach. The 
last section summarizes our conclusions.
Two-Slit Experiment with Light
The first two-slit experiment with light was performed by Thomas Young in 
1801. In the basic form of this experiment a monochromatic point source is 
emitting light that falls on a plate with two pinholes that are close together 
and equidistant from the source. The light passing through the pinholes is 
observed on a screen placed far behind the plate. The two pinholes act as 
secondary point sources which emit monochromatic light beams that are in 
phase. Due to the wave character of the light, light waves passing through 
the pinholes interfere, thereby producing a pattern of bright and dark 
bands on the screen, the so-called interference pattern.
[Fig. 2] Left: Simulated interference pattern for two different two-slit configurations. The 
metal plate with refractive index  n = 2.29 + 2.61 i and height  4 λ has two slits of width  λ sep-
arated by a center-to-center distance of  6 λ . In the middle between the two slits is an indent 
of width  λ and height  2 λ . In one of the two-slit configurations the indent is located at the 
bottom of the plate (x marks) and in the other configuration at the top of the plate (square 
marks). The plate is illuminated by light with a wavelength  λ = 500 nm . Right: Difference 
between the two interference patterns.
From the theory of optics (Born and Wolf 1964) it follows, after performing 
some relatively simple mathematical calculations using pen and paper, 
that the interference pattern depends on the wavelength  λ and the angle 
of incidence  θ 0 of the monochromatic light emitted by the two point 
sources, and on the distance  d between the two sources.1 In most two-slit 
1 In detail: the intensity pattern is given by  I (p)  =  cos 2   ( k d p ⁄ 2 ) with  p = sin θ – sin  θ 0 where  θ 
denotes the angle of refraction and  k =  2 π ⁄ λ .
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experiments that are carried out in the laboratory the slits cannot be 
described as pinholes acting as point sources. 
A more accurate representation of the slit is a line-shaped slit. The 
Fraunhofer diffraction pattern observed on a screen placed at a large 
distance from an illuminated plate that contains two line slits with width  
a and center-to-center distance  d is shown in Fig. 1.2 But, in laboratory 
experiments the interference patterns differ from this “ideal” two-slit inter-
ference pattern. The cause of these differences is that the assumptions 
under which the Fraunhofer formula has been derived do not apply: 
apart from a width slits also have a height and depth and/or the distance 
between the source and detection screen and/or the source and the plate 
with the slits might be too small, and/or the slit width is not small enough 
compared to the source–plate and plate–detector screen distances. 
Taking into account the experimental details in a derivation of the inter-
ference pattern requires more than pen and paper: one has to rely on 
computer simulations. An example demonstrating that slits cannot simply 
be replaced by secondary sources and that details in the experimental 
setup matter for the resulting interference pattern is shown in Fig. 2. It 
depicts the simulation results for the interference patterns of two different 
two-slit configurations with an indent between the two slits (De Raedt, 
Michielsen, and Hess 2012). The results have been obtained by solving 
the time-dependent Maxwell equation on JUQUEEN (Stephan and Docter 
2015), one of the largest supercomputers in Europe. The results show an 
intensity difference of 0.8%, and this is for an “ideal case simulation.” Even 
small details in the setup of the devices like indents or other constructive 
elements obviously matter! A calculation in which the slits were replaced by 
secondary sources would not show this difference.
Two-Slit Interference with Objects: Experiments
These experiments belong to the class of so-called quantum exper-
iments. As mentioned in the introduction, in former times one had to rely 
on Gedanken experiments to study questions related to the foundations 
of quantum mechanics. In 1964 Richard Feynman formulated a thought 
experiment for studying the two-slit interference experiment with elec-
trons (Feynman, Leighton, and Sands 1965). The experiment consists of 
2 The diffraction pattern of one line source with width  α reads  I (p)  =  [ (sin ( k a p ⁄ 2 ) ) / ( k a p ⁄ 2 ) ] 2 
(dashed line in Fig. 1). The Fraunhofer formula for the interference pattern observed 
on a screen placed at a large distance from the illuminated plate that contains 
two line slits with width  α and center-to-center distance d reads  I (p)  =  cos 2   ( k d p ⁄ 2 )   
[ (sin ( k a p ⁄ 2 ) ) / ( k a p ⁄ 2 ) ] 2 (solid line in Fig. 1).
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an electron gun emitting individual electrons in the direction of a thin 
metal plate with two slits in it, behind which is placed a movable detector. 
According to Feynman: (1) one could hear from the detector sharp identical 
“clicks,” which are distributed erratically; (2) the probability  P 1   (x) or  P 2   (x) of 
arrival, through one slit with the other slit closed, at position  x is a sym-
metric curve with its maximum located at the center of the open slit; 
and (3) the probability  P 12   (x) of arrival through both slits looks like the 
intensity of water waves propagated through two holes, thereby forming 
a so-called interference pattern, and looks completely different from the 
curve  P 1   (x)  + P 2   (x) that would be obtained by repeating the experiment 
with bullets. These observations led Feynman to the conclusions that: 
(1) electrons arrive at the detector in identical “lumps,” like particles; (2) the 
probability of arrival of these lumps is distributed like the distribution of 
intensity of a wave propagated through both holes; and (3) it is in this sense 
that an electron behaves “sometimes like a particle and sometimes like a 
wave,”—puzzling behavior for which the concept of particle–wave duality 
has been introduced. Feynman’s general conclusion about the single-
electron two-slit experiment was: “The observation that the interference 
pattern is built up event-by-event is impossible, absolutely impossible to 
explain in any classical way and has in it the heart of quantum mechanics. 
In reality it is the only mystery.”
Although Feynman wrote “you should not try to set up this exper-
iment” because “the apparatus would have to be made on an impossibly 
small scale to show the effects we are interested in,” advances in (nano)
technology made possible various laboratory implementations of his 
fundamental thought experiment. In what follows we discuss a selection of 
these experiments. 
[Fig. 3] Scheme of the setup of the single-electron two-slit experiment (Tonomura 1998).
The first real single-electron interference experiments that were conducted 
were electron biprism experiments in which single electrons pass to the 
left or the right of a conducting wire (there are no real slits in this type of 
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experiment) (see Merli, Missiroli, and Pozzi 1976; Tonomura et al. 1989). 
A scheme of the setup of the experiment of Tonomura and coworkers is 
shown in Fig. 3. The setup consists of an electron source, a biprism con-
sisting of a wire and two plates, a detector, and a monitor. In this exper-
iment at any time only one electron travels from the source to the detector. 
Each electron passes either to the left or the right of the wire before being 
detected by the detector, which results in a spot on the monitor. After 
many (about 50,000) electrons have been recorded an interference pattern 
emerges. Hence, although there is no interaction between the electrons 
they build up an interference pattern one by one. 
[Fig. 4] Left: Recordings of a single-electron double-slit experiment performed by Tonomura 
and coworkers showing the buildup of an interference pattern with an increasing number of 
detected electrons. Numbers of electrons are 11 (a), 200 (b), 6,000 (c), 40,000 (d), 140,000 (e) 
(Tonomura et al. 1989). Right: Final interference pattern. The inset shows the interference 
pattern expected from theory.
The buildup of the interference pattern is depicted in the left panel of Fig. 
4. If the number of detected electrons is small, then the single spots on the 
monitor screen seem to be positioned randomly; after a larger number of 
electrons have been detected stripes are formed. From these observations 
one could conclude that electrons are detected one by one as particles. The 
right panel of Fig. 4 shows the intensity pattern obtained from the stripe 
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pattern at the end of the experiment. The intensity pattern differs from 
what would be expected from theory for the ideal experiment but it does 
show interference. This interference pattern is often said to be formed 
when electron waves pass both sides of the wire at the same time. Hence, it 
is concluded that electrons in this experiment show both particle and wave 
character.
Rather recently, another realization of Feynman’s thought experiment has 
been performed making use of a plate with two slits instead of an elec-
tron biprism (Bach et al. 2013). In this experiment a movable mask is placed 
behind the double-slit structure to open/close the slits. Unfortunately, 
the mask is positioned behind the slits and not in front of them, so all the 
electrons encounter the double-slit structure and are filtered afterwards 
by the mask. One could therefore argue that as of 2017 Feynman’s thought 
experiment has still not been performed.
Interference experiments can also be performed with “objects” other than 
electrons. One example is the single-photon interference experiment of 
Jacques and coworkers ( Jacques et al. 2005). This experiment is similar in 
spirit to that of Tonomura and coworkers except that photons are used 
instead of electrons. The experimental setup consists of a single-photon 
source, a prism with a very shallow angle that splits the beam (a so-called 
Fresnel biprism), and a detector. After many single detection events an 
interference pattern is observed. Another example is the single-neu-
tron two-slit experiment of Zeilinger and coworkers (Zeilinger et al. 1988; 
Gähler and Zeilinger 1991), which is also of the same type as Tonomura’s 
experiment. The setup consists of a neutron source, a wire, and two glass 
plates. As in the other experiments, care is taken that only one “object,” 
in this case a neutron, at a time is ever traveling through the setup so that 
there can be no interaction between the neutrons. Also in this experiment, 
after many neutrons have been detected one by one, an interference 
pattern is seen. In this experiment the dimensions of the double slit are 
measured with an optical microscope and are also obtained by fitting 
curves to the experimentally measured interference pattern. Both methods 
give different results for the dimensions of the double slit, showing that 
the reality of an actual lab is much more complicated than the world of 
the Gedanken experiment. It is quite common practice to first extract 
the double slit dimensions from the experimental data by fitting them to 
Fraunhofer-like diffraction formulas and then comparing the measured 
interference pattern to the one obtained by numerical simulation with the 
extracted double slit dimensions.
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[Fig. 5] Left: Two-slit interference experiment with bullets. Right: Two one-slit experiments 
with bullets.
The original goal of the two-slit experiments was to demonstrate that not 
only waves but also “objects” (particles) can interfere. This original goal has 
shifted to obtaining interference with “objects” that are as large as possible, 
such as large organic molecules.
Two-Slit Interference with Entities: 
Description-Explanation
From now on we will call electrons, photons, neutrons, atoms and 
molecules “entities.” It is important to stress that entities are indivisible 
units; in other words, they cannot split. In the two-slit interference exper-
iments one click of the detector is associated with one entity arriving at 
the detector. Only after many single detection events does an interference 
pattern emerge. The interference patterns can be fi tted by wave diff raction 
theory. The so-called dual particle-like and wave-like behavior of the 
entities can be explained in diff erent ways. In what follows we discuss some 
of these explanations.
Entities are Particle Like
If the entities are particle like, then the two-slit experiment is well 
described by Feynman’s interference experiment with bullets. Fig. 5 shows 
such an experiment in which we replaced Feynman’s machine gun with a 
shooting cowboy. The cowboy shoots one bullet at a time towards a front 
wall that has one or two openings. The position of the cowboy with respect 
to the front wall is the same for each experimental setting. The positions 
of the openings in the front wall in the single-slit experiments correspond 
to their respective positions in the front wall in the double-slit experiment. 
In cases where the cowboy is shooting towards the wall with two openings 
labeled  S 1 and  S 2 , the bullet passes through one slit or the other and arrives 
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at a certain position on the rear wall that serves as a shield (a bullet is indi-
visible but one cannot observe through which slit it passes) or is stopped 
by the front wall. In cases where the cowboy is shooting towards one of 
the front walls with only one opening, labeled  S 1 or  S 2 , the bullet passes 
through this single slit and arrives at a certain position on the rear wall or 
is stopped by the front wall. After the three experiments are finished one 
observes that the bullet hole pattern of the two-slit experiment is equal to 
the overlay, the sum of the bullet hole patterns of the two one-slit exper-
iments. There is no interference. And if the bullets had been electrons, this 
is in contradiction to the observations made in the Tonomura experiment!
Any probabilistic theory, hence also quantum theory, describing these 
experiments postulates the existence of an underlying probabilistic 
process that determines the patterns with which the bullets will be 
observed. However, in these probabilistic descriptions the probabilities 
are conditional on the fact that a slit is open or closed—conditional prob-
abilities with different conditions cannot be added (Ballentine 2003)3. In 
the case at hand, probability theory does not allow the addition of the 
probabilities of the single-slit shootings in any theoretical description of 
the process! Nevertheless, Feynman (and many others) did so because he 
simply forgot about the conditions.
Hence, although the naïve conclusion that the observed interference 
patterns in two-slit experiments with “entities” cannot be obtained with 
entities passing one by one through the double-slit device might at first 
sight seem correct, we will demonstrate in the section entitled “Two-slit 
3 In the two-slit experiment with bullets one may get the impression that it is  
allowed to add conditional probabilities with different conditions, which are derived 
from the experimentally observed frequencies:  ∑ x    P (x | S 1  ,  S 2  , Z)  = 1  is equal to  
 ∑ x    P (x | 
_
 S 1   ,  S 2  , Z)  +  ∑ x    P (x | S 1   ,  ‾ S 2   , Z)  = 0.5 + 0.5  = 1 . Here, x denotes a position on the 
detection screen,  S j  (  
_
 S j   ) corresponds to an open (closed)  j -th slit (  j = 1, 2 ) and Z 
denotes all other identical conditions under which the three different experiments 
are carried out (e.g. the position of the shooting cowboy, the positions of the slits, 
the cowboy shoots half of the bullets in the direction of each slit, …). In general, one 
is not allowed to add conditional probabilities with different conditions, as can be 
seen from considering the following three experiments with variables (negations 
are represented by an overbar)  R denoting that it rains,  W representing that one 
gets wet from rain only, U denoting the fact that one has a very large umbrella 
that one uses not to get wet from rain, and  Z are all other identical conditions in 
the different experiments: (1) it rains and one does not have a very large umbrella, 
(2) it does not rain and one has a very large umbrella, and (3) it rains and one has a 
very large umbrella. In this example  P  (W | R, U, Z)  = 0 can definitely not be equal to  
P  (W | R,  
_
 U  , Z)  + P  (W | 
_
 R  , U, Z)  = 1 + 0 = 1 .
30 Interferences and Events
interferences with entities: discrete-event simulations” that this is in fact 
not the case.
Entities are Wave Packets (Wave Like)
Under this assumption the picture is that a wave packet with a size 
larger than the center-to-center separation of the slits plus the slit width 
impinging on a double-slit device interferes with itself. According to 
quantum theory the time evolution of the wave packet is governed by 
the time-dependent Schrödinger equation  iħ∂ψ (x, t)  / ∂t = Hψ (x, t) , where  H 
denotes the Hamiltonian of the two-slit system,  ψ (x, t)  represents the wave 
function of the complete system, and  ħ is Planck’s constant. Fig. 6 depicts a 
snapshot of a movie showing the time evolution of a Gaussian wave packet 
impinging on a double-slit device and thereby being partly reflected and 
partly transmitted. However, although the initial wave packet is split in two 
parts, at any time there is only one wave function,  ψ (x, t) . What is actually 
shown in Fig. 6 is the intensity  | ψ (x, t) | 2 , which according to the Born rule 
gives the probability of finding the entity at position  x . The “large” trans-
mitted part of the wave packet emanating from the double slit reaches the 
detection screen. Thinking of the laboratory experiments, one expects the 
wave packet to produce one single spot on the screen because in exper-
iments one does not observe the single interference of one entity.
[Fig. 6] Intensity of a Gaussian wave packet of width  σ = 10 λ reflected and transmitted by 
a wall with two slits in it (Michielsen and De Raedt 2012). The thickness of the wall is  λ . The 
slits have a width  a = λ and a center-to-center distance  d = 4 λ . The initial wave packet moves 
from the left to the right.
Note that what should happen to the reflected part of the wave packet that 
is moving in the direction of the source is unclear. Heisenberg introduced 
in 1927 the reduction and Bohm in 1951 the collapse of a wave function to 
explain how a single entity represented as a wave packet can give rise to a 
single spot on a screen. However, this does not explain the event-by-event 
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buildup of the interference pattern, i.e. the coordination between the 
detection events resulting from many “large” wave packets arriving at 
the detection screen. How should one explain this—by Einstein’s spooky 
action at a distance? After almost 100 years, the collapse of the wave 
function remains elusive and does not provide a rational explanation of the 
observations in a two-slit experiment with single entities.
Ensemble Interpretation of the Interference Pattern
According to Einstein, “The attempt to conceive the quantum mechanical 
description as the complete description of individual systems leads to 
unnatural theoretical interpretations, which become immediately unnec-
essary if one accepts the interpretation that the description refers to 
ensembles of systems and not to individual systems” (Einstein 1949). In 
other words, one should not try to explain individual events using quantum 
theory.
Interpreting the wave packet (see e.g. Fig. 6) as one probability wave, 
representing the collection of all entities that is propagated through the 
double-slit device according to the rules of quantum theory, leads to an 
interference pattern that is similar to the final one observed in a laboratory 
experiment. However, this ensemble interpretation gives no clue about 
how to get from the final probability distribution to the detection events 
observed in the experiment. Events can simply not be “derived” from 
quantum theory (or from probability theory). Hence, the ensemble inter-
pretation cannot explain the event-by-event buildup of the interference 
experiment.
Clearly we have here a dilemma. If, as Einstein said, we refrain from making 
statements about individual events, quantum theory is logically consistent. 
For atomic spectra quantum theory even gives a quantitative description. 
However, for the outcome of single-entity interference experiments or of 
experiments in which entanglement is involved quantum theory often only 
gives a qualitative description. This raises the question: how can it be that 
we have a very successful theory (quantum theory) that says nothing about 
the individual observations that make up the collective which the theory 
(quantum theory) describes very well?
As quantum theory cannot say anything about individual observations, 
another question that arises is whether it is possible to conceive ways 
of producing the kind of events that we observe in experiment directly, 
without referring to the concepts of quantum theory. The answer to this 
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question is affirmative. For many of the so-called fundamental quantum 
physics experiments it is possible to construct a fairly universal computer 
simulation model that reproduces the results of all these experiments 
through discrete-event simulation, without solving wave equations and the 
like: for example see (De Raedt, De Raedt and Michielsen 2005; Michielsen, 
Jin and De Raedt 2011; De Raedt, Jin and Michielsen 2012; Michielsen and De 
Raedt 2014).
Two-Slit Interferences with Entities:  
Discrete-Event Simulations
Discrete-event simulation is a very general form of computer-based mod-
eling. It provides a flexible approach to represent the behavior of complex 
systems in terms of a sequence of well-defined events; that is, operations 
performed by processors on entities of certain types. The entities 
themselves are passive, but they have attributes that affect the way they 
and their attributes are handled by the processors. Typically, many details 
about the entities are ignored. The events occur at discrete points in time. 
The system does not change between consecutive events. Discrete-event 
simulation is used in a wide range of health care, manufacturing, logistics, 
science, and engineering applications. We use discrete-event simulation 
to model various single-entity experiments relevant to the foundations of 
quantum physics.
In contrast to standard mathematical modeling, discrete-event simulation 
starts directly from experimental observations. In discrete-event mod-
eling one searches for a logically consistent, cause-and-effect description 
of the definite results (the events) that constitute the experimental facts. 
Hence, one goes from events to probabilities and not vice versa. Therefore, 
the algorithm in a discrete-event simulation cannot refer to a probability 
distribution to produce the events. The resulting model may or may not fit 
into classical (Hamiltonian) mechanics. As in discrete-event modeling one 
starts from human perception, then goes to events, and finally arrives at a 
quantitative description, there is no need for an “objective” mathematical 
world picture. In our discrete-event simulation of single-entity experiments 
quantum theory emerges through inference from the events. We illustrate 
this with two examples related to two-slit interference with single photons.
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Two-Slit Experiment with Two Beams (Two Sources)
From the theory of optics it follows that Young’s double-slit experiment 
can be simplified to a two-beam experiment by replacing the two slits with 
two virtual sources. The two-beam experiment allows us to study inter-
ference in its most pure form because in contrast to the two-slit exper-
iment the phenomenon of diffraction is absent. A time-resolved two-beam 
experiment has been performed in the laboratory (Garcia, Saveliev, and 
Sharonov 2002).
[Fig. 7] Schematic diagram of a two-beam experiment with light sources  S 1 and  S 2 of width  
a , separated by a center-to-center distance  d . Both sources emit coherent, monochromatic 
light. The angles of emission  β are uniformly distributed. The light is recorded by detectors  
D positioned on a semicircle with radius  X and center  (0, 0) . The angular position of a 
detector is denoted by  θ. 
A schematic setup of the two-beam experiment with coherent, mono-
chromatic light sources is shown in Fig. 7. In a single-photon version of the 
experiment the single-photon sources emit photons one by one. In the 
discrete-event model of this single-photon experiment entities are created 
one at a time by one of the sources (creation events) and are detected by 
one of the detectors forming the detection screen (detection events). We 
assume that all detectors are identical and cannot communicate with each 
other. We also assume that there is no direct communication between 
the entities (there is always only one entity between the source and the 
detector plane). Hence, the discrete-event model is locally causal by con-
struction. If the entities build up an interference pattern one by one, 
then the interference pattern can only be due to the internal operation 
of the detectors, which has to be more complicated than just counting 
the incoming entities. We disregard the option that a similar interference 
pattern can be obtained by adding the detection events from a huge set 
of detectors that each only detected one entity. We do not consider this 
option, which is based on the statistical property of quantum theory, 
because there is no experimental evidence that replacing detectors after 
having detected an entity and then combining all these detection events 
indeed results in an interference pattern. The discrete-event simulation is 
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based on observations made in laboratory experiments and not on hypo-
thetical theoretical considerations.
Fig. 8 illustrates the general idea behind the discrete-event simulation 
approach. Simple rules defi ne discrete-event processes that may lead to 
the behavior observed in experiments. The basic strategy in designing 
these rules is to carefully examine the experimental procedure and to 
devise rules such that they produce the same kind of input and output 
data as those recorded in the experiment. Evidently, mainly because of 
insuffi  cient knowledge, the rules are not unique. Hence, the simplest rules 
one could think of can be used until a new experiment indicates otherwise. 
Obviously, the discrete-event simulation approach is concerned with what 
we can say about these experiments but not what “really” happens in 
nature.
[Fig. 8] Schematic of the working principle of the discrete-event simulation approach. The 
fi rst step consists of a detailed analysis of the experiment. Information about the input, 
such as characteristics of the source(s) and all other components in the experimental setup, 
and the output, such as the detector clicks (intermediate output) and the interference 
pattern or correlation (fi nal output), including the data analysis procedure, is collected. It 
is assumed that it is not known how the input is transformed into the output. In a second 
step the “black box” that connects input and output in the experiment is replaced by a set of 
simple rules that transform this input into the same output. The frequently asked question 
about whether the rules describe what is going on in nature cannot be answered because 
the information necessary to answer this question is lacking.
The general picture in the discrete-event approach is that the entities are 
seen as messengers that carry certain messages, such as polarization, 
time, frequency, and so on, and run around in the experimental setup. The 
optical components in the experiment, in this case the two sources and the 
detectors, are seen as processors that interpret and manipulate the mes-
sages. It is important that the messengers do not communicate directly, 
only indirectly through the processors. This complies with the notion of 
local causality.
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We now specify in a bit more detail the set of simple rules for simulating 
the two-beam, single-photon experiment. More detailed information can 
be found elsewhere (De Raedt and Michielsen 2012).
 – Photons: The photon is regarded as a messenger carrying a message  
 e  (t)  =  (cos 2 π f t, sin 2 π f t) that is represented by a harmonic oscillator 
which vibrates with frequency  f (representing the “color” of the light). The 
internal oscillator is used as a clock to encode the time of flight  t , which 
depends on the source–detector distance. Think of this message as the 
hand of a clock that rotates with frequency  f .
 – Source: The source creates a messenger and waits until its message has 
been processed by the detector before creating the next messenger, so 
that there can be no direct communication between the messengers. 
When a messenger is created its time of flight is set to zero.
 – Detector: We describe the model for one of the many identical detectors 
building up the detection screen. These detectors operate independently 
from each other. Detectors are very complex devices. In its simplest 
form, a light detector consists of a material that can be ionized by light. 
This produces a signal, which is amplified. In Maxwell’s theory, the inter-
action between the incident electric field and the detector material is 
the result of a coupling of the oscillation of the incoming photon with the 
polarization of the detector material due to the photons that came in 
previously. In cases where incoming photon and remaining polarization 
are in phase—in the same state of oscillation—the detector is likely to 
click; in cases where they are out of phase, no click will occur.4 If the 
“memory” of the detector is good enough and if there are enough mes-
sengers, the event-based simulation generates the interference pattern 
4 In more detail: the interaction between the incident electric field  E " and the 
detector material takes the form  P "  ·  E 
"
  , where  P "  denotes the polarization vector of 
the material. In the case of a linear response of the material  P " (ω)  = χ (ω) E " , where  
χ denotes the electric susceptibility of the material and  ω is the frequency of the 
impinging monochromatic light wave. In the time domain this relation expresses the 
fact that the material retains some memory about the incident electric field,  
 χ (ω) representing the memory kernel. In the discrete-event model, the  k th message 
in the form of the two-dimensional vector  e " k (t)  =  (cos 2π  f k t) is taken to represent the 
elementary unit of electric field  E " (t) . The electric polarization  P " (t) of the material is 
represented by a two-dimensional vector  p "k . Upon receipt of the  k th message by the 
processor modeling the detector this vector is updated according to the rule  
 p "k  = γ p 
"
k -1 +  (1 - γ)   e 
" k  where  0 < γ < 1 and k > 0 . After updating the vector  p 
"
k  , the proces-
sor uses the information stored in this vector to decide whether to generate a “click.” 
As a highly simplified model, we let the processor generate a binary output signal  
S k using the intrinsic threshold function  S k  = Θ ( p k 2 –  r k ) , where  Θ (·)  denotes the unit 
step function and 0 ≤  r k < 1  is a uniform pseudo-random number. For  γ   1 – and a 
large enough number of messengers we recover the interference pattern from wave 
theory.
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that we know from wave theory. This detector is a kind of adaptive 
machine that “learns” from the incoming entities.
The whole algorithm is very simple and does not require a lot of computer 
power: a personal computer suffices. Fig. 9 shows a comparison of the 
simulation results from about six million entities with the theoretical result  
I (θ)  = A [ sin (  (α π sin θ) ⁄λ ) / (  (α π sin θ) ⁄ λ ) ] 2   cos 2 (  (d π sin θ) ⁄λ ) obtained from a straightforward 
application of Maxwell’s theory in the Fraunhofer regime. As can be seen, 
the agreement is excellent. The agreement is not only perfect for this 
parameter set but also for many others ( Jin et al. 2010).
[Fig. 9] Detector counts as a function of the angular detector position as obtained from 
event-by-event simulations of the two-beam interference experiment depicted in Fig. 7. 
The sources, emitting particles, are slits of width  α = λ ( λ =  670 nm), separated by a distance  
d = 5λ and the source–detector distance  X = 0.05  mm. A set of 1,000 detectors is positioned 
equidistantly in the interval  [ –57°, 57° ] , each of them receiving on average about 6,000 
photons. In the simulation model  γ = 0.999 .
Multiple-Slit Experiment with Slit Device
We consider the interference experiments with two-slit and three-slit 
devices as depicted in Fig. 10. In contrast to the two-beam experiment, in 
these experiments not only interference but also diffraction occurs. In the 
discrete-event model of these experiments the rules for the photons and 
source are the same as the ones used to simulate the two-beam inter-
ference experiment. As we may assume that in this case the multiple-slit 
device, and not the detectors, causes the diffraction and interference, the 
adaptive machines modeling the detectors are replaced by counters that 
simply count each incoming messenger. 
An adaptive machine models the multiple-slit device. An entity follows the 
classical trajectory in the multiple-slit device thereby possibly transferring 
momentum to the multiple-slit device. Hence, the multiple-slit device is 
modified by the passing entity and as a result each passing entity expe-
riences a slightly different multiple-slit device. Thus the multiple-slit device 
is a kind of adaptive machine that “learns” from the incoming entities.
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[Fig. 10] Setup for a single-entity experiment with a two-slit device (left) and a three-slit 
device (right).
Fig. 11 shows some simulation results for entities impinging on a two-
slit device at normal incidence  (θ = 0) and under an angle of incidence  
(θ = 30°) . Also a result for a three-slit device on which entities impinge at 
normal incidence is shown. The simulation results are compared with the 
theoretical results in the Fraunhofer regime and again perfect agreement 
is found.
[Fig.11] Detector counts as a function of the angular detector position as obtained from 
event-by-event simulations of the multiple-slit interference experiments shown in Fig. 10. 
Left: Two-slit device, Right: Three-slit device.
Conclusions
The discrete-event simulation method models physical phenomena as 
chronological sequences of events. The events in the simulation are the 
action of an experimenter, a particle emitted by a source, a signal detected 
by a detector, a particle impinging on a material, and so on. These are the 
events that are extracted from a thorough analysis of how the experiment 
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is performed. The next step, and this is the basic idea in the approach, is to 
invent an algorithm that uses the same kind of events (data) as in exper-
iment and reproduces the statistical results of quantum or wave theory 
without making use of this theory. Discrete-event simulation successfully 
emulates single-entity experiments (so-called quantum experiments) dem-
onstrating interference, entanglement, and uncertainty. By construction, 
the discrete-event approach is free of logical inconsistencies.
In principle, a kind of Turing test could be performed on data coming from 
a single-entity interference experiment performed in the laboratory and on 
data generated by the discrete-event simulation approach. This test would 
lead to the conclusion that both data sets look quite similar. The observer 
would be quite puzzled because this type of laboratory experiment is often 
classified as “quantum” yet no quantum theory is used in the discrete-event 
simulation.
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Discussion with Kristel Michielsen  
and Hans De Raedt
Eric Winsberg: So, I have two questions—one quick sort of specific question 
and a more general one. The quick question is: there was this exper-
iment done a couple of months ago, I think, which claimed it closed the 
Einstein–Podolsky–Rosen (EPR) loopholes or whatever. Can you guys 
do that within your paradigm here? 
Kristel Michielsen: We have simulated EPR experiments, yes. 
EW: But the one that was just done a couple of months ago, that sup-
posedly closed the loopholes or whatever? 
KM: There are two different approaches. On the one hand we can simulate 
various experiments. For this particular experiment we have to study 
how to implement it. That’s one thing. On the other hand there is a 
fundamental problem with this type of experiment and for us it doesn’t 
matter whether all the loopholes are closed or not because there will 
always be one remaining. That’s simply because one cannot perform 
the thought experiment as it was originally designed. Hence, these are 
two different things. But if one performs an Einstein–Podolsky–Rosen–
Bohm (EPRB) experiment and finds a violation of a Bell-type inequality 
then we can simulate it. For example, we have simulated the single-
photon EPRB experiment performed by Gregor Weihs in Vienna. We 
have also simulated the EPR experiment with neutrons. So those two 
EPR experiments we already simulated—but of course, people come 
with more and more experiments. 
EW: Okay, here’s my more sort of philosophical question. There are a 
number of ways of thinking about what the puzzles in quantum 
mechanics are. One way of thinking about it that I sort of find useful 
is that what seems to be wrong in a way with the conventional 
presentation of quantum mechanics is that it gives us two different 
laws of evolution. It says there’s the time-dependent Schrödinger 
equation, which evolves the wave function until you measure it and 
then there is a collapse. Why is there a collapse when you measure it? 
What’s so special about measurement? Shouldn’t measurement be 
described by the same theory that describes the evolution of the rest 
of the world? Why do measurement devices obey different laws than 
the rest of the world? It seems to me that one necessary condition for 
having a kind of adequate foundational story about what’s going on 
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in quantum mechanics is to not have that difference between how the 
world behaves and how detectors behave. But it seems to be built into 
your way of doing things that there… 
KM: There’s no difference. In our approach there is no difference between 
the detectors and all the… 
EW: But don’t you have different rules for entities and detectors and such? I 
thought that was kind of the… 
KM: No, because… 
EW: I mean, one way of thinking about it is this: in a way, whatever kind of 
representational system one has for the world, whether it ’s differential 
equations or event simulations or whatever it is, what one would like at 
the end of the day is one theoretical apparatus for quantum systems 
and for measurement systems and not to treat them separately. 
KM: But in our approach they are not treated separately. We are always 
designing consistent models. It depends a little bit on the experiment 
you’re looking at. Sometimes we encounter an experiment for which 
we have to build in new features. This could be a new apparatus for 
example, or it can be like as shown here, in the two-beam and two-slit 
experiment. In the case that you only have two sources and a detector, 
the detector has to be special, you could say. It needs to have some 
rules. 
If we have this other device between the source and the detector, 
this two-slit device, then we can say that this two-slit device plays 
a special role and that we can take a very simple detector, which 
is simply counting every incoming entity. What we mean by saying 
that the simulation model has to be consistent is that if we take our 
more complex detector and put it behind the two-slit device, we can 
still obtain an interference pattern. The idea is that we cannot know 
beforehand how complicated the device needs to be for simulating all 
kinds of experiment. Another very simple example is a beam splitter. 
One can make the model very simple, and say I observe 50% of the 
entities is going left and 50% is going right—I can just put a random 
number generator in place of the beam splitter: half is going left 
and half is going right. Fine. If one is going to make a Mach-Zehnder 
interferometer with this type of beam splitter, it ’s not going to work. In 
that case one needs something more complex for the beam splitter. 
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From then on we use the more complex model for the beam splitter 
and use it to construct other experiments. We do the same in mod-
eling other devices. So what we do is make a toolbox. We want the 
toolbox to be consistent. In the end the toolbox should be such that if 
one is designing an experiment one should be able to say I need this 
and this and this apparatus, so I go to the toolbox and take all the cor-
responding components, put them together, and simulate the exper-
iment. That is our approach. In that sense there is no big difference 
between simulation and experiment. We make no distinction between 
classical and quantum. By the way, one can indeed say that one should 
include the detector in the quantum theoretical description. One can 
do that no problem because then one has one big quantum system. 
But, this does not solve the problem. Quantum theory describes the 
whole system, the whole experimental setup, including in principle the 
detector. But, it does not help, where does one stop? 
Hans De Raedt: So, I think the final problem is the event. One has to explain 
the event. The fact that our brain somehow registers an event means 
that in the end one has to put a measurement system in our brain, 
if one goes with this logic of always extending quantum theory to 
incorporate more and more and more. 
EW: Right, I mean there are various approaches to this, one is to think that 
if you get enough stuff in the same place it collapses as a law or, you 
know… 
HDR: There are difficulties there. So if you say the collapse, we have to 
evoke the collapse, then the collapse is outside of quantum theory. The 
formula is not quantum theory, it ’s something external. It ’s fine, but in 
the end if you do the logic you have to say everything collapses in my 
brain. Not only in yours but also in mine. In everyone’s brain. Of course 
we can believe that, but the question is not whether it ’s true or not: the 
question is whether there is a more rational explanation to it.
Lukas Mairhofer: Let’s put it this way, Karen Barad tells us that Niels Bohr 
told us that if you look at an interference experiment you somewhere 
have to make a cut between your observed system and your observing 
system. Where you make the cut is kind of arbitrary but it determines 
what the result of your observation will be. For me, what you told 
us so much resembles this that for me it’s really hard to believe that 
you treat quantum systems and classical systems alike. Because you 
showed us that the adaptive system can be the screen or the dif-
fraction element, and I would claim that it should be possible to make 
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the entity the adaptive system. Just that you’re able to change the 
functions of different parts of your experimental system—isn’t that 
something that is so inherently quantum and that is so much not there 
in the classical world? 
KM: First of all I would say there is no quantum world and there is no clas-
sical world. The only thing we can do is give a description of the world. 
This way of describing is just the same technique I use here to simulate 
these so-called quantum experiments. One is always talking about 
quantum experiments but the question is, are they really quantum? 
What does it mean? So, that’s another question. Actually, using the 
same methods and apparatuses we simulate classical optical systems. 
We can simulate the Brewster angle single photon by single photon. 
Where then is the quantum? 
LM: But can you do it with classical billiard balls like atoms?
KM: Yes. On the computer we can. But these are just simple models for 
what is going on. It gives a description in terms of… 
LM: I think my problem is that I have the feeling that your whole epistemic 
approach is not classical. Because ascribing these adaptive functions, 
or being able to ascribe this adaptiveness to an arbitrary part of the 
system, is already something where the line between the observer and 
the object is getting so blurred and so on that in a Newtonian world 
this somehow feels very awkward for me. But okay. 
KM: Okay. Hans De Raedt, do you have a comment? 
HDR: What’s so special about Newton? 
LM: I just want to say that to me it seems that it ’s not Newtonian. It ’s not 
the classical epistemic approach. 
HDR: Yes, but don’t mix classical with Newton. Of course it’s not classical 
Hamiltonian.
KM: It’s not Hamiltonian mechanics, but in a sense it’s maybe better to 
think outside of physics like for the other examples I have given. It ’s 
a methodology applied to physics but maybe it’s less strange if you 
forget about… 
LM: I don’t find your approach strange. I just would find it strange to link 
this approach to a classical epistemic world view where there is a strict 
separation of the observer and the observed system. Because what 
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you described is so completely different from that. That’s all I wanted 
to say. 
Mira Maiwöger: If you would want to simulate an experiment that throws 
apples through two slits, what would you need to change in order to 
get the two Gaussian probability distributions overlapping? The dis-
tribution that one can observe when one throws lots of apples through 
two slits? 
KM: This is also a matter of dimensions and parameter values. If we do 
these two slit experiments, think about the dimensions. We have these 
rules and then it still fits. 
HDR: In this particular case you just turn off the adaptiveness of the 
machine. That’s it. Then it simply makes straight trajectories. In a sense 
you turn off the interaction of the entity and the slit. 
KM: You have this parameter gamma there, so you have a range of possible 
values. If one goes to the wave description then we take gamma close 
to one and otherwise close to zero... 
HDR: That is also what it is in Feynman’s picture: it thinks of bullets going 
through the slit and the bullet and the slit. I mean one could take away 
the slit and just shoot the bullet in a narrow region and one would have 
the same answer. So, if we do this in the simulation, say switch off the 
interaction between the slit and the object, then bullet behavior is 
observed. So, essentially that is the rule. If one removes the adaptive-
ness it behaves as classical Hamiltonian mechanics. 
Stefan Zieme: I think I have the same question that has been asked several 
times before—just to be sure that I got it right. You have a local 
description of your entities in your simulation? My first question would 
be how do you cope with Bell’s inequality, and didn’t you just shift 
everything you did into the detector? That would be my first thought. If 
you didn’t, how would you then cope with Bell’s inequality? I would find 
that rather strange, especially in regard of your EPR–Bohm experiment, 
because it’s hard to see what you are simulating—that would be the 
first question that comes to my mind. If you talk about local entities in 
your simulation I have the impression you just shifted the problem to 
the detector. By training I have to say this; it ’s not that I’m convinced of 
it, but my training… 
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KM: You have to ask this question. Then I would say it ’s hard to ask about 
simulating Bell’s inequality experiment, because we really have to see 
how this experiment is performed. 
SZ: Like I think Clauser in 1972 was the first one to come up with this idea. 
I don’t know anything about that, only very little. But I wondered how 
yours compares with that one? 
KM: I will tell you what the most important ingredients are. We all have 
in mind the thought experiment of EPR, so a source sending pairs of 
particles. One particle is going to the left, the other one is going to the 
right. If one is up then you detect the other one as down. So that’s one 
thing, but now one is going to do an experiment. This situation is not so 
ideal because one has to, in the end, identify pairs. If one looks closely 
at the experiments, it depends on how it’s done, but in most of them 
time is needed in order to determine whether the particles belonged to 
a pair. So, there is some coincidence time needed in order to determine 
whether one has pairs. This already tells one that if one does a 
simulation, time is an important ingredient, which is not present in 
quantum theory. One then has to see how to simulate the experiment 
as the experimenters do it. This also means that one has to do the 
data analysis in the same way as the experimenters do it. What they 
do is choose a certain time window themselves. If we include all these 
ingredients in our simulation then although we have a local method, 
we correlate the data based on time stamps and by comparing time 
differences to a time window. So… 
HDR: Maybe I may add here. In this particular case, this is the simplest 
simulation you can do from our perspective in the sense that you do 
not even need adaptive machines for it. So the only thing you have to 
do is… 
KM: Is you have a source. 
HDR: One has the source. One looks at what the experiment really entails, 
not at some idea that people have about the experiment. One really 
looks at how the experiment is being done, one puts all these things 
together, and one makes a simulation of it and it simply reproduces 
everything. 
KM: In this case it’s simple. You have a source emitting pairs and you have a 
detector that simply counts. Everything is counted. 
SZ: So you will measure something that is bigger than two? 
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HDR: Absolutely. 
SZ: And you have a local description? There’s something contradictory. I 
don’t know where to put the contradiction yet for me. 
KM: No, it ’s even stronger. What we observe is a correlation that exactly 
corresponds to the one of the singlet state. So we do not only find a 
violation, but it is two times the square root of two. Another thing that 
we find, and which is usually not shown in the experiment, is that the 
single particle expectation value is zero and does not depend on the 
setting. 
EW: So this is just by way of giving you a little bit of an idea of what might 
be going on here. There’s a sort of long tradition of studying the 
Bell-type experiments by looking at the detector efficiency. If you 
rule out the assumption—all the analyses of these experiments relies 
on the assumption that when the detectors fail to detect that’s a 
random event—if you give that up, you have a lot of wiggle room, and 
something like that is going on here I assume, but I’m not sure. 
KM: Some filtering is going on, which… 
HDR: Mathematically speaking, everybody refers to Bell’s inequality but 
one can also look at the experimental situation, which by necessity 
requires measurement of times. Then generalize Bell’s inequality to 
this situation. The inequality changes and this new inequality one can 
never validate—never. The limit is not two, the limit is four. This has 
been done by many people, but it ’s hardly mentioned in literature. So 
nobody seems to care. 
KM: So one has to look at the correct inequality. 
Martin Warnke: I would like to ask a question to everybody, not just the two 
of you. Could all this puzzlement we’re now experiencing collectively, 
could that stem from the fact that we are newly coming down from the 
Platonic heaven of ideas to a very, very concrete description of what’s 
actually happening? Could that be the media effect that we always 
look for? Might computer simulations have in this case the effect that 
you could deviate from very tough idealizations to a very concrete 
description? Might that be the difference? It seems that to me, but I’m 
not sure about it. 
HDR: I certainly agree. I think as KM said the basic starting point is 
perception, not some idea we have about the world. 
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KM: So, not a mathematical model that is already based on many 
assumptions and simplifications. 
MM: My question is could you have conceived a Bell experiment if not 
for this ideal, if not for these ideas of quantum physics? Could this 
experiment have been done? I think it’s an interaction of course; 
this description is really concrete, but would there be experimental 
evidence of a Bell-type experiment without the idea of quantum 
physics being there?
HDR: If I remember the history of Bell’s work well, Bell set up this inequality 
to prove quantum theory wrong, not to prove it right. So… no, no… that 
is what was made afterwards. 
KM: Afterwards, not originally. 
HDR: Bell was a strong believer in Bohmian theory and he wanted to show, 
that was his intention, he wanted to show that quantum theory was 
wrong. The experiment turned out to violate the inequality and then 
people started to change… you can look up the history. This has been 
lost somehow. 
EW: You’re right that Bell was a Bohmian, that’s absolutely right, but Bohm’s 
theory is nonlocal and so what Bell was out to prove was that there 
couldn’t be a local rival to Bohmian mechanics. 
HDR: Maybe we’re not going to discuss these kinds of things. 
Arianna Borrelli: I just wanted to say something on the subject of this media 
effect. I think here you can really see the power of a very powerful 
medium—mathematical formalisms. Because here the whole dis-
cussion in my opinion has very strongly been framed in terms of 
quantum mechanics versus classical mechanics. Is it the equations of 
quantum mechanics or the classical ones that are true? This is actually, 
from what I understood from the work that was presented here, 
not the point. This is more like you have the experiment, you have 
the perception. We have some clicks. We have some different math-
ematical formulas. Quantum mechanics, also classical mechanics, but 
that’s not relevant in this context. Then we had maybe something else, 
something different, computer simulation. And this is the tension that 
is being presented here. I think it’s sometimes difficult to approach, to 
frame the question in these terms, without immediately jumping and 
looking at what other mathematical formalisms are there. Of course all 
of these discussions could not have come up without quantum theory 
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being there. That’s clear—it would be crazy. That’s not the issue, I just 
wanted to highlight this. 
KM: Indeed, I agree. There is too much classification into classical, 
quantum, but we only look for an explanation or for a description so to 
speak. That’s the only thing. Indeed.


[ 3 ]
Observing the 
Unobservable: Quantum 
Interference of Complex 
Macromolecules
Lukas Mairhofer
In my laboratory I work on a Kapitza–Dirac–Talbot–Lau interferometer for 
large and complex molecules. In this interferometer we have demonstrated 
the quantum interference for the largest objects that have shown quantum 
interference so far—well, at least we claim it’s quantum interference. Those 
were molecules with a mass of more than 10,000 atomic mass units, which 
is about the mass of more than 10,000 hydrogen atoms. The interference 
pattern that we get looks like that shown in the inset of Fig. 1.
It is quite different from the patterns that we saw in the last talk. I will 
explain the reason for the difference in a second. This pattern is basically 
obtained by using an additional grating as a detection mask that is scanned 
over the molecular beam. 
Our experimental setup is shown in Fig. 1. It is an interferometer that 
works with three gratings. The first grating is our source grating, which 
creates the coherence of our matter waves. We need the source grating 
because these matter waves are produced by simply heating a sample 
of the molecules using a very crude method, namely a ceramic cylinder 
around which we wrap some heating wire. They leave this oven through a 
slit and enter the vacuum chamber with a thermal velocity distribution, so 
they are everything but coherent. They never actually become coherent 
in the forward direction because we just cut out something like 20% of the 
velocity spread. But what we really need for seeing interference is spatial 
coherence, that is coherence transverse to the direction of the propagation 
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of the molecules. This coherence is obtained by putting the first grating in 
the way of the molecular beam, and each opening, each slit of the grating, 
now acts as something like a point source. After this grating, the matter 
wave with which we describe the center of mass motion of our molecules 
coherently illuminates a few nodes of the second grating. This second 
grating in our case is not a material grating anymore, but it is created by 
retroreflecting a laser from a mirror such that it forms a standing light 
wave. 
[Fig. 1] This sketch shows the main components of the setup of the Kapitza–Dirac–Talbot–
Lau interferometer for matter waves. The molecules emanate from a crucible and form a 
molecular beam that passes three gratings and finally is ionized and detected. The inset 
shows the measured interference pattern, a sine-like modulation of the count rate that 
results when the third grating is scanned over the molecular beam (Source: Tüxen et al. 
2010, 4145–4147).
So you see, in earlier times people diffracted light at matter; we now dif-
fract matter at light. This works in the following way: the standing light 
field produces a periodic electromagnetic potential. In this electromagnetic 
potential the electrons are shifted inside the molecules. This induces a 
dipole moment in the molecule and this dipole moment then again inter-
acts with the electromagnetic potential. 
This interaction imprints a phase shift on the matter wave, induces in it a 
position-dependent shift of its momentum. As I already said, we use a third 
material mask of the same period to scan over the molecular beam, and 
behind this grating we ionize the molecules and count them in a quad-
rupole mass spectrometer. 
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You need a very good vacuum to see the interference effects. When the 
molecules interact with background gas on their way, you will loose your 
interference contrast. The actual setup is something like three meters long 
and is much emptier than many parts of the solar system, which contains a 
lot of dust and dirt. The reason why this pattern looks like such a nice sine 
curve is that we perform our experiments not in the far field, which was 
described in the talk before, but in the near field. Fig. 2 shows the transition 
between these two regimes, the near and the far field. 
[Fig. 2] Left hand: Transition from the near to the far field. Right-hand picture shows a 
numerical simulation of the Talbot carpet (Source: Hornberger et al. 2012, 157–173). 
You see that behind these narrow openings of the diffraction grating the 
waves evolve in a very chaotic way. You cannot really solve analytically what 
is happening there. But from all this chaos a certain order arises when at 
certain distances the pattern of the diffraction mask is reproduced, and 
this distance is the so-called Talbot distance. Also, you can see that at half 
the distance the pattern is reproduced with twice the period and so on. 
The structure that evolves here is sometimes called a Talbot carpet. On 
the right hand picture of Fig. 2 you see how the near field transits into the 
far field; this is not a sharp transition and where it happens depends on 
how many slits the diffraction mask has. In each Talbot order the out-
ermost maxima of the pattern evolve into the far field. The number of slits 
determines how often the grating mask is reproduced, that is, how many 
Talbot orders you will see.
So, we put our detector somewhere in the second Talbot order, where you 
see a reproduction of the diffraction grating, and that is why you see such 
a nice sine curve here—because the potential of the standing light wave is 
a sine in the first order. Of course when I came to this conference I asked 
myself is this a computer simulation already? This fitting a sine curve into 
our data? I would say it is, but I’m not sure. I’m not sure what a computer 
simulation is exactly. Well, one thing for sure that my predecessors on the 
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experiment did was asking the question about whether this diffraction 
pattern that we see really is a quantum diffraction pattern. Or is it just the 
result of classic ballistic diffraction, like of footballs hitting the goal post? 
They did a simulation where they compared how the visibility, the contrast 
of your interference pattern, would behave for different laser powers and 
the result are shown in Fig. 3. 
[Fig. 3] Fringe visibility as function of diffraction laser power. Measured data compared to 
simulation for classical and quantum interference (Source: Hornberger et al. 2012, 157–173). 
The blue line gives you the development of the visibility for a classical 
theory and the red line gives you the predictions of quantum theory; 
you can see that the experimental results agree quite well with quantum 
theory, but definitely do not agree with a classical approach. 
However, although we heat up about half a gram of molecules in our oven 
and many thousands of molecules are flying through the grating at the 
same time, what we see is not interference of molecules with one another, 
but of each molecule with itself. We claim that it has to be interference of 
the molecule with itself because the molecules are very hot. They have 
many internal degrees of freedom, many hundred degrees of freedom. 
It’s very unlikely that two of the molecules are in the same state at the 
moment they are simultaneously passing through the grating. If they are 
not in the same state, they can be distinguished—and two distinguishable 
objects can not coherently interfere with each other. So what we see is the 
interference of molecules with themselves. But there is something really 
puzzling going on: interference should be something that only happens to 
waves. One has to be very careful to be clear that what we are looking at 
in our theoretical models is the center-of-mass wave function. It is a wave 
function that describes the motion of the center-of-mass of a really big 
object, and the wavelength is actually orders of magnitude smaller than the 
object. It doesn’t tell us what happens to the components of the object, and 
Observing the Unobservable 55
we can interact with the object as if it was a complex particle with an inner 
structure. For example, we can measure the distribution of charges inside 
the molecule. Actually, when I told you that the light grating works because 
charges are shifted inside the molecules, I was using a particle picture to 
describe the diffraction of a wave. This is really weird to me, and it is also 
really weird to me that we can use the interference to probe the particle 
properties of the molecules, such as their electric polarizabilities or their 
permanent magnetic moment. These are properties that result from the 
internal structure of the molecules and that are not really part of my wave 
picture of these entities.
We can also do absorption spectroscopy in our interferometer—we send 
photons into the chamber, where they cross the molecular beam. When 
their wavelength is resonant with a transition in the molecules, they absorb 
the photon and get a kick to the side. While the matter wave is delocalized 
transverse to the direction of its center-of-mass motion, an absorption 
event takes place that is much more localized in the direction of this motion 
itself. In a way what happens in the experiment is something very strange, 
because we have a localized absorption of a photon by a molecule that 
is actually undergoing an interference process with itself. So it should be 
delocalized, and it is indeed delocalized in one direction and localized in the 
other direction.
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Discussion with Lukas Mairhofer
Eric Winsberg: Just a quick question about the comment you made about 
how it’s weird that you’re treating the molecule as a wave function, but 
then it has all these internal degrees of freedom that matter. Is that 
different from when you use an electron? After all, you might just look 
at the spin of the electron, which is a very reduced representation of it 
in respect to the electron’s degrees of freedom. Maybe it’s made up of 
some…
Lukas Mairhofer: Well, you don’t have this many degrees of freedom in an 
electron so it’s easier, or think of photons. 
EW: Let’s try electrons, right? You could look at an inner structure of an 
electron. 
LM: Supposedly an electron is a point-like particle that has no inner 
structure. Of course you can prepare atoms in different states but it ’s 
easy to prepare them in the same state. It ’s really, really hard to do that 
with large molecules. 
EW: What is the molecule that you’re looking at? 
LM: Well our working horse molecule is the fullerene C60; it consists of 60 
carbon atoms and looks like a football with its round shape and the 
structure made up of pentagons and hexagons. But we use many other 
molecules, some tailor-made by chemists, some just as they exist, for 
example in biological systems. Right now we’re doing interference with 
vitamins A, K, H and D. We are trying to show interference with longer 
chains of peptides and proteins, in the future maybe with a viroid. So 
those are the molecules we are working on. They are large enough to 
be called Schrödinger’s cats, definitely, yes—it’s really hard to prepare 
two cats in the same state. 
Stefan Zieme: I guess the size of the molecule—I mean, how big can they 
be? It’s just a question of how good the vacuum is so can you make an 
estimate on how far you can go and if you can make an estimate about 
whether it converges? What is the boundary between classical and 
quantum? 
LM: That’s a very interesting question, and that of course is a question that 
also drives us because it is at the foundations of physics. First of all 
it ’s not only a question of the vacuum… your de Broglie wavelength, 
that is, the wavelength of your matter wave, scales inversely with 
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your mass, so your de Broglie wavelength becomes very small when 
your mass increases, and then to see the interference effect your 
interferometer needs to become very long. If you want to build an 
interferometer for a viroid, for the RNA strand without its protein 
shell, with the sources and the techniques that are available at the 
moment, it will be something like… each arm will be something like one 
or one and a half meters long. At the moment in our interferometer 
each arm is 10 centimeters long. Of course you need a good vacuum 
then. Also vibrations really become a problem when you have such 
a long interferometer. Even in the interferometer that I work on now 
you loose half of your contrast if your grating period is misaligned 
by half an Angström, that is half the radius of a hydrogen atom, for 
example because your laser wavelength has changed or something 
like that. So things like this are limiting you in a technical way. And then 
on the fundamental level, some theories claim that there is a limit on 
the size of the objects that you can show interference with. Because 
the question is, why do we not see quantum effects like interference 
in our everyday experience? Why does the world we live in seem to 
follow such a radically different physics? There are many approaches 
to explain this, and one is to claim that there is a spontaneous collapse 
of the wave function under its own gravity, for example. That would 
scale with the mass of the particle. Early spontaneous collapse models 
derived that you shouldn’t see interference above 2,000 atomic mass 
units. Then it was about 10,000 atomic mass units, now it’s about 
100,000 atomic mass units. So there are some parameters you can 
tweak, but it seems that you cannot tweak them arbitrarily. At some 
point this model can be ruled out and this we try to test in our inter-
ference experiments. 
EW: I mean in the Ghirardi–Rimini–Weber (GRW) theory, it depends on time. 
You can have an arbitrarily large thing not collapse, according to GRW, 
for a very short period of time. 
LM: Yes. We look at it at reasonably long times, a few milliseconds. 
Martin Warnke: I have a question because you yourself put up so many 
doubts and spoke of your puzzlement—my biggest puzzlement is 
having seen you with your young colleague in the laboratory, filling in 
that blue stuff at the left-hand side of the experimental system. Using 
a spoon, taking lumps of C60 atoms out of a box, putting them into the 
oven. Then you closed the apparatus and drew a very high vacuum. 
After that preparation in the real world with real and hard matter, then 
58 Interferences and Events
in the world of an isolated apparatus you perform an experiment that 
you describe as one where matter waves interfere with themselves. 
The blue material from the beginning transforms, or should I say, 
trans-substantiates, into uncorporal waves. How do you do that in your 
mind? Say in one quarter of an hour you’re putting blue stuff into the 
left-hand side and after a few hours, when the vacuum is up again, 
you’re thinking of matter waves. How do you do that? 
LM: I asked that myself for a very long time, until after a bottle of red wine 
I thought of myself in a space suit drifting through a dark universe 
without any point of orientation and without any interaction, without 
any stars around me. Completely blind, completely isolated. I thought 
I might well think of myself as being delocalized then. What is the 
meaning of being localized when there is no frame of reference? When 
there is nothing you can map your location to, if there is no interaction 
with your environment? I think even in our human minds, we could 
imagine being delocalized—or at least the concept of being localized 
would lose its meaning. 
Hans-Jörg Rheinberger: I have a little problem with the probes that you’re 
using. So if you’re using that fullerene, it somehow makes sense. But 
if you think of a protein, that usually only exists with a lot of water 
molecules around it and so on and so forth. So what do you do to these 
molecules before you shoot them into the vacuum and what happens 
to them in the vacuum? 
LM: Proteins are not very happy in a vacuum, that is true. The proteins 
unfold, so they spread out. But for example, the aim with the virus 
would of course be to show that it is still reproductive afterwards 
and it is still this half-living thing that it was before. It ’s actually this 
transition between the gas phase and the in vivo environment that 
interests us so much. We try to attach water molecules to the protein 
in a controlled manner after we evaporate it, to see how that changes 
its behavior in the interferometer, its absorption of light and so on. 
To give you an example that is not a protein but that will make it clear 
why this is interesting, consider retinal, the molecule in your eye that 
triggers the visual process when it absorbs a photon. You know that 
you have different cells for blue light, for green light, and for red light. 
But the interesting thing is that it ’s always the same retinal in these 
cells. The shift in the absorption line is only caused by the protein 
that it has bonded to. It would be really interesting for biologists and 
chemists to know where retinal absorbs when it is alone, when it is in 
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the gas phase, and nobody knows because you cannot resolve it with 
classic methods—only the sensitivity of our interference patterns will 
allow us to measure that.
Kristel Michielsen: Maybe I missed it, but how many molecules do you have 
in your interferometer?
LM: Our detection efficiency is lousy. We detect one in ten thousand to one 
in a million of the molecules arriving at the detector. When you run the 
interferometer, when you run a scan, you have something like 300, or 
okay, let’s say you have something between 100 counts to 1,000 counts 
per second, but you can multiply this by a reasonably large number to 
get the actual number of molecules we have flying in there. The time of 
flight through the interferometer is a few milliseconds.
KM: So you have a bunch of molecules that goes at the same time? 
LM: Yes, but they are distinguishable, they are not in the same state. So that 
at least in the quantum mechanical description you cannot make them 
interfere with one another. 
Arianna Borelli: Of this question of the interference, because it was not 
very clear to me, what you meant that they cannot interfere if they are 
not in the same state, maybe you can make that clear, but now another 
question came to me. You speak always of waves, as far as I can tell, 
and never of fields. Of course if you would think of fields you would 
think there’s this molecule field with different waves on it and then of 
course they might interfere with each other, waves in the same field—
and now, moving into the mathematical world: if I think of these waves 
and waves in a field then they can all interfere. If you had to talk about 
fields, now speaking again in the mathematical world, would you say 
each of these waves is a different field or does that not make sense? As 
I said this is a former problem, but it ’s interesting for me to understand 
what you mean by interference and waves. 
LM: The question of the field is very difficult for me because I have never 
seen a quantum field theory description for such huge molecules. I 
also have to admit that for this question I’m a little bit too much on the 
experimental side. As far as I see in the theory, I don’t find an approach 
for a field theoretical model for what we do—just because the particles 
are too complicated. And yes, for the description of the center of mass 
motion you have a wave function. 
60 Interferences and Events
AB: So you have a wave and, maybe I can put it in a more concrete way, 
these waves are waves in space and each particle has its own space? Its 
own space variables? Okay?
LM: Yes. 
MW: May I quote Markus Arndt, the head of the group? When we talked to 
him he said there is actually no applicable theory for this situation and 
that we tried to measure what could not yet be calculated. Which is a 
very interesting point of view. Just a quote. 
Anne Dippel: Hans, Kristel, what Lukas shows here right now, that’s 
something you could model, but then this is not a simulation. You can’t 
calculate it without a field theory.
LM: Yes, that’s great. Isn’t the simulation something you always can 
calculate? 
MW: Maybe an analog simulation. I have just another question: You showed 
simulations but you didn’t name them. So the graphics you used, as far 
as I know, are from the Duisburg group simulating the near fields. It ’s 
very peculiar for me. I know that your very highly esteemed colleagues 
in Duisburg are doing this, but why is this always something mute and 
invisible in your work? Why are there computer simulations that are 
of extreme importance for the Talbot carpet, which come, as far as 
I remember from the papers I’ve read, from the simulations they do 
in Duisburg. Could you describe the relationship between the exper-
imental work and the computer simulations that were done before-
hand, which you never talk about? 
LM: Actually that’s a thing I really forgot, because at one point I thought, 
‘Oh nice—I’ll put in this picture and then I’ll tell you that’s the result of 
a computer simulation.’ Especially this Talbot carpet; it ’s a numerical 
simulation of one of my colleagues. But we have a very strong collab-
oration with the group in Duisburg that has been doing the theory for 
many years. One member of our group, who developed the theory 
for all of our interferometers, joined the Duisburg group after doing 
his PhD with us. So there are very strong links to them. For me…why 
I don’t talk about that work has two reasons. The first is that I don’t 
understand it completely and it’s their work. It ’s hard for me to present 
it. The other thing is: for me, there is very much the question that I 
asked in the beginning. What is a simulation? Because what they are 
doing is of course, that they develop models. They do that together 
with us, and model what is going on in the interferometer. Then they 
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write the model as MATLAB code for it and then they basically do a fit 
on our results for free parameters and they get a lot of information 
about our interferometer. Is this a simulation where you simulate what 
would happen in an experiment? No—it’s a fit on existing data based 
on a model, and I don’t know if this is a simulation—I just don’t know it. 
It might well be that you call this a simulation; for me it is more a recon-
struction of data. 
Sonia Fizek: I actually wanted to ask you why can’t you just go digital? 
Why do you need to do it the way you do it, and now you’ve kind of 
answered that. Maybe the simulation, you could call it a simulation the 
minute you can change variables. So let’s say you have this problem 
with the length of the arm in a simulation: in a digital world you could 
just remove that variable and it is no longer there. So you kind of falsify 
things and maybe that’s when you can talk about simulating stuff that 
is not 100% a reflection of reality in your lab. Maybe they do it?
LM: I agree, if you start to think ahead about what is going to happen if you 
do this and this, that for me would be a simulation. Exactly. 
Hans de Raedt: In this picture you showed a grating that looked perfect, but 
I assume in your experiment it ’s quite different? 
LM: Since the grating has been in there for something like eight or nine 
years, I’m afraid it really is far from perfect nowadays. 
HDR: Let’s say you get it from—I don’t know who makes it…
LM: Nobody makes it anymore, that’s the problem. 
HDR: Let me rephrase it: when you first got it, what were the specifications 
of these—are these openings the same?
LM: The period of the material grating is 266 nanometers, the opening 
fraction is 40%, and all the openings are supposed to be the same; 
after eight years that might not be true anymore. But this material 
grating is not the diffraction grating that produces your interference 
pattern. So if we talk about the actual diffraction grating, we need to 
talk about the laser. This laser we can specify very, very well. We can 
measure its wavelength with femtometer precision and keep it stable 
to a few picometers. We can measure its power very accurately and 
we can look at the profile of the beam when it enters and when it 
leaves the chamber. This is all necessary because this is an incredibly 
important screw for us to tweak. 
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HDR: I understand that. So the grating that you call G1 and G3 is of course 
essential for what you get out—what goes in the interferometer and 
also what you detect. Not for the pattern but for the… 
LM: It is important for creating good coherence, and if you don’t create 
good coherence you don’t see interference anymore. It is also actually 
critical that all slits should look more or less the same.
KM: In your picture you mentioned that one molecule is self-interfering? 
LM: Yes, that’s what we would claim.
KM: So if one molecule arises and if you are lucky because of the detection 
efficiency you see the spot, very localized. So now the next one comes. 
How is your picture at the end. Do you find stripes in an interference 
pattern? 
LM: I would claim that interference is not something that you can ascribe to 
a single particle or a single wave. For me interference is an ensemble 
phenomenon. You cannot, you will never resolve the interference 
pattern of a single interfering entity. As you said, you need a lot of 
them to see the pattern and I don’t have a problem with this. 
KM: In your picture you have self-interference but you need many, so how 
do you provide this? 
LM: Well, you need many entities that have been interfering with 
themselves. You describe an ensemble of entities that have been 
interfering with themselves—with themselves because they cannot 
interfere with the others. The concept of this self-interference is that 
the center of mass wave function gets split by at least two slits of your 
grating or nodes of your standing light wave. That it is… 
KM: In a way that’s a wave description of the ensemble. Not of one. How do 
you do this with one? 
LM: Well how do you distinguish between the ensemble description and 
the description of one entity? You cannot get the ensemble if you don’t 
have many “ones” and you cannot have any description of “the one” if 
you don’t measure the ensemble. For me it’s not possible to get one 
without the other. If you give a description of the ensemble, you give a 
description of all the entities in the ensemble but you do not describe 
the properties of the individual entities. You will never see these wave 
properties if you only look at the individual entity or event.
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Simulating Patterns, 
Measuring Fringes: 
Simulating Matter  
with Matter
Mira Maiwöger
I’m working in the group of Jörg Schmiedmayer at the Atominstitut of the 
Technical University in Vienna. Like Lukas Mairhofer I am experimenting 
with matter waves in a lab. In this talk I focus on the aspect of simulation 
and show you some experiments where we simulate interference patterns 
in order to explain what’s going on in our experiment or to reproduce the 
experimental observations. In my lab we work with ultra-cold atoms. We’re 
basically doing the opposite of what Lukas does: we’re cooling atoms down 
to almost zero temperature, where strange things happen.
At high temperatures, individual atoms will behave like billiard balls. The 
lower the temperature gets the lower the velocity of the atom becomes. 
At the same time the wavelength of the matter waves associated with 
the atoms increases up to a certain critical point where the interparticle 
spacing is the same as their de Broglie wavelength and the matter waves 
start to overlap, until at zero temperature all these atoms form a giant 
matter wave that can be described by a single wave function. This is 
called a Bose–Einstein condensate (BEC). So in my lab we’re working with 
rubidium atoms and we are developing new tools to manipulate them, to 
create BECs, and to perform different experiments with them. 
In many other groups ultra-cold atoms, especially in optical lattices, are 
used as analog quantum simulators, and I thought I should mention that 
in this symposium. Ultra-cold atoms in such lattices are used as model 
systems, as analog model systems. The idea is that they behave like certain 
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other systems, for example as if they were a superfluid or a magnetic 
material. So that behavior is simulated instead of calculating what a mag-
netic material would do. These cold atoms are observed in order to get the 
answer to a very different problem. This was first proposed by Feynman in 
1982, when he said let the computer itself be built of quantum mechanical 
elements that obey quantum mechanical laws. Once you’re having those 
giant matter waves, those ultra-cold atoms that you can manipulate really 
precisely and that you can read out really precisely, you basically have an 
intrinsically quantum mechanical system that you can interrogate instead 
of the solid state that you want to know some answers about.
[Fig. 1] (Courtesy of the author). 
However, in our lab we are doing something different with BECs. Fig. 1 
shows our experiment. It basically looks like any other cold atom exper-
iment. We have a single vacuum chamber where we prepare the BEC and 
do all the stuff we want to do with it, and then perform measurements just 
by taking photographs of these atomic clouds. On one side, hidden behind 
the shield, is all the optics we need to manipulate and prepare the atoms 
in the right state in order to be magnetically trapped. In contrast to the 
type of traps that only work with laser light, we trap our atoms in magnetic 
fields, and these fields are produced by wires on an atom chip. One of the 
main advantages of this atom chip is that it ’s a really stable and versatile 
device to prepare, control, and manipulate our BECs. 
In our group there is more than one BEC experiment, but I will focus on my 
experiment. There are many things that we do with this setup and the one 
I’m going to talk about today is the so-called optimal control of the motional 
state of a quantum system. Here we are using optimal control theories, so 
we’re calculating what we should do with this cloud of ultra-cold atoms in 
Simulating Patterns, Measuring Fringes 67
order for it to behave in a certain way, and I will tell you how this works in a 
minute. 
Another thing that we’ve been studying recently is a phenomenon called 
population inversion, which we can simulate with our atoms. That mech-
anism is required for optical lasers. In our system the wave function is 
initially sitting in the ground state of the magnetic potential, but we can 
manage to get all the atoms—or at least a huge fraction of atoms—up to 
the first excited state of this potential. In this case collisions between the 
atoms will occur that produce correlated pairs of atoms with opposite 
momentum. This is in some way analogous to down-conversion in a non-
linear optical medium. 
In this sense we can also analogously simulate the effects that take place in 
a very different medium with our cold atoms systems. We usually work with 
quasi one-dimensional BECs. 
In my experiment I generate cigar-shaped BECs. Cigar-shaped means they 
are 100 times longer than they are wide. Therefore in many situations 
we can describe the behavior that we’re seeing with one-dimensional 
theories, which makes it easier for theoretical physicists to explain what is 
going on. It also adds some other phenomena that you don’t see in three-
dimensional physics. It ’s really about playing around with a system that is 
artificially abstractified in some sense. With the complexity of this exper-
imental apparatus we actually eliminate a lot of the effects that could mess 
up the nice theory we have for it. So we have a tool to probe rather simple 
models. Furthermore, we recently learned how to split one BEC, one of 
those cigar-shaped condensates, in a double-well potential. Then we can 
also do interferometry with it. In 2013, a Mach-Zehnder interferometer was 
implemented with such BECs. We have a lot of little projects around the 
development of new tools; it is basically a playground with toys for ultra-
cold atoms. Now I want to get back to this optimal control story, which has 
mainly been done by my colleague Sandrine van Frank during her PhD, and 
about which she taught me a lot last year. 
What we want to do is to move a fraction of the atoms really precisely out 
of the ground state into which we are cooling down the atoms, where we 
are condensing them. So in our initial state all the atoms are in the ground 
state of the harmonic potential, and we want to transfer a portion of the 
atoms to this first excited state with a high fidelity. This could be 10% of the 
atoms, this could be 50%, this could be 90%. We came up with a scheme for 
that, together with theoreticians who modeled and who simulated how to 
do this. We achieve this by displacing the condensate transversely, that is 
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along the tightly confined axis. This is achieved by really special pulses and 
those pulses were optimized by our colleagues in Ulm. You need to do a 
model of your system, the simplest way to describe the BEC; in this case it 
is a formula we call the nonlinear Gross–Pitaevskii equation. It is a variant 
of the Schrödinger equation in the mean-field description.
This approach treats the entire wave packet consisting of many atoms 
as a single wave. Atomic interactions are ignored; they only appear in a 
density term. We also ignore the longitudinal axis of our elongated BEC, 
which is also the axis where finite temperatures play a role—so we consider 
our condensate to have zero temperature. Then we need some handle to 
manipulate our system, which in our project is the transverse displacement 
of the BEC. This allows us to transfer a portion of the atoms from the 
ground state into the excited state. What the theoreticians do is that they 
minimize some sort of cost function, which in this case is the fidelity or the 
infidelity. So you want to minimize the error you make when transferring 
a fraction of the atoms to this first excited state. You want to be as precise 
as possible. The theoreticians have developed an algorithm that takes the 
technical limitations of our experiment into account. We went to our col-
laborators and said we can do up to 20 kilohertz. That’s what the device 
can do, we cannot do more. We cannot shake it any faster. They came up 
with the sort of pulses that are very close to the quantum speed limit, the 
fastest you could do according to quantum theory.
I will tell you in a second how they work and what you can learn from that. 
Let me come back to the experimental tools. As I mentioned before we 
use an atom chip. We have to slow down the atoms a lot, to velocities that 
would correspond to a temperature of a thousandth part of a degree above 
absolute zero. Only then can we actually trap them in those magnetic fields 
produced by the chip, but in principle you use a really small, really thin 
trapping wire. When we run a current through this wire, it produces a mag-
netic field that, together with an additional external magnetic field, creates 
the harmonic potential where atoms are trapped and finally condense into 
the ground state. I think I never mentioned that we use rubidium 87, so 
one of the most well-behaved species that there is for doing BECs. That’s 
a common quote of my professor Jörg Schmiedmayer: he always says 
rubidium is so well behaved, it ’s easy. So these well-behaved atoms we trap 
usually in those cigar-shaped potentials as I told you before, so that they 
are one-dimensional, or quasi one-dimensional. 
Another tool we have, which I think our group was the first to apply, is 
using those radio frequency wires, where we send oscillating currents 
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through, which allows us to deform a trap. If we turn on those RF wires 
and we send a current through them, we can dress the trap and deform it 
until double-well potentials evolve. The final shape depends on the power 
we are sending through the RF wires. This is basically our tool to create 
quite arbitrary trap shapes. In the optimal control case I want to have an 
anharmonic trap because I want to have the first-level spacing different 
from the second-level spacing so that I’m really able to target only this first 
excited state and not excite my atoms up to all the other states.
Another important tool in our experiment is the device to look at our 
atoms. We have an imaging system where we release the atoms from the 
trap, and then they fall through a thin sheet of focused laser light after 46 
milliseconds’ of free flight. We then collect the fluorescent photons emitted 
by the atoms on a camera. This means that we only see images that are 
integrated over the direction of gravity. So of course we can never image 
the entire cloud. We can image it in several shots, like resolving layer after 
layer, but every time we would need to make a new BEC. We just wait for 
a certain time and then switch our trapping fields off. The atoms will fall 
down and fall through the light sheet and we collect single images.
Then we integrate over this direction and just stack the images together, 
and then you actually see the pulse shaking the atoms as well, so it ’s not 
only after transferring the atoms to this first excited state but even during 
this transfer that we take images. 
For the analysis, in order to know whether our shaking and bringing the 
atoms into a target state has worked, we apply a fitting procedure. Here 
we use again this Gross–Pitaevskii equation, idealized for zero temper-
ature and the one-dimensional situation where we only take the trans-
verse direction into account and ignore everything that happens along the 
extended axis. It turns out that in order for the equation to fit the result 
reasonably well we need to take at least three states into account, so more 
than we actually want to address in the experiment. We need to take at 
least the ground state, the first excited state, and the second excited state 
into account. We then compare the simulations on the basis of the Gross–
Pitaevskii and compare this to our measurements.
So we’ve created a very artificial scenario that actually works quite well for 
a certain amount of time. Afterwards it gets fuzzy and starts to decay. But 
we can control our well-behaved atoms reasonably well with this technique. 
So as I mentioned before, a simulation is about taming the future, which 
was the part I was talking about before. But simulation is also about 
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explaining the past. Of course we wanted to know why the theory does not 
fit the results after a certain point. What are the reasons that after, I don’t 
know, 10 milliseconds our model that we’re using to fit our data is deviating 
so much from the data, where the agreement with the theory breaks down 
somewhere? In the meantime we started to look into different models or 
different ways of simulating our situation. We now use a Gross–Pitaevskii 
equation again, but we change it a bit. With the usual Gross–Pitaevskii 
equation for zero temperature this behavior would continue much, much 
longer: it would not decay after 20 milliseconds. Here we are trying to 
simulate the system for finite temperatures and we actually see that we can 
get there. So it’s probably enough, at least for the first 20 milliseconds, just 
to add temperature to our model and we learn that this is the critical point 
that was missing before. So that is how I experience the interplay between 
theory and experiment. 
Discussion with Mira Maiwöger
Anne Dippel: Thank you Mira for showing the opposite side of complex 
quantum systems, showing quantum behavior, and maybe there 
are some questions from the audience concerning that experiment? 
It’s going in the opposite direction, it ’s another setup. Still, we have 
quantum mechanics proved.
Hans De Raedt: I have kind of a more general question. If I look at the 
sophistication of your experiment; it ’s really impressive by itself. To 
see what appears to be some quantum effect and then compare this 
to what people did in the 1800s looking at the spectra of simple atoms, 
which was of course the source for developing quantum theory. There 
is something strange. Originally to see quantum effects you had to do 
nothing: just look and it’s really true. In the meantime in order to see 
something that even closely resembles a little bit quantum behavior 
you have to have extremely expensive equipment, very sophisticated 
things, tools—a lot of people working on it.
Mira Maiwöger: To be honest to me this is part of the fun, that my object 
of study is some piece of reality that to me feels so highly artificial. I 
mean it was predicted in 1925 and it took 70 years to produce it in a lab 
for the first time. I really enjoy that I’m actually studying this artificial 
thing that to some degree can be useful as well when trying to simulate 
other systems.
HDR: Yes, sure, I can definitely appreciate the fun, I see that too. My ques-
tion goes a little bit further. The fact that you have to work so hard to 
see it also means something. It ’s not just fun.
MM: Of course it means something—we can create a very specific 
phenomenon that consists of 10,000 to 100,000 atoms. These atoms 
are a fact that lasts a few, 10, milliseconds—which is a rather long time 
scale for a fact describable by a single wave function.
HDR: Under the right conditions.
MM: Under the right conditions, yes.
HDR: So the only thing you’re doing actually is…
MM: Creating the right conditions. Yes, yes.
HDR: But if quantum theory or quantum mechanics is supposed to be all 
around, it should not be necessary to wait for the correct conditions 
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to be realized to see it. In the case of atoms, there’s no doubt about it. 
That’s clear. You don’t have to produce spectral conditions, you’d see 
them right away. That there are lines are in the spectra and so on. But 
the more sophisticated we get, the more complicated the conditions 
are.
MM: Yes, what is reality?
Wolfgang Hagen: What is reality and what is the phenomenon and what is 
the difference in your experiment?
MM: I cannot separate. In my experiment I would say I cannot separate my 
phenomenon Bose–Einstein condensate (BEC) or this entity BEC from 
this huge apparatus.
WH: Does that mean that there is no difference between reality and 
phenomenon?
MM: No, because I make a cut between apparatus and object in describing 
it. By the way physicists deal with this phenomenon BEC we make this 
cut. We choose to decide that this tiny, tiny cloud of atoms out of this 
huge apparatus here is the object. We decide to describe only those 
10,000 or 1,000 atoms that are prepared in such a way that they’re con-
sistently described by this theory. This is a cut I’m making. Of course I 
cannot separate my BEC from this huge apparatus that produces it. But 
in our way of thinking about it we can. Or we choose to do so. Or play 
with it and try to extend it and so on.
Arianna Borrelli: Thanks, yes, I’m working on the same issue. But more on 
the theoretical side. Because you speak of Bose–Einstein condensation, 
BEC, and then you referred of course to Einstein’s paper, and of course 
in the Einstein paper the theory is half formal. What exactly he was 
writing there, it ’s a bit what we interpret from it. My question would 
be, your phenomenon—is it Bose–Einstein condensation and if so how 
is it primarily defined? Is it that equation for example? Of course the 
term Bose–Einstein condensation is something that you could apply 
to many, many other phenomena, to photons and so on. Is there for 
example some bridge through some theory or experiment between all 
those phenomena and your condensate? I’m trying to clarify how uni-
versal the idea of Bose-Einstein condensate is, because you talk about 
it as though it were universal and refer back to the Einstein paper, and 
of course I understand there is a problem with the experiment, but at 
the theoretical level is there universality?
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MM: It really depends on the dimensionality of the condensate. I mentioned 
before that we were working with one-dimensional or quasi one-
dimensional BECs, and if you treat the phenomenon of Bose–Ein-
stein condensation theoretically in a stringent way then there is 
condensation only in three dimensions or in two dimensions. So in 
one dimension we always only can say condensed in a sense that we 
can claim that all the atoms are sitting in the ground state only in the 
transverse direction. Along the long axis of the BEC there are always 
phase fluctuations going on. Having a single wave function describing 
the condensate with a single phase does not work for the 1D case. 
We can, however, develop theories that can model how many phases 
we would need to describe the whole condensate and so on. I don’t 
know—did this answer your question? No, it ’s not universal. Depending 
on the number of dimensions you have different scenarios, but you 
can describe them reasonably well to some degree until you get to a 
problem that you cannot describe anymore.
Lukas Mairhofer: I just wanted to come back to the discussion before. When 
I listen to Mira, I sometimes tell her you’re not doing, you’re not… well 
it ’s hard to say in English. You’re looking at art, not at nature. You’re 
looking at a piece of art. But in that way we can separate the artifacts, 
the drawing or whatever from the tools with which we made it. In 
that way I think we can make the cut, or we are allowed to make a cut, 
between Van Gogh’s drawings and the palette that he used to make 
them.
AD: There is no difference between art and nature.
MM: Donna Haraway’s slogan, “querying what counts as nature,” is my cat-
egorical imperative.
AD: Not exactly, creating our own reality and the reflections about it that 
we discussed. This was the reason why I invited you and I’m very happy 
that this became very clear here, how artificial the experiment itself is.
MM: The nature of the experiment.
AD: The nature that is made within those experiments, compared to 200 
years ago. Are there more questions?
Frank Pasemann: A last remark, that nature can be very strange.
AD: Yes, nature can be very strange, absolutely. 
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Event-Based Simulations: 
Is there a Need for New 
Physical Theories?
Frank Pasemann
Following the discussions concerning the role of computer simulations 
in the development of natural sciences, and especially for the physical 
sciences, at some point I was confronted with the statement that, as a 
result of these simulations, “there is a need for new theories in physics.” 
For me as a theoretical physicist this was a quite provoking appraisal, 
which showed up, almost naturally, in the debate on the interpretation 
of quantum mechanical predications. Based on the papers on event-
based simulations (see Michielsen and De Raedt 2014) it was argued that 
for explaining quantum phenomena, like, for instance, the interference 
patterns in electron-scattering experiments, no quantum theoretical 
assumptions have to be made. The specific type of the described computer 
simulations will reproduce results of quantum theory showing that there 
exist macroscopic, mechanical models of classical physics that mimic the 
underlying physical phenomena. This is in contrast with statements like, for 
instance, that of Richard Feynman saying that the double-slit experiment 
“is impossible, absolutely impossible, to explain in any classical way, and 
which has in it the heart of quantum mechanics” (see Feynman 1989).
As a first reaction to this situation I had to reformulate the statement 
in terms of the question, which gave the title of my talk. Then I had to 
reassure myself about what I am willing to understand by a theory, by a 
physical theory, and, on the other hand, what kind of ingredients are nec-
essary for setting up significant computer simulations of physical systems. 
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So, what I would like to present here are some general remarks about 
what I think are basic properties of physical theories; to make sure that we 
are talking about the same thing when demanding something new. And 
because the topic of this workshop is the context of computer simulations, 
and especially the simulation of physical experiments, I would like to 
add some general comments on simulations used for research in natural 
sciences. So I will not go into the specific simulations, which were presented 
in the first talk, and it is only at the end of my talk that I will try to imbed 
their event-based simulations into the scheme I will introduce.
Let me start with a description of a physical theory. I will do that in terms of 
a few simple but strong statements. This view is influenced mainly by the 
situation at the end of what may be called “the Old Science,” characterized 
by the state of theoretical physics around the 1970s when it was still able 
to predict, besides the outcome of quantum mechanical experiments, also 
the outcome of those in the high-energy domain. But I think with respect to 
quantum phenomena this view of an established theory is still valid.
Although this is trivial, if one wants to set up a new physical theory, or a 
new type of a theory, it should be clear in which domain of phenomena 
it should be placed. So the first statement will be: Every physical theory 
describes a well-defined area of physical phenomena.
There are of course different ways to identify such domains. For example, 
one may refer to the length scale, which is quite natural, and talk about 
subatomic or atomic phenomena, about the domain of everyday physics 
that is described by classical physics, or about phenomena on the cosmic 
scale.
One can also refer to the forces that dominate the physical processes in 
a certain domain, and one may distinguish between the physics of strong 
forces, of weak forces, of electromagnetic forces, and of gravitational 
forces. The scattering phenomena under consideration here are primarily 
related to the single particle phenomena in the atomic domain, that is, we 
are in the arena of quantum (field) theory.
At this point one should perhaps mention the observation that there is a 
large gap in existing theories concerning the number of particles involved 
in processes. We have very nice theories about single particles or single 
objects, and we can often handle systems with two objects quite nicely. For 
the other extreme (i.e., systems composed of very many particles) stochas-
tic theories are very effective. Between these two extremes there is the 
interesting physics of “medium-sized” systems, which is difficult to describe 
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in detail. Even when dealing with just three objects the classical theories 
get into difficulties. We know that from the 1898 Poincaré paper (Gray 1997, 
27–39), where he identified in the classical three-body problem a behavior 
that today is identified as chaos. I mention this because I believe that what 
computer simulations can do in the future, and are partially already doing 
now, is filling up this knowledge gap where reasonable theories do not (yet) 
exist. I will come to this again later.
In addition there are many special physical theories, like solid-state physics, 
quantum optics, hadron physics, plasma physics, and others. The point is, 
that for all of these theories there are of course still open scientific ques-
tions, and there are always limits of applicability. But despite this situation, 
there is still no cry for new theories. What is often done successfully is 
to take a well-established theory and develop an extension into a larger 
domain of applicability.
My next statement refers to the structure of a physical theory (Ludwig 
2012): A (well-established) physical theory is a kind of functor from the 
set of physical phenomena to a set of mathematical objects.
Thus a theory corresponds to an unambiguous assignment of physical 
phenomena to certain mathematical objects, that is, it is a kind of map-
ping that preserves the relations between the corresponding objects. This 
functor is verified by physical experiments. Preferably it will be invertible, 
because one should be able to make verifiable (falsifiable) predictions from 
derived mathematical theorems.
Phenomena Represented by
A stone Point in phase space (six-dimensional Euclidean 
space for the space and momentum coordinates)
Moves on trajectory Solution of a set of differential equations
The stone as a system A vector field on phase space
Initial conditions Initial position and momentum (or velocity)
Parameters Mass, etc.
Boundary conditions Restriction for applicable forces, friction, etc. 
[Fig. 1] Phenomena and their Representations
To make clearer what this means let us look at a well-known example in 
classical mechanics. To describe what happens if we throw a stone in a 
certain direction what a physicist will do first is to abstract from the stone 
and reduce it to a description of a mass point (see Fig. 1). This mass point is 
then represented as (mapped to) a mathematical point (a zero-dimensional 
78 Interferences and Events
object) in the so-called state space or phase space of the system. The 
observable trajectory of that stone will then be described as a solution of a 
set of corresponding differential equations. 
The stone as a physical system (i.e., the stone together with all its pos-
sible trajectories resulting from all possible initial start points and initial 
velocities), is then described by a so-called vector field on state space. This 
will be a complete mathematical representation of all the motions this 
stone can realize. To obtain a specific trajectory, that is, a specific solution, 
one has to specify, besides the initial conditions, the relevant parameters 
of the system; for instance, the mass in this case. One also has to take 
relevant boundary conditions into account; for example, that the force 
one can apply is limited. Then one also has to specify those forces acting 
in addition to gravity on the system, such as friction. This is a satisfying 
classical characterization of a system like a stone. It is a heavily idealized 
mathematical description concerning measurable, physical quantities. It 
is not an attempt to describe the underlying real-world process that led to 
these measurements: this was stated by very many scientists, for instance 
by Feynman and Bohr.
If one accepts this definition of a physical theory then, of course, one 
must assert that quantum mechanics is a very well-established theory, 
and in fact it is—particularly as quantum field theory—the best verified 
physical theory we have so far. Why then should one ask for a new theory 
for this domain of atomic scale phenomena? There are at least two 
different arguments coming to my mind. One argument is based on the 
observation that quantum mechanics is a linear theory (linear in its state 
variables). Furthermore, following a more formal procedure to derive 
quantum mechanics from classical mechanics (Sniatycki 1980) one realizes 
that in principle one is able to quantize exactly only dynamically “trivial” 
systems like the harmonic oscillator (corresponding to a frictionless ideal 
pendulum). But the more interesting classical problems are of nonlinear 
and dissipative type, as I will discuss later. And one might question if there 
should be a more general “nonlinear quantum theory.”
Another string of arguments stems from the observation that somehow 
one runs into difficulties if one wants to extend the application of quantum 
mechanical principles, which work so convincingly on the atomic and 
nuclear levels, into other domains like that of strong forces or gravitation. 
From a theoretician’s point of view one would prefer to have a “theory of 
everything,” based on universal principles and unifying the description of 
all fundamental forces and their phenomena.
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One may augment these statements about physical theories by saying 
that these theories—as idealizations clearly formulated in mathematical 
terms—are as good as the perturbation theories belonging to them. This is 
of course due to the fact that the real-world processes are always “noisy” 
and have to be tamed by experimentalists in laboratory settings.
A third simple statement I want to make is the following: Every physical 
theory is only as good as its underlying abstractions.
I think this is an essential aspect and I want to mention it here because 
it tells you that we should be very open when we are looking for new 
theories, and especially for those in the context discussed in this workshop. 
This is because we make some fundamental assumptions about observed 
phenomena like interference. Do we have to deal with particles or waves? 
Or do we need new concepts for whatever it is between the source and the 
detector of an experiment? And perhaps one should remember that all the 
abstractions we are using in non-classical physics are still coming from the 
macroscopic world. So they are deduced from what our sensors receive 
from phenomena in the macroscopic world. From that it seems clear 
that abstractions so derived may not be optimal for processes acting in a 
different domain of phenomena.
To be a little bit clearer about what I mean by that, let me give a few 
examples.
As we have seen, objects like stones, cannon balls, bird feathers and things 
like that are in classical theories represented by mass points; that is, they 
are abstracted from all their properties like form, color, smell, roughness of 
the surface, and other properties that are thought to be irrelevant for the 
description of their movement in space.
Another essential concept is that of a free particle, meaning that there is 
no force acting on it. If one defines it, following in a way Aristotle in his 
Physics,1 as an object that comes to rest at a finite time—which is what we 
will always observe—then the concept of a force like friction will not be 
developed. On the other hand, if, as with Newton (1999), a free particle is an 
object moving in a straight line with constant velocity then—by observing 
the orbit of the moon around Earth—one has to introduce a force, giving 
birth to the gravitational force. By the way: force is the most mystical con-
cept in physics.
1 Compare for instance Rovelli, Carlo. 2015. “Aristotle’s Physics: A Physicist ’s Look.” 
Journal of the American Philosophical Association, 1(1): 23–40.
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Another powerful abstraction is that of a vacuum. If one states—following 
Galileo (1953)—that every object near the earth falls with a constant accel-
eration, this again is not what one observes in reality: if you throw a marble 
or bird feather from the tower of Pisa, you will observe that they fall to 
earth differently. 
Formulating a rule like Galileo did is making a very strong abstraction, 
which makes a comprehension of the observed processes only then acces-
sible; in fact there is no physical vacuum in the real world.
Deriving such powerful abstractions from observed processes has always 
been—and always will be—the cornerstone for the development of new 
physical theories. Is it possible to derive such abstractions from computer 
simulations of physical systems?
Another problem that might be of relevance in the context of this workshop 
is declaring what a fundamental physical object is. For example: What is an 
elementary particle like the electron for which we observe the described 
scattering phenomena, and how can we simulate it?
There was (and still is) a long debate going on about how to answer this 
question, and if it is really necessary to assume elementary objects into 
which the world can be dissected and from which it can be synthesized 
again. As far as I know, already Heisenberg’s paper of 1955 claimed that 
there are no real physical criteria to discern between an elementary object 
and a compound system (Heisenberg 1957, 269), i.e., a system that is built 
of many convenient parts. This difficulty when dealing with a concept of 
fundamental or elementary objects is due to the situation in elementary 
particle physics (i.e., strong forces physics), during the 1950s and beginning 
of the 1960s, where one identified around 130 elementary particles 
according to the then actual definitions. Of course everyone then asked 
the question: What is elementary about 130 particles? Naturally, there then 
were some quite different approaches that tried to rethink what should 
be postulated as being elementary, or which tried to abandon the concept 
of something being fundamental at all. One may mention the S-matrix 
theory and bootstrapping (Chew 1966) or von Weizsäcker’s Ur-Theory (von 
Weizsäcker 1985), among many others. Those were very inspiring days for 
theoretical physicists, which came to a sudden end with the postulation of 
quarks as fundamental objects. And this end of the “particle zoo” dem-
onstrates the power of a theory, because the demanded existence of 
(initially three) quarks (Gell-Mann 1964, 214–215) comes from pure math-
ematical beauty, namely symmetry, and there is no other reason. Strangely 
enough, the theory claims that quarks are unobservable as free particles.
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Based on the underlying group theoretical methods one was able to set up 
a theory not only for hadron physics, but also for the domain of electro-
magnetism and weak forces; a theory called the “standard model” today. 
This left us with the challenge of building up a unified theory of all forces 
(i.e., including gravitation)—a challenge that was not met until today.
Anyway, as was stated somewhere: “Without a guiding theory scientific 
explorations resemble endless forays in unknown territories. On the other 
hand, a theory allows us to identify fundamental characteristics, and 
avoid stumbling over fascinating idiosyncrasies and incidental features. It 
provides landmarks to orient ourselves in unknown grounds.”
But enough about physical theories! What to say about computer simu-
lations of physical phenomena and their relation to physical theories? I 
think it is remarkable to observe that at the same time that there was great 
confusion about what the fundamental physical objects should be, there 
was a growing awareness that the most interesting phenomena in the 
physical world result from nonlinear effects; that is, nonlinear systems are 
ubiquitous—and as the mathematician Stanislaw Ulam observed, to speak 
of “nonlinear science” is like “referring to the bulk of zoology as the study of 
non-elephant animals” (Campbell 1985, 374).
There was an upcoming feeling that new types of theories were needed to 
describe the diversity of these nonlinear phenomena. One may refer for 
instance to the work of Prigogine (Nicolis and Prigogine 1977) and Haken 
(1984). And new insights were driven in an accelerating sequence by the 
growing available computer power. There was the Lorenz equation (Lorenz 
1963, 130–141), giving the first nonlinear model for weather dynamics. It was 
the first example of chaotic dynamics inherited by so many simple math-
ematical equations, as was shown in the famous book of Mandelbrot (1983). 
There was also a formulation of global nonlinear dynamics by Hirsch and 
Smale (1974), applied to physics (Abraham and Marsden 1978), which was 
progressively noticed in the 1960s and 1970s. Finally it became clear that 
a desirable nonlinear theory has to describe the behavior of something 
like “complex adaptive systems” (Gell-Mann 1994, 17–45), a concept that 
is still under development. This can be marked by the foundation of the 
Santa Fe Institute in 1984. Now, concepts like nonlinearity, chaos, fractals, 
emergence, and complexity gathered more and more attention, and at the 
same time physics as a leading science was superseded by biology.
Already in 1953 it was (probably) Fermi who invented something like the 
concept of numerical experiments by proposing that instead of simply 
performing the standard calculation doing pencil and paper work, one 
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could use a computer to test also physical hypotheses (Weissert 1997). At 
that time the Fermi–Pasta–Ulam group tried to understand the behavior 
of atoms in a crystal. To do simple things first, they reduced the problem 
to a one-dimensional problem considering a chain of mass points coupled 
by springs that obey Hooke’s law; that is, they introduced a linear inter-
action. This linear problem is then something one can handle with classical 
theories. Needing a chain of masses of infinite length one will end up natu-
rally with statistical physics. In this situation it was asked, what happens if 
one puts into these linear equations a very small nonlinear term. The well-
known answer from statistical physics was: the energy of the system will 
finally be equally distributed over all the possible modes of the mass chain.
So, a simulation of the system with the equations augmented by a nonlin-
ear term was run, and what was observed was very surprising: the energy 
does not drift towards the equipartition predicted by statistical physics, but 
periodically returns to the original mode. This was very difficult to under-
stand and it was not predicted by any theory. In fact, this result led to a new 
field in physics centered on soliton theory.
What I think should be mentioned here is something quite characteristic for 
simulations of nonlinear systems: almost unexpectedly there do appear to 
be phenomena adhering to the simulated system that are unexpected and 
unexplainable, and they become manifest only by chance. In the Fermi–
Pasta–Ulam case “the quasi-periodic behavior wasn’t observed at first, 
because the computer was too slow to allow a simulation to run for long 
enough. But one day the computer wasn’t stopped as intended, and the 
calculation was left running. The researchers found to their great surprise 
that nearly all of the energy returned to the initial mode, and the original 
state was almost perfectly recovered” (Dauxois 2008, 55–57).
The situation at that time was nicely described by Norman Zabusky, who 
said, “Now with the advent of large computers, sophisticated graph-
ical algorithms and interactive terminals, we can undertake large-scale 
numerical simulations of systems and probe those regions of parameter 
space that are not easily accessible to the theorist/analyst or experimen-
talist” (cited by Weissert 1997). The Fermi–Pasta–Ulam simulations showed 
for the first time that computer simulations as a scientific tool can lead to 
phenomena inherited by physical systems, which are neither predicted by, 
nor expected from, the theories then at hand.
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Nowadays computer simulations find widespread application in many 
different domains. For instance, they are used for predicting the behavior 
of physical systems, for proving the existence of hypothesized effects, for 
testing alternative approaches to a problem, or to explore the behavior of 
a model in new or larger parameter domains. And sometimes computer 
simulations also reveal unexpected phenomena, hidden in well-established 
theories. The best example is perhaps the visualization of chaotic behavior 
in a simple quadratic map, like the logistic map f(x)= r x (1-x) (Feigenbaum 
1978), where r is the parameter determining the general behavior. This first 
and well-known example already points to the decisive role of the chosen 
visualization of computer simulation results.
For more clarification, let me finally unfold what I mean by a computer sim-
ulation: A computer simulation realizes the behavior of a model system 
under certain boundary conditions for a given set of parameters.
I want to point out that to have a convincing simulation you have to 
make sure that all three ingredients—the model, its parameters and the 
boundary conditions—are well defined. Thus, computer simulations in 
general follow a standard setup: first, there is a model (or a set of models) 
of the physical system under study. The model is given by a set of math-
ematical equations, usually based on an appropriate physical theory. In 
general this set of equations will have a finite set of parameters for which 
the behavior of the system should be studied. The specification of the 
parameter domain is essential for conditioning the applicability of the 
results derived from the simulation. In addition, appropriate boundary 
conditions determining the “environment” and the initial conditions for 
starting a process have to be fixed.
It should be clear that every model picks up only certain aspects of a phe-
nomenon and neglects others that are considered marginal with respect to 
the particular investigation. But the quality of the utilized models depends 
essentially on an appropriate mathematical formulation, eventually added 
by interesting terms, like in the Fermi–Pasta–Ulam case, or just by some 
interesting mathematically motivated equations. Models are of course 
always reasonable reductions, abstractions, approximations or analogs of 
the real physical systems they mimic. In addition, one often has to deal with 
a large set of parameters for which the behavior has to be tested, and that 
is what larger computer power is usually needed for.
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For many interesting problems of today it is a quite difficult task to set up 
reliable models and to identify crucial parameter domains, because the 
intrinsic complexity of the investigated systems and their environments 
is still increasing due to the involved stochastic properties and nonline-
arities. Furthermore, these systems are often composed of many sub-
systems, so questions like that of system-level organization, development, 
interdependence, and interactions of subsystems have to be considered 
carefully, as well as the interaction of the compound system with its 
often challenging environment. And the parameter sets then have to be 
thoughtfully adjusted to the posed problem. One therefore often has to 
go through a cyclic procedure: modeling, simulating, analyzing the results, 
adaptation of model and parameters, simulating again, and so on.
One way to categorize the many variants of practicing computer simula-
tions is to follow John Holland (2012) by discerning data-driven models, 
existence-proof models, and exploratory models. These are outlined 
below.
The data-driven models are the common ones used to establish good 
predictions or a better understanding of processes of interest like climate, 
weather, traffic, car crashes, bomb explosions, and so on. For these simu-
lations one usually has a given set of mathematical equations, which are 
derived from an established theory, and a well-defined set of parameters. A 
comparison of the simulation’s results with observed data should then lead 
to a more precise simulation by adjusting relevant terms in the mathemat-
ical equations and tuning the respective parameters. These data-driven 
simulations mostly give answers of the causal if/then type: if the following 
initial conditions are satisfied then one will observe the following behavior.
Existence-proof models are used to prove the hypothetical existence of 
phenomena in certain not yet observed or explored parameter domains 
and initial conditions. A typical example for this category of computer 
simulations is von Neumann’s hypothesis (von Neumann and Burks 1966, 
3–14) that self-reproducing machines do exist. The positive answer to this 
question we nowadays enjoy as the game of life. Another of the many 
examples, which was also reported by newspapers, was that the existence 
of monster waves—which have long been around as a vivid fantasy of 
sailors—has now been proved by computer simulations. Physicists showed 
that a combination of linear and nonlinear terms in corresponding wave 
equations could lead to the spontaneous appearance of monster waves, 
which are not announced in advance by the slow buildup of a superposition 
of normal waves (Adcock, Taylor, and Draper 2015).
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The goal of exploratory models is oriented towards answering questions 
concerning processes that correspond to rather abstract models of sys-
tems or to problems for which a theory or a reasonable mathematization 
is not (yet) available. They are often purely based on computer programs 
representing for instance something like Gedanken experiments. Often they 
are driven by the goal of realizing a certain fictional system or optimizing a 
desired procedure, but neither a mathematical method nor a reasonable 
theory is known for doing so. Exploratory computer-based models have 
much in common with the traditional thought experiments of physics. One 
selects some interesting mechanisms and then explores the consequences 
that occur when these mechanisms interact in some carefully contrived set-
ting. These experimental settings are often not achievable in a laboratory; 
hence, the “laboratory” resides in the head.
To give again an example reported in the newspapers: artificial diamonds 
were realized in a microwave reactor. To achieve this result a group of 
scientists at the Diamond Foundry (diamondfoundry.com) company 
first simulated tens of thousands of different mixtures of ingredients in 
different reactor shapes to finally obtain in reality an extremely hot plasma 
under very high pressure at a certain localization. Other examples can be 
taken from synthetic biology. Here one of the goals is for instance to build 
regulatory circuits of proteins that are able to control cell behavior. With 
respect to basic research the aim is to construct—among others—a living 
artificial biological cell. In the first attempts computer simulations were 
used to identify a kind of minimal genome that allows for a living cell. Then 
this genome was chemically synthesized and injected into a bacterium 
(Hutchison et al. 2016) demonstrating that it is sufficient to realize a living 
cell. Without the tremendous computer power available it is impossible to 
find the necessary protein reactions.
For these exploratory simulations therefore (complete) knowledge about 
a system is not applied but generated. In fact, a theory-driven com-
prehension of observable real processes is replaced by an experience with 
possible structures and processes, which is based on specific simulations 
using large computer capacities. This kind of experience with the simula-
tion of exploratory model systems, which may have no counterparts in the 
physical world, will not necessarily lead to new theories. But it leads to very 
many desired applications following the slogan, I do not understand how it 
works, but I know how to do it. With respect to the natural sciences, complex 
computer simulations often replace tinkering in the lab with modeling in the 
computer, and referring to scientific explorations without a theory one may 
state that understanding is replaced by engineering techniques.
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After having described what I understand by a physical theory and having 
surveyed different types of computer simulations, I will shortly come back 
to event-based simulations.
The goal of these simulations was to demonstrate that for certain scatter-
ing experiments the results predicted by quantum theory are reproducible 
by assuming purely classical arguments. This is done by showing that the 
statistical distributions of quantum theory can be reproduced “by mod-
eling physical phenomena as a chronological sequence of events whereby 
events can be actions of an experimenter, particle emissions by a source, 
signal generations by a detector, interactions of a particle with a material” 
(Michielsen and De Raedt 2014, 2).
Now, what is the setup of these simulations? To begin with we have three 
different models: one for the source, one for the detector, and one for what 
is in between. All these models are claimed to be derived from properties 
ascribed to objects of classical physics. All of these models have several 
parameters that can be tuned in such a way as to reproduce the inter-
ference pattern observed in laboratory experiments (ibid.).
According to the classifications given above, to which categories can we 
assign event-based simulations? Of course they do not use data-driven 
models. But they have aspects of existence-proof simulations in so far 
as they try models of classical systems able to reproduce the observed 
interference patterns. Although they are exploring the effects of different 
models and parameters concerning the involved subsystems (source, 
detectors, and the “between”), they are not exploratory computer simula-
tions because the behavior of the compound system to be reproduced is 
given beforehand by the laboratory experiments.
What hampers event-based simulations—as they stand now—to give 
guidance for the development of a new physical theory is then obvious. It is 
of course the role of the models and parameters in this context. Replacing 
an electron with a “messenger” in a scattering is for the moment only an 
exchange of the naming for what is “between” the source and the detector. 
But the quantum mechanical electron has many additional properties, like 
quantum numbers identifying it as a lepton, and therefore makes possible 
the prediction of the outcomes of many other experimental settings. For 
every new type of experimental setup the “messenger” has to be modeled 
anew, together with different models for the source and especially for the 
detectors. Furthermore, all these models have many tunable parameters, 
which allow adapting simulation results to those obtained from the physical 
experiments performed in a laboratory. Another question is if event-based 
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simulations can make observable predictions of new phenomena—as any 
convincing theory is expected to provide.
To summarize: my impression is that at the moment the event-based 
simulation approach merely replaces for a certain set of physical exper-
iments the “mysterious” quantum theoretical interpretations with a no 
less “mysterious” signal messenger or “mailman.” If in the future there 
will be an accumulated experience with event-based simulations giving a 
more consistent view of how to describe microscopic, atomic, or even sub-
atomic phenomena, my view may be changed. Knowing about the impact 
of computer simulations on generating new concepts and “world views” 
one may still hope to excavate certain properties of the physical world, or 
powerful abstractions of those, which then can inspire or trigger a new 
type of physical theory having again a formal mathematical description.
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Discussion with Frank Pasemann
Stefan Zieme: I’d like to go back to the very beginning, to the first statement 
you made. You said every physical theory describes a well-defined area 
of phenomena. My question would be what to your belief is a phenom-
enon, and even further can there be a phenomenon without a theory?
Frank Pasemann: I used it here in the naïve sense, referring to objects, 
processes or facts observed in the physical world by our senses. Talk-
ing about physics I naturally understand our measuring apparatuses 
to be an extension of our human senses. What was called an “event” 
by Kristel [Michielsen] and Hans [De Raedt] is related to that. Can there 
be a phenomenon without a theory? To a certain extent this question 
refers to a kind of chicken-and-egg problem. I would say in general you 
do not need a theory to observe something I called a phenomenon. 
On the other hand a theory sometimes claims that something—an 
effect, a process—should be observable and it gives a name for it. For 
what we were discussing here I would call the observable “interference 
pattern” predicted by quantum theory a phenomenon, but not the 
electrons, quantum probability waves, or any kind of descriptive “mes-
senger.” These are wordings used in the specific context of theories or 
simulations.
Hans-Jörg Rheinberger: If you are coming from biology and not from phys-
ics, this is I would say an everyday situation, that you can have and 
even stabilize and reproduce phenomena without having a theory in 
the background. You can do genetics – classical genetics – in a quan-
titative manner without having to know anything about the material 
constitution of the hereditary units. I think that’s very common in the 
life sciences.
FP: I believe that the development of the biological sciences had a great 
influence on the way we are reflecting natural processes today 
because, compared to the standard physical systems, biology has to 
deal with much more complex and differentiated structures. Perhaps 
biologists are much closer to thinking in terms of dynamics, of “noisi-
ness,” of networks and coherent subsystems. That is perhaps the point 
where the “New Science” is developing. 
Eric Winsberg: I think that’s also the case in physics. I think the expressions 
you used, stable and reproducible, those are I think what are charac-
teristic of phenomena. It ’s not just something that you see happen in 
the world, but it ’s something that can be reproduced consistently and 
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you get the same kind of data pattern from a variety of different appa-
ratus and such. Which may or may not fall under a theory—it’s when 
you have stable and reproducible phenomena that don’t fall under a 
theory that you think well, gee, maybe I need new theory.
SZ: Let me give an example: I thought about what is the phenomenon, 
what stage to understand it. Looking at the sky every night, you can 
produce data about where the planets go. You can look at the data, you 
can have a pattern of recognition, you can say they move in an ellipsis. 
It ’s the phenomenon, the data or the ellipsis. Because ellipsis is not a 
phenomenon. Firstly it ’s wrong, they don’t move in an ellipsis. They 
can only do so if you choose a theory. My question was where would 
you put the phenomena? At which stage? I think you are at the second 
stage.
FP: And let me make a remark also about stability. The nice thing about 
our everyday world is that it is almost stable; there is no stability in an 
absolute sense. Of course we would not exist if atoms and the things 
composed of them were not stable on a certain time scale. But stability 
is still a concept to think about, due to the fact that often only a con-
figuration of elements is relatively stable, not their parts. Think about 
a dynamic equilibrium. Due to the relative stability of the macroscopic 
physical world we were able to develop first of all classical mechanics, 
giving a deeper understanding of our everyday world. But as we see 
nowadays that is not the whole story.
For me the phenomena are the moving planets in the sky. Measuring 
their advancing positions will result in a set of data. Now, an ellipsis for 
me is primarily a mathematical object. It may be used to fit the data of 
the planets’ positions. But the ellipsis may also be a solution curve of 
some differential equations, provided by a physical theory, represent-
ing the idealized movements of celestial bodies.
SZ: Do you think it is necessary to have a theory as you have described it for 
the development of physical science?
FP: No, not at all. I therefore referred to a “well-established” theory like 
classical mechanics or quantum mechanics. If you are active in a new 
field or stumble over some new phenomena it may be better to forget 
about such a definite theory. In these situations usually one will talk 
about things in terms of working definitions; for instance, one uses 
terms like roughness, fractality, chaos, nonlinearity or complexity to 
point to repeating patterns of observations and properties. Most of 
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the time a mathematical theory comes after certain relations between 
phenomena are aggregated and consolidated. So a mathematical 
theory can refer to a deeper understanding of what determines these 
relations.
MW: What if you would introduce the media of science into your world 
view? It all looks so ideal once again. It has no materiality, theory build-
ing is coming and going. I do not understand yet how theories could 
come and go? What do you think about introducing the concept of 
media on which sciences rely? That would change this ideal situation.
FP: Yes, theories are coming and going, that is a ”natural process.” How 
did Newton come up with his theory, and where is his theory going? It 
simply was absorbed in another, more comprehensive theory. Other 
theories have to go because new ones generate better data, produce 
more interesting, verifiable predictions, and the like.
As I said, as mathematical theories they are idealizations. Take classical 
electrodynamics: you can write it down in two equations with only a 
few symbols. It is a “medium” to understand all the electromagnetic 
phenomena of the everyday world. It has an epistemological func-
tion, and as such it depends on the actual “world view”—that’s what 
I referred to as abstractions. I suppose that theories, as media of sci-
ence, are forms of organizing our scientific experience of the physical 
world. Perhaps mathematical theories are a sort of “hot media” in the 
sense of McLuhan, and what one is using a theory for depends very 
much on the community that is trying to apply it. With the widespread 
use of computer simulations, as a kind of “cool” medium perhaps even 
the “hotness” of theories will change.
Moreover, if we call the mathematical theories “hot” theories, it ’s 
the “cool” theories that have a substantial impact on the developing 
sciences. Think about “chaos theory,” which is still based on different 
“working definitions” but has influenced many, and not only scientific, 
fields of interest.
On the other hand, take a beautiful mathematical theory like string 
theory: because the community is able or willing to think about opera-
tions in 11 or 13 dimensions, its influence on our “world view,” our tech-
nological or social development (at the moment), is quite negligible. It 
seemingly does not have the aura of a popular medium.
But to answer your question: I do not know if using the notion of media 
of sciences for physical theories will change the way we will try to 
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understand physical phenomena. Anyway, to say it in today’s parlance: 
it is cool to have a theory.
Arianna Borrelli: You mentioned that computer simulation could contrib-
ute, for example in this case of complex systems, where you don’t 
really have any mathematical tools, but before, earlier in your talk you 
mentioned the interesting questions open at the theoretical level. For 
example unification—you spoke about unification of forces. I was won-
dering, don’t you think, for example, simulations could contribute to 
that? Of course unification between say electromagnetism and gravity 
is what everybody is working on—I mean not everybody, but many. Of 
course there could be possibility of trying to unify quantum mechanics 
and quantum field theory, which are not unified. I don’t know if anyone 
is working on that. I was wondering, I ask you because this is some-
thing I often wonder about because there’s a lot of talk about unifica-
tion at this high level and there is so little unification at the level where 
one could also work. So I was just wondering, since we have talked 
before about this problem of one particle and of many particles. Could 
that be a possibly interesting or promising direction?
FP: Yes, of course. The point is that in the “old” days you could sit down, 
have some nice idea, write some equations on paper, and then cal-
culate the possible effects. Nowadays we are confronted with more 
sophisticated problems. To get some reasonable results from your 
possibly good ideas it will take substantial computer power, a group 
to work on them, and not least, quite a bit of money. With respect to 
unification I can for instance imagine using simulations to study phys-
ics in higher dimensions, without relying on mathematical devices like 
group theory. If in these simulations your apple still falls down to earth 
and, in addition, all the other observed (and possibly not yet observed) 
processes are presented, then perhaps you have understood some-
thing essential—without having (yet) a theory.
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Quantum Theory: A 
Media-Archaeological 
Perspective
Arianna Borrelli
Introduction: Computer Simulations as a  
Complement to Quantum Theory?
In this paper I will provide some historical perspectives on the question 
at the core of this workshop, namely the many ways in which computer 
simulations may be contributing to reshape science in general and 
quantum physics in particular. More specifically, I would like to focus on 
the issue of whether computer simulations may be regarded as offering 
an alternative, or perhaps a complementary, version of quantum theory. 
I will not be looking at the way in which computer simulations are used 
in quantum physics today, since this task has been outstandingly fulfilled 
by other contributions to this workshop. Instead, I will present a few 
episodes from the history of quantum theory in such a way as to make it 
plausible that simulations might indeed provide the next phase of historical 
development.
In what sense can computer simulations be regarded as “theories,” though? 
How can a computer simulation be on a par with the Schrödinger equation 
of quantum mechanics? To answer this question I will start by discussing 
(and criticizing) the rather naïve, but very widespread ideal of “theory” that 
dominates much of today’s fundamental physical research, and of which 
quantum mechanics constitutes a paradigmatic example. 
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There is little doubt that quantum mechanics is seen today as an 
epistemically privileged physical-mathematical construct, and this status 
is hardly surprising, because quantum mechanics provides the basis for 
a large number of experimentally successful quantitative predictions. 
However, the predictive efficacy is by far not the only factor supporting 
the authority of quantum mechanics. Of paramount importance is the fact 
that it conforms to an ideal of theory that emerged in the course of the 
nineteenth century and still largely dominates physical research today: 
a “theory” as a coherent, rigorous mathematical construct expressed in 
symbolic formulas from which testable numerical predictions can (at least 
in principle) be derived. Such a construct may then be coupled to a physical 
interpretation expressed in verbal terms, to deliver not only predictions, 
but also explanations of phenomena. As I have discussed at length in other 
publications (Borrelli 2012; 2015a; 2015b), this image of a physical-math-
ematical construct both numerically predicting and verbally explaining 
phenomena is a fundamental template of authority in the physical 
sciences (and often also beyond them), despite the fact that not even long-
established “theories” such as classical mechanics or electromagnetism 
actually conform to it.
Few, if any, mathematical theories can remain coherent and rigorous if they 
also have to provide procedures for actually computing predictions. Even in 
those very rare cases in which an equation like Schrödinger’s can be solved 
exactly, applying the solution to a real-world case always requires adjusting 
it in some way that will make it not any more coherent with the original 
equation. In quantum mechanics the connection of Schrödinger’s equation 
with phenomena is particularly problematic, because in the standard 
Copenhagen interpretation the measurement process is assumed to irre-
versibly change the state of the quantum system. During a measurement, 
in the standard interpretation, a so-called reduction of the wave function 
occurs: the wave function associated with the quantum state immediately 
before the measurement is instantaneously replaced by a different one 
that reflects the outcome of the measurement.1 In other words, there is 
no coherent mathematical structure capable of modeling the process of 
measurement in a quantum system. 
1 On the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics, the measurement 
problem and the alternative interpretations proposed since the 1950s (see Faye 
2014). It is not my intention to discuss here interpretative issues of quantum 
mechanics, since no satisfactory solution for the measurement problem has been 
found so far, and the Copenhagen interpretation remains the dominating one, at 
least among practicing physicists.
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In general, the image of a theory as a rigorous and coherent mathematical 
construct from which numerical predictions can be derived has little 
or no correspondence in actual research. Yet this image still dominates 
science and endows constructs like the Schrödinger equation with a spe-
cial authority. A key feature of this special status is that, both in today’s 
scientific culture and in the popular imagination, symbolic formulas are 
usually regarded as mere vehicles to convey abstract, disembodied con-
ceptual structures whose features are fully independent from the form in 
which they are expressed. 
In contrast to this view of theoretical knowledge, I believe that theories 
are “abstract” only in the sense of being far removed from everyday 
experience, not in the sense of being “disembodied.” Science is first and 
foremost a collective enterprise, and so no theory can exist that is not 
expressed, communicated, and appropriated by means of some aes-
thetically perceivable form, such as symbols, words, diagrams, three-
dimensional models—and perhaps also computer simulations. Math-
ematical symbols, for example, are obviously visual and, for those who are 
familiar with the rules for manipulating them, they also possess a haptic 
component (Borrelli 2010; Krämer et al. 2012; Velminski and Werner 2010). 
This material and performative dimension of theories does not allow a 
sharp separation of form and content and is an essential factor shaping 
their employment in research practices. To put it in other terms, I would like 
to claim that the dynamics of medium and message apply also to physical 
theories.
Therefore I will now discuss some episodes from the history of quantum 
theory by highlighting the role of the material, performative dimension. 
I will show how, in the early days of quantum theory, the range of forms 
mediating theories was much broader than one might expect. I will argue 
that, if we set aside the ideal of theory as a disembodied construct nec-
essarily manifesting itself only in rigorous mathematical formulas, there 
is little difficulty in considering computer simulations as a medium of 
quantum theory on a par with the many symbolic and diagrammatic con-
structs that were developed in the pioneering years of the discipline. 
Spectroscopy between Arithmetics and Geometry
I begin my overview by considering what is today referred to as “classical 
physics”, that is, the many theories developed or refined over the course of 
the nineteenth century, such as mechanics, electromagnetism, acoustics or 
hydrodynamics. In that context, there was one medium of theory enjoying 
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a very privileged status: differential equations and the functions solving 
them. Differential equations worked very well in delivering numerical 
predictions for a wide range of phenomena, but some areas appeared 
problematic. The experimental field that most decisively contributed to 
the rise of quantum theory was the study of light and its properties, and 
more precisely the phenomena of spectral lines and black-body radiation. 
It was in those contexts that refined differential equations came to be 
replaced by very simple arithmetic formulas as the most effective medium 
to theoretically capture observation. 
Already in the early modern period it had been accepted that white light 
resulted from a superposition of colored rays, and when in the nineteenth 
century the wave theory of light became established, each colored ray 
that could not be further decomposed came to be associated with a wave 
of specific length and frequency. Around 1850 physicists noticed that the 
light produced by igniting different chemical elements was made out of 
different, discrete sets of colors (i.e., wavelengths).2 By the late nineteenth 
century physicists had developed a new research object: “line spectra,” that 
is, the sets of lines produced by decomposing the light emitted by various 
substances. 
 [Fig. 1] Line spectrum of hydrogen (Source: Huggins 1880, 577).
Line spectra such as the one of hydrogen shown in Fig. 1 clearly displayed a 
discontinuous character, with each element emitting light only of specific, 
discrete wavelengths, whose numerical values could be estimated by 
measuring the distance between the lines in the spectrum. The discon-
tinuity of spectra was problematic because if microphysics was ruled by 
differential equations having smooth, continuous solutions, then the light 
emitted should have formed a continuous spectrum—not a discrete one. 
Researchers at the time made various proposals for how to connect the 
experimental results with available theory. One approach often employed 
was to make an analogy between light spectra and acoustic vibrations, 
2 The following overview of the development of spectroscopy and of spectral formula 
is based on Hentschel (2002). For the role of spectroscopy in the development of 
quantum theory see Jammer (1966).
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which had been successfully represented in mathematical form through 
the so-called harmonics (i.e., Fourier series of sine and cosine functions). 
However, such approaches were not very fruitful, and the breakthrough 
occurred only with the proposal of Johann Jakob Balmer (1825–1898), who 
was not a physicist, but a mathematician and an architect, and in particular 
an expert in the field of architectural perspective drawing. Never having 
worked on spectroscopy before, Balmer in 1885 published a short paper 
in which he proposed that the wavelengths of the hydrogen spectral lines 
would conform to the very simple formula: 
 H (m, n)  = h   m 
2  ______  m 2  +  n 2  
with H the value of a given wavelength, (m, n) two integer numbers and 
h = 3,645 a constant computed on the basis of measurement (Balmer 
1885, 81, 83). For m = 3, 4 and n = 2 Balmer’s formula fit very well the 
measurements available, and in the following years it turned out that also 
for higher values of m and n the formula matched the wavelengths of newly 
observed hydrogen lines.
How did Balmer, a mathematician and architect who had never shown an 
interest in physics, arrive at his formula? We have no direct sources on 
this issue, but historian and philosopher of science Klaus Hentschel has 
offered a very plausible answer based on an analysis of Balmer’s work and 
of archival material (Hentschel (2002, 295–301, 442–448; Hentschel 2008). 
In his 1885 paper Balmer did not explain how he had arrived at his formula, 
but some years later, in 1897, he again wrote about spectroscopy and 
showed how an improved expression could be derived based on a geomet-
rical construction similar to those employed in architectural perspective 
drawing, in which Balmer was an expert (Balmer 1897). In his 1897 paper 
Balmer explained that the hydrogen wavelengths could be constructed 
geometrically as shown in the right half of Fig. 2.
First one should draw a circle whose diameter AO represents the minimum 
wavelength of hydrogen. Then the points 1, 2, 3... are drawn along the 
X-axis at equal distance from each other. By drawing the tangents to the 
circle passing from points 3, 4, ... and looking where they intersect the 
vertical axis, one obtains the wavelengths of the hydrogen spectrum as the 
distances between point O and the intersection points. This construction 
is the same as that employed to derive the perspective shortening of 
a circular column as seen by an observer walking along the X-axis and 
pausing to look at the column at points 3, 4 … 
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 [Fig. 2] Geometrical derivation of spectroscopic formula (Source: Balmer 1897, plate VIII).
Hentschel argues that this geometrical derivation was similar to the way 
in which Balmer came to his formula in the first place: his experience 
with perspective drawing led him to visually perceive the spectral lines in 
terms of a familiar construction for the shortening of a fluted column. It 
is not possible for me to present here Hentschel’s detailed argument, but 
an important point he makes is that while physicists at the time focused 
on an analogy between light and sound that was expressed in terms of 
frequencies and mathematical functions (harmonics), Balmer worked 
visually and geometrically, and so could open up new paths of reflection. 
Here we see an example of how the employment of different media to 
express the “same” knowledge could lead research in diverging directions. 
For us today Balmer’s symbolic formula represents a physically significant 
result, which prompted the development of quantum theory, while his geo-
metrical reasoning appears to be purely contingent. Yet Balmer saw geo-
metrical methods as a significant guideline in research and, after describing 
the geometrical construction in Fig. 2, he stated:
This construction may possibly be useful in throwing a new light on the 
mysterious phenomena of spectral lines, and in leading to the right 
way of finding the real closed formula for spectral wavelengths, in case 
it has not already been found in the formula of Rydberg. (Balmer 1897, 
209)
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Balmer’s rule for deriving hydrogen spectral wavelengths could be 
expressed both in arithmetical and geometrical terms, but the choice of 
medium had epistemic implications. Balmer’s contemporaries, perhaps 
unsurprisingly, chose the arithmetic formulation, and today the idea of 
using geometrical construction for theoretical guidelines may appear 
very far-fetched. Yet it was probably geometrical reasoning that produced 
Balmer’s formula in the first place and, as we will presently see, theorists 
later developing quantum theory did not shy away from very far-fetched 
constructions expressed in symbolic notation.
By the early twentieth century Balmer’s formula had been developed 
into more general expressions for spectral series, according to which all 
frequencies of light emitted by atoms could be expressed arithmetically as 
the difference between two terms, each depending on a positive integer 
(m, n), on the universal “Rydberg constant” R, and on a number of other 
constants (s, p, d...) depending on the kind of atom.3 The formula looked 
like this:
 ν  (m, n)  =  R ___  (n + s) 2  –  
R ___  (m + p) 2 
Such simple formulas could fit practically all the results of atomic spec-
troscopy, a rapidly expanding experimental field at the time. By finding 
the values of the constants s, p etc. on the basis of the first few lines in a 
series, predictions for lines with higher m, n could be obtained, and they 
often turned out to be correct. The fact that the formulas were based on 
integer numbers seemed at first surprising, and some authors at the time 
tried to find a differential equation from which such formulas could be 
derived, but in this early phase the search was to no avail (Hentschel 2012). 
For more than a decade, the formulas for line spectra resisted all attempts 
to embed them in an overarching physical-mathematical framework, or at 
least provide them with a verbal interpretation with explanatory character. 
The formulas remained what I would like to characterize as “mathematical 
fragments,” that is, physical-mathematical expressions which, although 
complete in themselves, stood in isolation from the theoretical landscape 
of their time. Theorists used them as starting points to try and construct 
broader theoretical frameworks, treating them as though they might be 
traces, “fragments” of a (hypothetical) overarching theory that had yet to 
be formulated. 
3 The information contained in the following overview on the development of 
quantum mechanics can be found for example in Jammer (1966). On the role of series 
formulas in the development of quantum theory see also Borrelli (2009; 2010).
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In the early twentieth century spectral series were not the only “math-
ematical fragments” involving natural numbers that played a role in 
microphysics: there was also Planck’s formula for black-body radiation. 
Like Balmer’s formula, Planck’s expression had been derived bottom-
up by matching experimental results in a situation where all top-down 
derivations from electromagnetic theory had failed to provide empirically 
plausible predictions.4 Planck’s formula could be seen as implying that the 
energy exchange between matter and electromagnetic radiation could only 
take place in finite quantities, and that the minimum amount (“quantum”) 
of energy exchanged by matter with light of frequency ν was hν, where h 
was Planck’s constant. 
Bohr’s Atom and the Old Quantum Theory as 
Multimedial Constructs
By the early twentieth century simple arithmetic formulas involving 
positive integer numbers had taken center stage in the search for a theory 
of “quantum” physics, and in 1913 the Danish theorist Niels Bohr (1885–1962) 
combined them with elements from classical physics and verbally formu-
lated physical assumptions to produce “Bohr’s atom,” a very innovative 
theoretical construct.5 
First of all Bohr assumed that the hydrogen atom could be regarded 
as a small solar system governed by a classical differential equation 
defining its possible orbits. Then he introduced a novel physical principle 
expressed verbally: only those orbits having certain particular values of the 
energy were actually realized, because only in them would the atom not 
radiate and would thus remained stable.6 These stable orbits were called 
“stationary states” and, according to Bohr, radiation only occurred when 
the atom “jumped” from one stationary state to another. The energy E lost 
(or gained) by the atom corresponded to the creation (or annihilation) of 
light of frequency ν such that E = hν, as required by Planck’s formula. Each 
of the stationary energy levels was linked to an integer number, chosen so 
as to exactly match one of the two terms in the hydrogen series formula. 
4 The history of the emergence and transformation of Planck’s black-body formula 
has been studied in much detail by many historians and cannot be discussed here. A 
recent overview with further references is Badino (2015).
5 For a recent, exhaustive treatment of Bohr’s atomic model and its development see 
Kragh (2012).
6 The stability of matter was a problem for the solar system atom in classical physics, 
since in classical electromagnetism a moving electron would radiate, lose energy, 
and eventually fall into the nucleus.
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Since all spectral series formulas were differences between two similar 
terms, they could all be interpreted as expressing the difference between 
the initial and final energy of an atom. Clearly, the predictive value of Bohr’s 
atom was identical to that of the spectral formulas on which it was based, 
so no new knowledge was actually obtained. However, now the “math-
ematical fragments” were connected to a more complex construct that 
involved both classical orbits and novel notions like “stationary states” 
and “quantum jumps”—a construct that is regarded as the first quantum 
theory, combining functions, arithmetic formulas, and verbal statements 
in what may be characterized as a multimedial whole. The fact that verbal 
statements played such a crucial role in Bohr’s atom was typical of his 
work, and it is no accident that he is often highlighted as one of the most 
philosophical scientists of his time. Despite its hybrid, innovative character 
Bohr’s atom was very positively received, and soon became the core of 
what is today known as the “old” quantum theory, which was developed 
between 1913 and 1925 by Bohr himself, and by many other authors.7
In the “old quantum theory” each possible stationary state of an atom 
was associated with a set of integer (or semi-integer) numbers derived 
by performing an increasing number of spectroscopic measurements, 
and then fitting these empirical results with spectral formulas containing 
the quantum numbers of the various stationary states. Although these 
sets of “quantum numbers” may appear to be nothing but a group of 
natural numbers, they actually constituted a new form of theoretical 
representation—a new medium of physical theory that was necessary to 
represent and manipulate the new notion of “stationary state.” In principle, 
each stationary state was also associated with a classical orbit but, as the 
formal intricacy of the theory increased, quantum numbers became more 
and more the primary means to aesthetically represent and manipulate 
the innovative, and in many ways obscure, notion of stationary state 
introduced by Bohr.
Physical Quantities as Infinite Matrices 
By 1925 quantum theory had proved to be capable of subsuming a large 
number of new experimental results in spectroscopy, but it still remained 
an extremely fragmentary construct that physicists kept on modifying and 
enlarging to accommodate new spectroscopic evidence. Scientists involved 
in this task usually justified their modus operandi by invoking Bohr’s 
7 For details of these developments see for example Kragh (2012), Jammer (1966), or 
Borrelli (2009).
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“correspondence principle,” a very flexible—not to say vague—heuristic 
tool to formally derive quantum relationships from classical ones. In 1925 
the young physicist Werner Heisenberg (1901–1976) made a proposal for a 
new way of reframing and unifying the results obtained up to then, and fur-
ther developed his suggestion together with Max Born (1882–1970) and Pas-
cual Jordan (1902–1980).8 The result of this process was “matrix mechanics,” 
a theoretical construct perhaps even more innovative than Bohr’s atom. 
Matrix mechanics was a theory expressed in part in verbal terms and in 
part through symbolic expressions, which although at first sight appeared 
to be mathematical structures in fact did not correspond with any rigorous, 
coherent objects of the mathematics of their time. 
Matrix mechanics emerged quite rapidly over the course of a few months 
during 1925, but the process of its construction was extremely complex, 
and I will not attempt to summarize it. I will instead offer a brief overview 
of the new theory, arguing that it represented not only a fundamental step 
from a physical point of view, but also a further radical transformation of 
the way in which “quantum theories” were aesthetically made available to 
fellow scientists. 
Just as was the case for Bohr’s atom, matrix mechanics did not bring with 
it new testable predictions, but rather offered a different, more unitary set 
of rules for obtaining already known results. Matrix mechanics took over 
the key new elements from the old quantum theory: the idea of stationary 
states associated with sets of quantum numbers and that of quantum 
jumps from one state to another. Classical orbits were left out: Heisenberg 
explained that physics should only deal with “observables,” and in atoms 
the only observable quantities are the frequencies and intensities of spec-
tral lines, which are not linked to a single electron orbit but to the transition 
between the two of them. The exact position and velocity of an electron 
orbiting around the nucleus, on the other hand, are not observable and 
so should have no place in quantum theory. Heisenberg’s key original idea 
was that quantum-physical quantities should not be theoretically conceived 
and represented as having at each instant a single numerical value, as was 
the case in classical physics, but rather thought of as always related to an 
infinite set of values. Accordingly, each physical quantity was associated 
with a set of infinitely many values, which were ordered into a two-
dimensional matrix having infinitely many rows and columns. In the case of 
the hydrogen atom each row and each column was labeled by the quantum 
numbers of one hydrogen stationary state, as is seen in the formula below, 
8 For an overview on the emergence of matrix mechanics see Jammer (1966, 196–220).
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where “n” and “m” stand for one or more quantum numbers describing a 
stationary state.
 M 1,1  M 1,2 ...  M 1,m ...
... ... ... ... ...
 M n,1 ... ...  M n,m ...
... ... ... ... ... 
In this way, each element of the matrix was formally linked to a transition 
between two atomic states, providing a fitting scheme to express the 
observable values of frequency and intensity of atomic radiation. Born, 
Heisenberg, and Jordan stated the rules for how to construct the matrices 
and manipulate them to obtain spectroscopic predictions. The details of 
this procedure are not important for the subject dealt with in this paper, 
but it is very relevant to note that these “infinite matrices” were no rigorous 
mathematical constructs. Born, Heisenberg, and Jordan manipulated 
them according to the usual rules for adding or multiplying finite matrices, 
but they fully acknowledged that for infinite matrices those rules led to 
infinite sums, which in all probability did not converge. For their aims it 
was sufficient that the physically relevant results obtained would make 
sense. In other words, the infinite matrices were a new medium of quantum 
theoretical practice through which predictions could be obtained.
In late 1925 Born collaborated with the already renowned mathematician 
Norbert Wiener (1894–1964) to generalize the formalism of matrix 
mechanics into “operator mechanics,” which would be both physically 
significant and mathematically rigorous. However, their attempts were 
soon preempted by the unexpected appearance in early 1926 of Erwin 
Schrödinger’s (1887–1961) wave mechanics. 
The Return of Differential Equations
As we have seen, the development of quantum theory had taken a path 
that led it further and further away from the differential equations that 
dominated classical physics. With matrix mechanics and Heisenberg’s 
suggestion of discarding atomic orbits, the formal development had also 
produced quite radical physical interpretations. However, differential 
equations made a surprising reentry into the game with a series of 
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papers published by Schrödinger in the space of a few months in 1926.9 
Schrödinger had found an exactly solvable differential equation whose 
solutions  ψ m, n, l depended on a set of three integer and semi-integer 
parameters (m, n, l) which precisely coincided with the quantum numbers 
of the stationary states of hydrogen. This was an essential new devel-
opment as far as predictive power was concerned: both in the old quantum 
theory and in matrix mechanics quantum numbers had to be derived 
from empirically based spectroscopic formulas like Balmer’s and then 
inserted by hand into the theory. Schrödinger’s equation instead allowed 
the derivation of hydrogen quantum numbers without making reference 
to experiment. Similar equations could be written for all atoms and, 
although they could not be exactly solved, one assumed that they would in 
principle allow the derivation of the energy levels of the atoms. In a sense, 
Schrödinger’s equation was a very complex and redundant apparatus to 
derive quantum numbers, and the question now was how its many parts 
could or should be interpreted physically. It was a new medium of theory 
opening up a huge new space of physical-mathematical speculation. 
Schrödinger was understandably convinced that atomic spectroscopy 
might be reformulated in terms of the functions  ψ m, n, l  , which he inter-
preted as describing “matter waves.” However, the Schrödinger equation 
by itself could not deliver any spectroscopic prediction, as one still had to 
assume that quantum numbers corresponded with stationary states, and 
that “quantum jumps” between states would lead to radiation. As is well 
known, Schrödinger made it his main task to get rid of quantum jumps by 
appropriately extending his theory, but was never able to do so. 
By 1927 the refined, if somehow still fragmentary, theoretical apparatus of 
quantum mechanics was in place, and it comprised Schrödinger’s equations 
and their solutions, infinite matrices, and a verbally expressed statement 
about “quantum jumps” between “stationary states,” which had originally 
been introduced by Bohr. The interpretation of the new theory was still 
quite fluid, and some features of Schrödinger’s equations provided material 
for discussion. 
A very important feature of the equation was the fact that if two functions 
solved it, then any linear combination of the two would be a solution, 
too. If a combination of two stationary states was also a solution, did this 
mean that an atom could be in two stationary states at the same time? 
Schrödinger had no problem with this view, since for him the “states” 
9 For an overview of the early development of wave mechanics see Jammer (1966, 
236–280).
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were nothing but waves in a “matter field,” and two waves could always be 
superimposed. Other authors however disagreed, among them Born, who 
suggested that the quantum wave should be interpreted as giving the prob-
ability with which an atom was in one or another state: “an atomic system 
can only ever be in a stationary state [...] but in general at a given moment 
we will only know that [...] there is a certain probability that the atom is in 
the n-th stationary state” (Born 1927, 171).10
This was an early statement about the “statistical interpretation” of 
quantum mechanics, and it marked the start of discussions on whether 
the idea of wave-particle duality that had been assumed for light quanta 
(i.e., photons) could and should also be regarded as valid for electrons and 
protons.11 We see here how the (re)introduction of the classical medium of 
theory, differential equations, and function led to new physical questions. 
These in turn prompted scientists to further analyze quantum mechanics, 
both by trying to reframe it into more rigorous, unitary mathematical 
terms, and by attempting to establish experimentally which interpretation 
of the formalism—if any—made more sense. 
Today, wave-particle duality is part of the standard interpretation of 
quantum mechanics, and the “two-slit experiment” appears in most 
textbooks as the paradigmatic exemplar of the experimental consequences 
of this duality. As shown by Kristel Michielsen and Hans De Raedt in this 
volume, however, the two-slit experiment was formulated only much later 
as a thought experiment, and actually performed even later. If one looks 
at what was happening in the 1920s and ‘30s, the situation appears much 
less clear than what may seem today. For example, in 1928 Arthur Edward 
Ruark (1899–1979) proposed, “A critical experiment on the statistical inter-
pretation of quantum mechanics” (Ruark 1928). Ruark’s proposal was an 
experiment that at the time could not be performed, aimed at establishing 
whether a single atom could actually be in two states at the same time: 
if that was the case, claimed Ruark, then the atom might be able to emit 
light of two frequencies at the same time. This idea sounds quite strange 
today, but these reflections belonged to an earlier, fluid state of quantum 
mechanics in which the wave function was still regarded as a novel formal 
construct, which helped formulate predictions but was not necessarily 
physically significant in itself. 
10 “ein atomares System [ist] stets nur in einem stationären Zustand [...] im allgemeinen 
werden wir in einem Augenblick nur wissen, daß [...] eine gewisse Wahrscheinlichkeit 
dafür besteht, daß das Atom im n-ten Zustand ist” (Born 1927, 171).
11 On the emergence of the statistical interpretation of quantum mechanics see 
Jammer (1966, 282–293).
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Dirac’s Symbolic Notation
After this short detour on experiment, let us go back to the way in which 
quantum theory developed in the late 1920s. Most theorists were not 
primarily interested in interpreting the formal apparatus of quantum 
mechanics, but rather in expanding it to fit a broader range of quantum 
phenomena. Many authors worked to this aim, and their results often 
merged with and built upon each other. I would like to conclude my short 
media archaeology of quantum theory by focusing on one author who was 
probably the most creative one in his manipulation of symbolic expres-
sions: Paul Dirac (1902–1984). In my presentation I have suggested that 
different authors contributing to the emergence of quantum theory used 
different aesthetic strategies to develop and express their theoretical 
research. Many of Bohr’s key research contributions were expressed 
in words and not in mathematical language, while other authors, as for 
example Schrödinger, employed traditional mathematical techniques, 
such as differential equations. More skilled mathematicians, like John 
von Neumann (1903–1957), used very refined mathematical structures as 
guidelines for their work on quantum theory, while Heisenberg, Born, and 
Jordan expressed their reflections in the form of innovative, and possibly 
nonrigorous, constructs: infinite matrices. Dirac’s strategy in theoretical 
research was the manipulation of symbolic notation without much regard 
for mathematical rigor on the one side or physical sense on the other.12 
Dirac’s papers, especially those he wrote early in his career, are often a 
challenge to read. Unlike Heisenberg or Bohr, he offered hardly any verbal 
explanation of the reasoning behind his operations, and unlike Schrödinger 
or von Neumann, his manipulations of mathematical symbols cannot be 
understood in terms of any sharply defined mathematical structure. Yet 
Dirac reached his most significant results by taking symbolic expressions 
and transforming them to generate new physical-mathematical meanings 
(Borrelli 2010). On the basis of archival material Peter Galison has argued 
that much of what Dirac did with his formulas was guided by a visual 
and haptic intuition, which he did not express in his papers—a “secret 
geometry,” as Galison wrote (Galison 2000). While this may be the case, it is 
also clear that Dirac paid great attention to the development of a symbolic 
notation that fittted his aims. It was not a notation linked to rigorously 
defined mathematical notions, but rather reflected the way in which he 
wished to manipulate the epistemic objects he was creating. 
12 On Dirac’s transformation theory see Jammer (1966, 293–307).
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In 1927, while the new quantum theory was proving very successful in 
dealing with atomic and molecular systems and discussions about its 
statistical interpretation were underway, Dirac published a paper in 
which he proposed an extension of quantum mechanics to the treatment 
of phenomena that were not discrete, like atomic spectra, but rather 
continuous, such as collisions between particles. For handling discrete 
systems, matrices were appropriate representations, in that the rows 
and columns formally reflected the discontinuous nature of the states—
but what about systems where energy and other quantities varied con-
tinuously? Dirac neither described physical considerations in words nor 
followed a rigorous mathematical path, but rather tackled the problem in 
terms of finding an appropriate extension of matrix notation. 
His idea was in principle simple: in atomic theory rows and columns of 
matrices corresponded with discrete energy states, but in a more general 
theory they would have to relate to states of quantum systems having 
continuous values of energy or other physical quantities. Dirac did not 
ask what mathematical structure might correspond to a generalization of 
matrices, as Born and Wiener had done, but simply spoke of “matrices with 
continuous rows and columns” (Dirac 1927, 625) and wrote down symbolic 
expressions for them that were not backed up with any rigorous math-
ematical notion. Let us look in some more detail at one example of his 
work. 
As we saw, quantum mechanics contained infinite matrices, and in the 
standard notation the symbol  g a, a'   represented the element of the matrix 
for quantity g whose rows and columns corresponded to the values of 
quantity a. Dirac now introduced the symbol  g a, a'  , which visually conveyed 
the idea that it was the same as the matrix for g, but with continuous rows 
and columns. Matrices could be manipulated by sums of their elements, 
and Dirac manipulated “continuous” matrices in an analogous way using 
integrals. For example, the rule for multiplying two matrices g and f had the 
form:
 (g · f) a,b  =  ∑ 
a'
 
 
   g a, a'  f a', b   
In the case of “continuous” matrices, the rule for multiplying them became:
 (g · f)   (a · b)  =  ∫ 
 
 
 g (a, a') f  (a', b)  da' 
When working with matrices, a necessary tool was the matrix usually rep-
resented by the symbol  δ a, b  , that is, a matrix having 1 on its diagonal and 0 
at all other positions:
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 1     0    0 0    ...
 0  1  0 0 ...
 0    0  1  0   ...
... ... ... ... ... 
This matrix was regarded as the “unity” matrix, since any matrix multi-
plied by it remained unchanged. What kind of expression could take up the 
same role for “continuous” matrices? It was here that Dirac introduced his 
perhaps most successful creation: the “delta function,” often also referred 
to as Dirac’s delta function. Dirac introduced the delta function in a para-
graph bearing the title “Notation.” I will quote the passage at some length: 
readers not familiar with the delta function need not try to understand 
what the characterization means exactly, but simply appreciate the tone of 
the text, which gives a very good idea of the nonchalant attitude Dirac had 
to mathematical rigor.
One cannot go far in the development of the theory of matrices with 
continuous ranges of rows and columns without needing a notation for 
that function of a c-number  x [NB c-number = complex number] that is 
equal to zero except when x is very small, and whose integral through 
a range that contains the point  x = 0  is equal to unity. We shall use the 
symbol  δ(x) to denote this function, i.e.  δ(x) is defined by:
δ   (x)   =   0 when x   ≠   0
and
 ∫ 
-∞
+∞
 δ (x) = 1.
Strictly speaking, of course,  δ (x) is not a proper function of x but can be 
regarded only as a limit of a certain sequence of functions. All the same 
one can use  δ (x) as though it were a proper function for practically all 
the purposes of quantum mechanics without getting incorrect results. 
One can also use the differential coefficients of  δ (x) , namely  δ’ (x) ,  
δ’’ (x) ..., which are even more discontinuous and less “proper” then  δ (x) 
itself. (Dirac 1927, 625)13 
Thus, Dirac thought of the introduction of the delta function as a question 
of notation: he clearly perceived his theoretical activity as the manipulation 
not of mathematical objects of physical quantities, but rather of symbolic 
13 Readers familiar with the delta function will have noticed that what Dirac is defining 
here is actually what we today would refer to as  δ’ (x) , but soon the labeling of the 
function was changed to the one usual today.
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expression that carried a hybrid meaning. When the manipulation was 
completed, the results might be tested for mathematical soundness and 
empirical accuracy, and if the outcome was positive, all was well. This 
attitude can be found in many theoretical physicists, but Dirac brought it to 
a new level, and mathematicians heavily criticized the delta function espe-
cially until it was eventually given a rigorous definition.14
Axiomatic Definitions
One of the main critics of Dirac’s delta function, and more in general of the 
flippant way in which the creators of quantum mechanics handled symbolic 
expressions, was von Neumann. In 1928 von Neumann published a seminal 
paper offering a rigorous, axiomatically defined version of quantum 
mechanics based on a notion he developed specifically for that purpose: 
abstract Hilbert spaces (von Neumann 1928).15 At the beginning of that 
paper he criticized specifically the delta function, and wrote:
[In the present quantum theory] one cannot avoid to allow also the so-
called improper functions, such as the function  δ(x) used for the first 
time by Dirac, which has the following (absurd) properties: 
 δ (x) = 0 , for  x ≠ 0 
 ∫ 
-∞
+∞
 δ (x) = 116. (von Neumann 1928)
Other than Dirac, von Neumann saw the delta function—and also other 
symbolic expressions—as always carrying a mathematical meaning, and 
regarded it in this case as “absurd.” Von Neumann was able to distill from 
the symbolic expressions involved in quantum mechanics some rigorous 
mathematical constructs, but ironically this success helped support 
the physicists’ view that it was perfectly fine to play fast and loose with 
physical-mathematical expressions, as long as the final result was not 
incorrect: eventually, so physicists thought, some mathematician would 
come along and show that what physicists had done improperly could 
be done just as well in a proper mathematical way. Still today, even if a 
14 The delta function is today rigorously defined as a distribution; see Jauch (1972).
15 For an overview on von Neumann’s early work on quantum mechanics see Jammer 
(1966, 307–322).
16 Man kann nämlich nicht vermeiden, auch sogenannten uneigentliche 
Eigenfunktionen mit zuzulassen, wie z.B. die zuerst von Dirac benutzte Funktion δ(x), 
die die folgenden (absurden) Eigenschaften haben soll:  δ(x) = 0 , für  x ≠ 0,  ∫ 
-∞
+∞
 δ (x) =  1” 
(von Neumann 1928, 3). von Neumann‘s characterization of the delta function is the 
same as is usual today.
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symbolic procedure appears questionable, its success is usually taken 
by physicists as an indication that it corresponds with a rigorous math-
ematical procedure that no one has yet had the time or inclination to dis-
cover (Borrelli 2012; 2015a; 2015b). This attitude has led to many significant 
physical results, but has also made the status of mathematical formulas as 
a privileged medium of theory increasingly stronger, as it helped disregard 
problems of rigor and coherence as temporary issues that would find a 
solution with time. 
Epilogue: Bra and Kets
von Neumann’s formulation of a rigorous, axiomatically defined math-
ematical apparatus for quantum mechanics was appreciated more by 
mathematicians then by physicists. Abstract Hilbert spaces eventually 
became the overarching formal constructs for defining quantum theory, 
but in physics research practice they were rarely utilized. The rather 
cumbersome formalism introduced by von Neumann in his papers found 
few, if any, followers, and his innovative mathematical ideas ironically 
ended up being usually expressed in terms of the “improper” notation Dirac 
had introduced in 1927 and later continued to develop further. It is worth 
taking a closer look at the evolution of this notation, as it provides further 
evidence of the importance of the aesthetic, in this case visual and haptic, 
dimension of (quantum) theory.
In his 1927 paper, Dirac had pursued his extension of matrix mechanics 
to “continuous matrices” by generalizing an idea that was at the core of 
Heisenberg, Born, and Jordan’s theory: matrix transformation. The matrix 
associated with a given quantity g (e.g., position) with rows and columns 
corresponding to another given quantity a (e.g., energy) could be trans-
formed into a matrix associated with the same quantity g, but whose rows 
and columns were associated with a quantity c, different from the original 
one. This was done by multiplying the original matrix by an appropriate 
“transformation matrix”  T and its inverse  T -1 according to the rule: 
 g c, c'  =  ∑ 
a, a'
 
   T c, a  g a, a'  T a' c' 
-1 . 
For transforming matrices with continuous indices, Dirac simply wrote the 
symbolic analogous formula in which the sum was replaced by an integral, 
without worrying about what it might mean exactly in mathematical terms:
 g (a, a')  =  ∫ 
 
 
 
 (a/c)  g  (c, c')   (c'/a)  dc dc' .  
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This formula defined the symbol (a/c) as the continuous equivalent of the 
transformation matrix, a “transformation function,” but left huge math-
ematical questions open. The matrix sum had already been problem-
atic for infinite matrices, since it was unclear whether it would converge. 
Generalizing it to an integral without specifying what form the various 
terms included in it would have was even more problematic. However, the 
new notation had a very clear intuitive interpretation for readers used to 
working with infinite matrices. It is particularly interesting to note that the 
symbol (c/a) had no graphic equivalent in the formalism of the time. The 
symbol somehow visually and haptically suggested a matrix of which only 
the indices were visible—an object whose only aim was to substitute the 
indices a for c or vice versa. 
One might be tempted to regard Dirac’s procedure as an axiomatic def-
inition of new physical-mathematical notions through the way they were 
manipulated, and in some sense that was what Dirac was doing. Yet he was 
doing it at the aesthetic level of symbolic notation, and not by employing 
the standardized logical-mathematical formalism of the time, as von 
Neumann would later do. One might claim a posteriori that abstract Hilbert 
spaces were already “implicit” in Dirac’s symbols, but this would in my 
opinion misinterpret the historical constellation. At the same time it would 
also be incorrect to deny that von Neumann’s axiomatic construction was 
largely building upon the constructs developed “improperly” in quantum 
mechanics.
In his textbook Principles of Quantum Mechanics ([1930] 1935) Dirac 
employed an only slightly modified version of the notation used in 1927 
for transformation functions, but in 1939 he published a paper “On a new 
notation for quantum mechanics” in which he developed that symbolism 
further into the now ubiquitous “bra-ket” notation. In that paper Dirac 
explicitly stated the importance of notation (Dirac 1939), noting right at the 
beginning:
In mathematical theories the question of notation, while not of primary 
importance, is yet worthy of careful consideration, since a good 
notation can be of great value in helping the development of a theory, 
by making it easy to write down those quantities or combinations of 
quantities that are important, and difficult or impossible to write down 
those that are unimportant. (Dirac 1939, 416) 
The key idea of the bra-ket notation was to split the notation developed for 
the transformation function into two halves:
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 (a/b) " < a | b > which was the product of the bra < a| and the ket |b >.
As is clear both from their name and their graphic form, a “bra” and a “ket” 
were supposed to be combined with each other in a particular order, so 
that a haptic dimension joined the visual and auditory ones. Putting a ket 
in front of a bra was possible, but the resulting ket-bra would have very 
different properties from a bra-ket, as immediately conveyed by its peculiar 
appearance: |a > < b|. Readers familiar with the formalism of quantum 
mechanics will know that bras and kets today are regarded as representing 
elements of an abstract Hilbert space and of its dual, respectively, and 
there is no doubt that Dirac was exploiting those mathematical structures 
as a guideline, while at the same time avoiding any rigorous definition 
and leaving it to his new notations to promote useful, and to impede 
unimportant, terms. 
Conclusions: Computer Simulations as a New 
Medium of Quantum Theory
I am now at the end of my overview of the many media that contributed 
to the construction of quantum theory: perspective drawings, simple 
arithmetic formulas, verbally stated physical principles, sets of numbers, 
the rows and columns of infinite matrices, differential equations, axiomatic 
logical-mathematical constructs and, last but not least, Dirac’s innovative 
symbolisms such as the bra-kets. Each author was free to choose the 
medium best suitable to his way of working and, especially in the early 
period, attitudes about what may or may not be acceptable as a “quantum 
theory” were very flexible—as long as correct results could be reproduced. 
Can the employment of computer simulations to reproduce the results 
of quantum experiments without making use of the machinery of 
Schrödinger’s equation be seen as a practice belonging to the tradition of 
quantum theory I just sketched? It is my conviction that this is the case, 
and I hope that my presentation offered some material to broaden the 
discussion on that issue. I am convinced that computer simulations as a 
new medium of quantum theory might bring back some of the productive 
tensions present in early quantum physics. 
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Discussion with Arianna Borrelli
Hans-Jörg Rheinberger: Thank you very much for your talk. The stage is 
open for questions, please. 
Hans De Raedt: That was a very nice presentation by the way. So, I was 
always wondering, in a way quantum theory is nothing but linear 
algebra, and linear algebra was known since the time of Gauss. So why 
did it take so long for these physicists to realize that what they were 
doing was just a form of linear algebra?
Arianna Borrelli: Thank you. That is a very good question on the history 
of mathematics and physics. There are many historians of math-
ematics, including me, working on that topic. The answer to your 
question is that, in a sense, linear algebra has not been there since 
Gauss. If we think of linear algebra as abstract algebra, that is in terms 
of abstract Hilbert spaces and similar formally defined objects that 
were introduced by von Neumann... if we think of linear algebra in 
that sense, then there was no “linear algebra” before quantum theory. 
There were only what we see today as different implementations of 
abstract linear algebra, like in differential equations or matrix calculus.
Now, if historically at a certain time there is no formalized, abstract 
linear algebra, the historical actors clearly could not use it to con-
nect all the different “implementations.” Take the example of 
infinite matrices: we can think of them in terms of abstract algebraic 
structures, as “operators” in Hilbert space. But the historical actors 
saw them differently. John von Neumann, for example, or David 
Hilbert thought that if you have an infinite matrix which is bounded, 
then that is a mathematical object and you can do linear algebra with 
it. But if you have an infinite matrix which is not bounded, like those 
of quantum mechanics, a matrix about whose behavior you can say 
nothing, then that is not a mathematical object—I mean, it may be a 
mathematical object today for me or for you, but for the people at the 
time, such a matrix was not a mathematical object. And so one could 
not do any algebra with it.
In a way one may speak of a “thought collective” in Ludwik Fleck’s 
sense (Fleck 1935). What seems obvious to us was not obvious to the 
“thought collective” of quantum physicists at the time.
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HDR: Is it historically correct that Heisenberg, when he was writing down 
this so-called matrix algebra, was not aware of the fact that he was 
doing that? 
AB: Yes, this is correct for the first paper, the one written by Heisenberg 
alone. The matrix formulation was brought in by Born and Pas-
cual Jordan, who were familiar with the matrix formulas. However, 
Heisenberg was working with a formal analogy to Fourier series and 
the multiplication of Fourier series by convolution. That procedure 
has the same form as matrix multiplication. So it’s again a question 
of how you want to look at it. Born and Jordan replaced the structure 
of Fourier series with matrices. That’s a very interesting story and 
in a way it also shows how a formula is not just a formula: the same 
formula can have completely different meanings for different authors.
Martin Warnke: Thank you, this was really a very enlightening presentation 
about how contingent the ways are to grasp the phenomena by 
different formal methods. But what really struck me was that you 
reiterated the fact that the double-slit experiment was so late in con-
ception and in practice. So this is really something that is not clear to 
me: Why this came so late? But the question now is: Have you any clue 
about the nature of this experiment? Since if, as we both do, we follow 
Dirac in saying that the apparatuses and experiments evoke what they 
measure, how could that be, that there is one experiment and one 
apparatus that evokes those complementary phenomena at the same 
time? Is it a sort of joined—linked—experiment and thought exper-
iment around which everything we do, did yesterday, and are doing 
today is orbiting?
Have you got any clue about that?
AB: First of all I have to say when I was preparing this presentation I looked 
for some history of the double-slit experiment, but there is none yet—
and I think someone should write it! What I can say now—and maybe 
those who have worked more with the experiment can say more about 
this—is that in this early period there was a lot of open discussion 
about how to… what term did you use? “Evoke”, yes? So, the physicists 
had these equations and wanted to try to evoke something from them. 
The question is: What? What were they interested in “evoking” through 
the equations? We now think of particles or waves, but that was not the 
case then.
Discussion with Arianna Borrelli 119
For example, Ruark, he saw these equations as a possible indication 
of the nonconservation of energy. Ruark thought of the Schrödinger 
equation as possibly saying that energy is only statistically conserved, 
that you could look and find evidence of energy nonconservation in 
single events—but that in the end it would average out. He was trying 
to think of a critical experiment showing whether there was or was not 
this nonconservation. That’s what he was trying to “evoke,” if you want: 
energy conservation or its opposite.
 In the late 1920s people were trying to use thought experiments 
to better grasp what exactly the theory could or could not mean. 
And maybe the idea for the double-slit experiment could only come 
afterwards, when somehow the notion of particle-wave duality 
became more prominent. Only then one thought of an experiment 
evoking waves or particles. 
Kristel Michielsen: I have one comment. There is a paper (Rosa 2012) that 
you could consider as an historical overview of these double-slit 
experiments. It appeared actually because of a discussion on whether 
a Japanese or an Italian group was the first to do the real electron 
double-slit experiment.
AB: Thank you!
KM: And then related to your question or comment, Martin, I would say in 
the two-slit experiment the wave and the particle do not appear at the 
same time. Because you see single events coming and then there’s still 
no observation of wave character, and you have to wait for quite some 
time before you see the interference. So it’s not at all a simultaneous 
appearance of waves and particles.
Lukas Mairhofer: I also rather have a comment, because I think that really 
with the diffraction from a crystal you could demonstrate that there 
is some wave nature of things that you always have been thinking 
of as particles. So maybe the double-slit experiment is not that big 
a step as you seem to describe it. Because there is also an inter-
ference phenomenon, the diffraction from a crystal, and putting in a 
double slit is just creating a different apparatus for doing interference 
experiments.
MW: But we are just talking about interferences, now. We are not talking 
about the other side, the particle. You are talking about the bra and not 
about the ket.
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Eric Winsberg: Yeah, no I agree with you, I think the double-slit experiment 
is pedagogically beautiful in the sense that you don’t really have to 
know very much about other physics to see both the particle and the 
wave existing in the same experiment. But yeah, there are exper-
iments that are harder to understand, where you have to have more 
arguments that maybe, you know, a sophomore undergraduate can 
follow. But yeah, I think there really are experiments like that.
HDR: One more question: On your last slide you said that if you do 
computations we need the wave function collapse. I actually don’t 
think that is true. You said “wave functions, wave collapse is still 
needed for the computation.” Wave functions, certainly, but wave 
collapse, it is not needed: there is no computation where you actually 
use it—interpretation, yes.
AB: Well, I was referring to having first a formula with abstract 
Hilbert spaces and then at some point, when you have to do the 
measurement, you have to introduce the wave functions, and then the 
collapse, in that only one component wave function is left after the 
measurement, and that gives you the probability of the results. So you 
are right: one does not compute with the wave collapse, but assumes it 
to explain how you arrive at the prediction for the probabilities. So it is 
indeed interpretation.
Frank Pasemann: So perhaps just one comment on Dirac’s delta: of course 
it is precise mathematics today, it is a simple example of distribution 
theory. Now because it’s about history perhaps I can give a small story. 
It was on the occasion of Dirac’s eightieth birthday, where almost every 
still living physicist of that time gathered together to celebrate his 
birthday at the International Centre for Theoretical Physics in Trieste, 
and there was a talk by van der Waerden, I think at that time a famous 
mathematician, on Schrödinger equation history. He mentioned a 
physicist in Dublin named Cornelius Lanczos, and he worked out that 
he had exactly the same equation and the difficulties with inter-
pretation, and he was arguing that because he was not embedded in 
the famous German school with all the discussion on how to interpret 
it, he was not—you know—as famous as Schrödinger. 
Now at the end of this talk I think Jürgen Ehlers, director of the Max 
Planck Institute of Physics in Munich at that time, stood up and said, 
“I’m happy to introduce Lanczos here, who is around.” And so he was 
still living, was a very old man with very long white hair, and it was very 
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funny, you know, that someone stood up and that’s the guy who had a 
talk about himself and no one knew that he was still living. Okay.
Anne Dippel: I have one last question. You said at the end computer 
simulations are another medium and they could bring back the 
tensions, the creative tensions, into theory. How would you relate your 
statement to the talk we had yesterday by Hans De Raedt and Kristel 
Michielsen?
AB: Yes, I think computer simulations could play a similar role to Dirac’s 
strange notation. It would be an example of a different strategy to rep-
resent or to make contact with the experimental results—a strategy 
that has already produced these tensions with respect to the usual 
representation in terms of Schrödinger equations. I think this was quite 
clear in the discussion yesterday. It was strange: the discussion took 
the form of classical physics against quantum mechanics, and the Bell 
inequality—and these are... I don’t want to say old subjects, but these 
are discussions that have been spoken about a lot. I think that there is 
actually more. I believe that in what Hans and Kristel presented there is 
some new dimension from the point of view of a representation.
And this is to me similar to the strange notations of Dirac—of course in a 
completely different way, but from the epistemic point of view similar. 
Of Dirac’s notation today we can say: “Oh, we have now shown that it 
was rigorous.” But then, at the time, much of what Dirac was doing was 
not rigorous. And it was just different from the mainstream, it was the 
path that he had to take, in a sense, to try and expand the theory that 
was there. But this is just my take on it.
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On Nature, its 
Mental Pictures and 
Simulatabilty: A Few 
Genealogical Remarks
Wolfgang Hagen
In a chapter titled “Scientific Imagination,” Richard Feynman in his Lectures 
on Physics asked: What do I imagine when I see electromagnetic waves? 
What do I actually see? What are the demands of scientific imagination? 
Is it any different from trying to imagine that the room is full of invis-
ible angels? No, it is not like imagining invisible angels. It requires a 
much higher degree of imagination to understand the electromagnetic 
field than to understand invisible angels. Why? Because to make invis-
ible angels understandable, all I have to do is to alter their properties a 
little bit … which is … relatively easy. So you say, ‘Professor, please give 
me an approximate description …’ —I’m sorry, I can’t do that for you. … 
When I start …, I speak of the E- and B fields and wave my arms … I see 
some kind of vague shadowy, wiggling lines—here and there is an E 
and B written on them somehow, … I have a terrible confusion between 
the symbols I use to describe the objects and the objects themselves. I 
cannot really make a picture that is even nearly like the true waves. …. 
Perhaps the only hope, you say, is to take a mathematical view. … From 
a mathematical view, there is an electric field vector and a magnetic 
field vector at every point in space; … there are six numbers associated 
with every point. Can you imagine six numbers associated with each 
point in space? That’s too hard. Can you imagine even one number 
associated with every point? I cannot! I can imagine such a thing as the 
temperature at every point in space. That seems to be understandable. 
124 Interferences and Events
There is a hotness and coldness that varies from place to place. But 
I honestly do not understand the idea of a number at every point. 
(Feynman 2006, 10–20)
This is the Feynman of the early sixties, lecturing undergraduates at 
Caltech. We don’t find a word about Bell’s inequality, because these pre-
conditions for any experimental proof of quantum entanglement were 
still unknown to physicists at that time. The EPR (Einstein–Podolsky–Rosen) 
paradox is mentioned explicitly by Feynman though, in the end explained in 
an original way by the uncertainty principle (Feynman 2006, 8–18). 
But this is not the reason why I quoted this angel statement of Feynman, of 
wiggling in the air and seeing numbers in space. What interests me is firstly, 
that Feynman comes up with a question of “what is”; secondly how he 
thereby embraces “scientific imagination”; thirdly how he incites solving the 
problem; and finally how peculiar and odd he is talking about this topic. 
To put it in more general terms: depicting electromagnetic waves, as this 
little sketch already shows, is a question of how they are rendered. And, 
if that is true, I would like to argue that they should be rendered as an 
ontological, phenomenological, symbolical, epistemological, and also an 
ethical or meta-ethical problem.
Ontologically one has to admit electromagnetic waves have a reality, but 
a very special one, possibly in the way Niels Bohr spoke about “different 
levels” of reality, where “conceptions like realism and idealism find no place 
in objective description as we have defined it” (Bohr 1958, 89).
Phenomenologically there can be no doubt: at least as much as real entities 
these waves are phenomena. As George Greenstein reminds us, “an elec-
tromagnetic wave is detected by monitoring its effect on charges—charges 
in, for instance, an antenna” (Greenstein and Zajonc 1997, 83).
Thus detected as phenomena in reality, from the outset electromagnetic 
waves have been shaped as symbolic mathematical descriptions rather 
than empirical experiences. As is well known, Feynman’s six numbers at 
every point in space apply to Maxwell’s equations which, as I will show you 
soon, guided Hertz’s experiments to success.
On this realistic, phenomenological, and symbolic level electromagnetism 
has to be understood as an object and subject of a new scientific setting, 
opening up a new epistemology—as Karen Barad puts it, as “a nondualistic 
whole marking the subject-object boundary.” Or with Bohr’s words: 
different to “the scope of classical physics, where the interaction between 
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object and apparatus can be neglected …, in quantum physics this inter-
action thus forms an inseparable part of the phenomenon” (Barad 2007, 
136).
Eventually, concerns about ethics just draw the consequences of what I 
said about the epistemology, reality, and phenomenology of electromag-
netism. As much as it comprises, on a basic quantum level, fundamental 
interactions between particles and wave mechanisms, electromagnetism 
has been responsible, over the last 120 years, for the groundbreaking 
successes of all new medial cultural techniques on a technological level. 
Electromagnetism, from the moment it came into existence as a technical 
phenomenon, encapsulates, in the sense of Donna Haraway, a long story 
in itself, still ongoing by the way, because it would never have come into 
existence and never would have grown to such worldwide dominance 
outside the subject-object connection of cultural techniques, nor outside 
the material, economically driven nature-culture discourses of scientific 
practice. According to Bohr, as Barad resumes: “The central lesson of 
quantum mechanics is that we are part of the nature that we seek to under-
stand” (ibid., 265).
Not just John von Neumann’s solutions of the quantum mechanical 
measurement problems, as I have shown elsewhere (Hagen 2002, 195–235), 
but already the basics of quantum theory itself have laid ground to the 
cybernetic feedback models in the sense of Norbert Wiener. In contrast 
to this, Barad emphasizes a new ”ethico-onto-epistemic attention to our 
responsibilities not only for what we know” (Barad 2007, 283) but also, of 
course, for what we don’t know yet.
I.
My genealogical remarks start off with Heinrich Hertz, around Christmas 
Day of 1887. Experimenting in his lecture hall in Karlsruhe, its walls and 
ceiling luckily built purely of wood, he knew quite well that all the light fall-
ing through the windows consisted of waves as it was known since Fresnel’s 
legendary proof of diffraction in 1819. This was already knowledge taught 
in schools, but any connection between light and electricity was still more 
than dubious. Not until 1873, just 15 years earlier, in the second volume of 
his Treatise on Electricity And Magnetism, James Clerk Maxwell had con-
tested: “We shall have strong reasons for believing that light is an electro-
magnetic phenomenon” (Maxwell 1873, 383). Ten years later the two vol-
umes were translated into German. Eventually, after one year of research, 
over Christmas 1887 Hertz had to fulfill this impossible Feynman task, the 
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task that has made electromagnetic waves somehow visible and verifiable 
as identical with light. 
I don’t want to go into too much detail about why and how Hertz started 
off with all of this. It began, in late autumn 1886, with a famous “dipole” 
scenario: Hertz amplified a Rühmkorff inductor (a device generating con-
tinuous discharges) using two big condensers spilling out sparks, which 
are—this is Hertz’s experimental setting—received through tiny sparks 
spraying off from little slits in his receiving devices of bare wire (Fig. 1).
 [Fig. 1] Foelsing 1997, 272
Let us remember that Hertz was part of the agent network of Hermann 
von Helmholtz, who held the most important post in German physics, at 
Berlin University, and who was very engaged in clarifying the fundamental 
differences between the German “nature-romantical” theory of electricity 
and the much more successful scientific approaches in the leading indus-
trial nation at the time, Great Britain. To the dismay of the majority of 
German physicists, Helmholtz had translated Thomson and Tait’s Treatise 
on Natural Philosophy as a students’ textbook in 1871, explicitly lining 
himself up on the side of the British empirical theories against the pre-
vailing Kantian transcendentalism in Germany. In those days Helmholtz 
gained the reputation of being a rude, materialistic thinker who denied the 
deep interconnections between the transcendental truth of nature and the 
human spirit, dem menschlichen Geist (see Cahan 1994).
As a matter of fact, one of the crucial points in this metaphysical dis-
pute was the still open physical question of whether electricity could be a 
potential force with partly immediate distant effects, or if it should be con-
ceived as a force of disturbances propagated by a so-called displacement 
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current along conducting wires or without any carrier, traveling freely 
through space.
Of course, in these Christmas days, Hertz didn’t see any electromag-
netic waves at all. What he saw were sparks, only recognizable with 
special microscopic lenses, tiny little sparks oscillating in the slits of his 
receiver rings when he posted them on special points in his hall; luckily, 
as I mentioned, a room without any iron in its walls or ceiling, otherwise 
everything would have gone wrong, as so many failed replications of his 
experiments have shown painfully over the past decades (see Wittje 1995).
[Fig. 2] Feddersen 1908, Anhang I
Hertz’s experimental setting was a spark-receiving circuit, extremely cute 
but also cumbersome. From the so-called Feddersen photo experiments 
of the 1850s (Feddersen 1858, 69–89) he knew a lot about the interior of 
discharging sparks (Fig. 2), namely that they include damped oscillations 
of alternating currents floating back and forth between the poles of the 
Rühmkorff dipole: “It has long been known that the discharge of a Leyden jar 
is not a continuous process, but that, like the striking of a clock, it consists 
of a large number of oscillations, of discharges in opposite senses which 
follow each other at exactly equal intervals.” Interestingly Hertz considers 
this property a simulation, as he continues: electricity, to explain how it 
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works in sparks, “is able to simulate the phenomena of elasticity” (Hertz 
1896, 321).
Feddersen photos empirically affirmed the so-called Thomson formula of 
oscillation,  T = 2 π  √ 
___
 (LC) ,1 and remembering that, Hertz knew roughly how 
fast the oscillations in his sparks were going. But, given all the elasticity, 
there seemed to be rather more chaotic happenings at the slit-pole of the 
receiving curls. Hertz knew that he could never compute the receiving 
spark frequencies there: their strength and brightness he could only 
observe with microlenses. One can imagine how tedious Hertz felt tagging 
specks on his floor plan (Fig. 3) where sparks looked brighter than else-
where was. 
[Fig. 3] Doncel 1995, 222
Operating with metal mirrors and huge lumps of pitch placed between the 
dipole and the receiving rings, Hertz proved also in principle the similarities 
of electromagnetism and light in reflection and refraction characteristics. 
In the end, after one long year of countless tests, Hertz had a few rough 
calculations of the possible frequencies which, divided through the velocity 
of light, provided him with the theoretical length of his presumed waves. 
But, we are in a three-dimensional room and unfortunately, even Maxwell 
had not really entertained calculations of free propagating “disturbances” 
in spherical spaces. Above all, his mathematics was all but clear to his Eng-
lish contemporaries, let alone to a German physicist who was trained in the 
differential equations of Neumann and Weber potential expressions but by 
no means able to work with the quaternions and pre-vector mathematics 
Maxwell used in his treatise. The elegance of the four Maxwell equations 
1 T = Period, L=Inductance, C=Capacity; the last two values Hertz could calculate from 
the parameters of his equipment.
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as we know them today is in fact due to a reduction of about 12 in his 
book, work done by Josiah Gibbs and Oliver Heaviside after Hertz’s death. 
However, Hertz’s waves might look in 1887, elasticity simulating or not, they 
surely were not two-dimensional entities. So Hertz had to delve now into 
the very complicated mathematics of spherical harmonics in Maxwell’s 
first volume, as his Rühmkorff dipole spilled out waves not in a linear plane, 
but rather curved in all possible directions. And above all, at a certain 
frequency, his waves peeled off and moved on as an autonomous electro-
magnetic field, or just electromagnetic wave radiation.
At the level of contemporary scientific practice, nobody could know what 
was really happening here. Therefore Hertz had to grapple for something 
intelligible that could give him a picture of what was going on, an inneres 
Scheinbild (mental image) as he would call it later on. I will come back to that 
later. Indeed, he pictured to himself the inner processes in the discharge 
sparks. 
“The period of a single oscillation” Hertz wrote, “is much shorter than 
the total duration of the discharge, and this suggests that we might use 
a single oscillation as a sign” (Hertz 1896, 321). Hertz wrote this two years 
later, telling the story of his experiments to the German Association for 
the Advancement Of Natural Science and Medicine. “Taking the oscillation 
which he couldn’t see as a sign to identify something unseeable”: this 
sentence I would like to highlight here, because it makes clear what 
Hertz was really concerned with. There were not only sparks he had to 
receive—he had also to solve an epistemological problem. His tiny sparks 
didn’t just receive the big sparks of the Rühmkorff, although these were 
the phenomena. But for Hertz in every spark there was something unsee-
able, like a furious mixture of abating frequencies caused by the damped 
oscillations, in every spark the Rühmkorff radiated. Feddersen’s photos 
didn’t show this “something” either, but gave at least a hint. Reproducing 
all the frequencies of a Rühmkorff spark on his floor-planes was impos-
sible. Instead, here the inneres Scheinbild comes into its own: Hertz had to 
construct just one of them, one wave out of thousands the sparks radiated. 
He had to reconstruct one of them, estimating the length and shape of one 
wave, to get the points of the wave superpositions in his room (i.e., getting 
brighter receiving sparks to locate its shape more precisely in the room), 
and all this in the reality of thousands upon thousands of other waves of 
other frequencies swooshing around. In other words, he had to build up a 
precise and conscious intra-action between his apparatuses and the effects 
he wanted to identify.  
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“When you discharge the conductor of an electrical machine” says Hertz, 
“you excite oscillations whose period lies between a hundred-millionth and 
a thousand-millionth of a second … There is still the possibility of success 
if we can only get two or three such sharply defined signs” (ibid.). The 
German original is important here: scharfe Zeichen. Please note this unusual 
German expression, actually a bit unclear. What is the sharpness of a sign? 
Clear and distinct, yes, but sharp? Maybe Feddersen and his view about 
spark photographs, is reverberating here. Scheinbilder. 
[Fig.4] Hertz 1893, 145
These now, two years later, are the harmonic spheres of Hertz (Fig. 4), 
very similar to what Maxwell has drawn in his Treatise. Seen from the strict 
perspective of Ernst Mach’s epistemology, all Hertz had done was to make 
incorrect inferences. “For Mach a physical theory was no more than an 
abbreviated expression for a collection of statements about sense-data. 
Terms which could not be grounded in sensory experience were not to be 
retained in scientific discourse, and theories appealing to unobservable or 
indirectly observable entities—the electric waves of Hertz or the atoms and 
molecules of Boltzmann’s statistical mechanics—ultimately were to be cast 
out as metaphysical superstitions” (Barker 1980, 247), as science historian 
Peter Barker put it. “Hertz on the other hand argued that … at the level of 
experimental observation, the correlation of sentences in the theory with 
phenomena in the world is [strictly and only] imposed by ourselves, ….” 
Hertz’s epistemology says that “a physical theory has a given structure is 
never a guarantee that reality has this structure” (ibid.).
That is to say: given the curves of Maxwell’s theory, “we find as many points 
on the curve as we please” (Hertz 1893, 145). Let’s be clear: Hertz is not 
faking his result. Although the curves are given here as a blueprint of his 
results, this is just one phase of his complex workflow. It is a phase and a 
part of his new intra acting approach to scientific practice.
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For the last time, let’s go back to the key device of Hertz and see what he 
has to say about how his mix of a simulative and experimental setting 
had worked out. “Just at the spot where we wish to detect the force” he 
explains, 
we place a conductor, … interrupted in the middle by a small spark-gap. 
The rapidly alternating force sets the electricity of [this receiving] con-
ductor in motion and gives rise to a spark at the gap. The method had 
to be found by experience, for no amount of thought could well have 
enabled one to predict that it would work satisfactorily. For the sparks 
are microscopically short, … It almost seems absurd … that they should 
be visible. (Hertz 1896, 322)
Well, nothing is absurd here. It ’s a mixture between thought simulation 
and proof from data. Most likely, Hertz climbed on his ladder only at those 
spots in the room where some theoretical computation in advance had 
already forecasted seeable sparks. Detecting sparks in an unexpected 
place would mean nothing, whereas not seeing sparks in an expected spot 
would mean at best a failure of the apparatus. Thus, Hertz performed a 
growing-in-practice and self-referential intra-action between his apparatus 
and the theory, proving, amplifying, and giving shape to itself in a feedback 
loop. 
II.
Electromagnetism had to be discovered that way, or, to say it the other 
way round, in a Latourian turn: that’s how electromagnetism produced its 
way of being detected. Let’s keep in mind that Hertz didn’t know anything 
about the interaction between photons and electrons: the discovery of the 
electron was still 10 years ahead, Planck’s constant, the smallest quantum 
of action, 12 years, and Einstein’s detection of the relativistic invariance of 
the electromagnetic waves another 18 years away. About 40 years ahead lay 
the definition of the uncertainty principle, Copenhagen complementarities, 
Schrödinger’s equation, Dirac’s bra-kets and von Neumann’s Hilbert space. 
Nevertheless, Hertz’s experimentation already shows rudimentary parts 
of the later quantum mechanical concept of nature. With and after Hertz 
nature is no longer an object of observation that remains untouched. 
Untouched nature, as Peter Mittelstaedt put it, is a nature “without relation 
to the possibility of observation” (Mittelstaedt 1986, 17 [my translation]). On 
the contrary, observation of nature in terms of physics is always a process 
of changing the observed, of constructing a new world of neo-ontological 
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facts that are at the same time real phenomena, intelligible noumena, and 
subjects of empirical verification.
And, since Hertz, we have electronic media! Let’s not forget, after the 
electromagnetic era of the telegraph, electronic media starts off with 
“Hertzian” waves, ironically in 1894, with Oliver Lodge’s experiment in 
Liverpool, as a commemoration of Hertz’s death. Electronic media, from 
radio telegraphy to the internet computer world, are based on quantum 
mechanically produced chips as well as on electromagnetism and the same 
epistemology, ontology, phenomenology, and ethics.
Regarding the medial side of his discovery, Hertz didn’t anticipate it. 
Being asked by an engineer whether his “rays” could transmit telephone 
messages or something similar he replied honestly—no! Facilities for 
modulating electromagnetic frequencies up and down didn’t exist in his 
time. And, he died before those weird folks like Edison and de Forest came 
around 15 years later, tinkering with light bulbs and cathode rays, not 
knowing what they were doing but thus inventing the radio tube.
Moreover, as a physicist Hertz had to cope with a far bigger dilemma. Elec-
tromagnetic waves demanded a medium for propagation, at his time called 
ether. His discovery seemed to affirm its existence insofar as one couldn’t 
imagine how else these waves could propagate other than in a special 
medium. But, on the other hand, Hertz knew so much about the almost 
absurd qualities that this material should have, for example, absolute 
transparency for ponderable matter and at the same time an absolute 
density, even harder than diamond, thereby behaving totally elastically to 
propagate transversal waves.2 
Hertz and Maxwell lived in the world of the ether absurdities, against which 
all possible inconsistencies of our quantum world look like child’s play. 
William Thomson, the great hero of Helmholtz, had famously proposed his 
so-called Vortex Atom Model in the 1860s. While Hertz in Kiel and Karlsruhe 
had to teach Weber and Neumann “acting at a distance” electricity, George 
FitzGerald came out with his rotating model of ether molecules. After 
Maxwell published his theory in the 1870s, countless models came up of 
how electricity would travel through this rolling balls (see Nersessian 1983, 
175–212). Hertz didn’t live to see J. J. Thomson’s electron detection and the 
subsequent plum pudding atom model of 1897 (see Keller 2013).
2 How familiar Hertz was with the ether theories of his time is shown in a recently 
found lecture from 1883: Hertz, Heinrich: Die Constitution der Materie: Eine 
Vorlesung über die Grundlagen der Physik aus dem Jahre 1884, Berlin: Springer, 1999.
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My point is here, all these concepts, including Weber/Neumann’s action 
at a distance electricity molecules (see Assis 1994), had one ontological 
assumption in common, and that is nature as a continuously com-
prehensive entirety, nature as an objective reality that doesn’t jump. Natura 
non facit saltus had been one of the main principles of modern physics since 
Leibniz, who first coined this “continuity law”: “c’est une de mes grandes 
maximes et des plus verifiées, que la nature ne fait jamais des sauts: ce que 
j’appelais la Loi de la Continuité” (Leibniz 1898, 110). Thus, Leibniz created a 
stable epistemological horizon corroborating the assumption that nature 
could be measurable with infinitesimal tools. More importantly, this same 
assumption allowed the subsequent emergence of a demand for a “com-
pleteness” of all theories dealing with a nature without jumps, called 
continuity physics. For instance, Heisenberg, still in 1955 referred to this 
continuity principle as if it was a cast-iron assertion. But, he gave a very 
“Bohrian” answer to the question of whether a quantum theory could still 
be considered in the realm of any continuity: “When the old adage ‘Natura 
non facit saltus’ is used as a basis for criticism of quantum theory, we can 
reply that certainly our knowledge can change suddenly and that this fact 
justifies the use of the term ‘quantum jump’” (Heisenberg 1958, 9).
Long before quantum physics, Hertz took another course. After having 
done his heavy experimental year with electromagnetism, he started 
reconfiguring the relation between object and observer, subject and 
object, nature and culture, theory and practice. Explicitly and fraught with 
consequences. In the preface of his last book about mechanics we read: 
“We form for ourselves mental pictures [innere Scheinbilder] or symbols of 
external objects; and the form which we give them is such that the nec-
essary consequents of the pictures in thought are always the pictures of 
the necessary consequents in nature of the things pictured” (Hertz 1899, 1). 
Again, Hertz is choosing his words very carefully; the German phrase innere 
Scheinbilder especially deserves a closer look.
Hertz follows Maxwell not only at the material level. He does it also in his 
epistemology, including a smart and almost inconspicuous renunciation 
of the continuity principle. “My theory,” Maxwell had written, leads “to 
the conception of a medium in which the propagation takes place.” We 
know that is the ether, never experimentally proven, but violently claimed 
and widely believed because of the continuity principle. “If we admit this 
medium as an hypothesis, I think … that we ought to endeavour to con-
struct a mental representation of all the details of its action, and this has 
been my constant aim in this treatise” (Maxwell 1873, 438). How smart. 
Maxwell conceived electromagnetic waves as ether waves, regardless of 
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whether ether exists. Here we already see his careful decoupling from 
nature as such, conceiving a new theory of nature, which leads to the 
concept of a “mental representation”—surely the role model for Hertz’s 
Scheinbild? Even if the continuity principle had been Maxwell’s guideline, 
the question would have to be: what is the mental representation of ether 
besides electricity? Maxwell’s answer: I don’t have one, and I don’t care. 
By the way, this is the reason Thomson rejected the ideas of Maxwell so 
strenuously.
The most striking thing to be found in Hertz’s sentences might be the self-
referential tone of his argument. To bestow pictures with an ability—as 
physical concepts—that their necessary consequences should always be 
pictures of the necessary consequences of the natural things pictured, 
weaves a carpet of paradoxes that can only be resolved by the perform-
ance of a scientific practice. According to this theory, what is happening 
in observing nature is an intra-action of pictures with pictures, where the 
difference between one and the other is infected by apparatuses that 
encapsulate nature in a concept that Karen Barad has coined “agential 
realism” (Barad 2007, 165). The “certain conformity between nature and our 
mind” demanded by Hertz wouldn’t work if nature is not part of our mind 
or our mind is an agent completely separated from nature. Indeed, this is a 
hidden variable, maybe the only necessary one in modern relativistic and 
quantum physics after Hertz, but if so then also, presumably, a new ethics 
is demanded.
“When from our accumulated previous experience,” Hertz continues, “we 
have once succeeded in deducing pictures of the desired kind, we can then 
in a short time develop by means of them, as by means of models, the con-
sequences which in the external world only arise in a comparatively long 
time, or as the result of our own interposition” (Hertz 1899, 1). I would like to 
call the reader’s attention to the word model. What Hertz is outlining here 
can very well be understood as the concept of a simulation wherein we are 
configuring consequences that will arise in the external world indepen-
dently of our ability to intervene appropriately.
In my view, the following sentence articulates the most striking and sur-
prising thought of Hertz expressing an explicitly incomplete ontology, or to 
put it the other way round, an ontology of incompleteness: “The pictures 
which we here speak of,” says Hertz, “are our conceptions of things; with 
the things themselves they are in conformity in one important respect, 
namely, in satisfying the above-mentioned requirement. For our purpose 
it is not necessary that they should be in conformity with the things in any 
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other respect whatever” (ibid., 2). Let’s apply this to the case of electro-
magnetic waves. Do we—today—know they consist of particles called 
photons? Yes! Does that play a role in taking them as waves as it is proven 
in all known diffraction and refraction experiments? No! “We do not 
know,” says Hertz, “nor have we any means of knowing, whether our con-
ceptions of things are in conformity with them in any other than this one 
fundamental respect” (ibid.). Unfairly enough, I here recall debates about 
complementarity as they were held decades later in the 1920s. But, from 
the outset, Hertz pleads explicitly for an ethic of not knowing, since we will 
never know what nature “in itself” would be. There is no continuity principle 
anymore in the world view of Hertz’s scientific thinking.
“As whether only matter exists and force is a property of it,” adds one 
of the biggest fans of Hertz, “or whether force exists independently of 
matter or conversely whether matter is a product of force … none of these 
questions are significant since all these concepts are only mental pictures 
whose purpose is to represent phenomena correctly” (Boltzmann 1974, 
104). Again, referring to Barad’s agential realism, with Ludwig Boltzmann we 
are in the same epistemological boat. The only existing things in nature are 
phenomena produced by a scientific practice led by mental pictures and 
symbols, but these phenomena are also enacted and acted out by nature. 
This is surely an idea of Bohr’s, whose work is impressively resumed in the 
propositions of Barad, but which is also already present in the scientific 
thought of Boltzmann as a reader of Hertz.
The young Ludwig Wittgenstein was an intense reader of Boltzmann and 
thereby became acquainted with the thinking of Hertz. Wittgenstein 
adopts Hertz’s vocabulary for his own account of the relationship between 
language and the world, as one reads in his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, 
written during the First World War:
2.1 We make for ourselves pictures of facts. [Wir machen uns Bilder der 
Tatsachen.] 
2.12 A picture is a model of reality. [Das Bild ist ein Modell der 
Wirklichkeit.]
2.201 A picture depicts reality by representing a possibility of existence 
or non-existence of states of affairs. [Das Bild bildet die Wirklichkeit 
ab, indem es eine Möglichkeit des Bestehens und Nichtbestehens von 
Sachverhalten darstellt.]
2.202 A picture represents a possible situation in logical space. [Das 
Bild stellt eine mögliche Sachlage im logischen Raume dar.]
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2.0212 It would then be impossible to draw up a picture of the world 
(true or false). [Es wäre dann unmöglich, ein Bild der Welt (wahr oder 
falsch) zu entwerfen.] (Wittgenstein [1922] 1984)
Wittgenstein’s pioneering role in the development of analytical philosophy 
is undisputed and yet his so-called metaphysical atomism is discussed in 
these circles very virulently, even today. This atomism refers to the thesis 
that the world as a whole cannot be pictured, but all objects and things we 
can talk of have an enacting part in the world, otherwise they wouldn’t exist 
at all.
And finally, Ernst Cassirer. He opened up his main work The Philosophy 
of Symbolic Forms, with a definition referring to Hertz. “The new ideal 
of knowledge … was brilliantly formulated by Heinrich Hertz in the 
introduction to his Principles of Mechanics. … The concept of the ‘image’,” 
writes Cassirer, 
had undergone an inner change. In place of the vague demand for a 
similarity of content between image and thing, we now find expressed 
a highly complex logical relation, a general intellectual condition …. 
Its value lies not in the mirroring of a given existence, but in what it 
accomplishes as an instrument of knowledge. (Cassirer 1955, 75)
Last comment: with and after Maxwell and Hertz, electricity gained a 
powerful epistemological dimension, but thereby it lost its Anschaulichkeit, 
its clarity, its aesthetic dimension completely. No similarity between image 
and thing anymore, to say it in Cassirer’s words. Today, a silicon chip, as the 
most important piece of electricity, is an entirely anesthetic and “anes-
thesial” (see Derrida and Kamuf 2014, 26) device in the sense of Derrida’s 
use of the word. In silicon grids we distinguish electrons from holes, as 
Shockley told us,3 although electrical holes have no existence physically. 
On the other hand, without it, without these “holes”, nothing would work in 
any modern computer, although there is no such a thing as a hole. Nobody 
will ever “see” it. It has, if at all, a quantum mechanical meaning only. Do 
these holes represent the magic of modernity, whose aesthetic potential 
holds the promise of a reconciliation of man and nature? I doubt it. The 
same applies to the electrodynamical occurrences in an antenna, the inter-
change between electrons and photons generating one of these myriad of 
3 William Shockley was one of the inventors of the transistor in 1948 and the creator of 
its theoretical description, Electrons and Holes in Semiconductors: With Applications to 
Transistor Electronics, New York: Van Nostrand 1950, IX: “The hole, or deficit produced 
by removing an electron from the valence-bond structure of a crystal, is the chief 
reason for the existence of this book.”
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electromagnetic waves that hold our world together—does anybody feel 
the magic of reconciliation here? I’m not sure. Starting with Hertz, we live, 
as Barad puts it, maybe for a century now, in “agential realities.” But instead 
of reflecting, in plain language, their limits and obligations, we still dream of 
them as a universal nature where electrical sparks spraying out of our head 
would tell of our vivid soul. But that’s not the world we live in anymore.
That brings me to the famous Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen article of 1935 
concerning the problem of quantum entanglement. “Any serious consid-
eration of a physical theory,” Einstein and his colleagues wrote, “must take 
into account the distinction between the objective reality, which is indepen-
dent of any theory, and the physical concepts with which the theory 
operates. These concepts are intended to correspond with the objective 
reality, and by means of these concepts we picture this reality to ourselves” 
(Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen 1935, 777). So far, this refers to the Hertzian 
lemma of 1894, but interestingly Einstein continues differently. “In 
attempting to judge the success of a physical theory we may ask ourselves 
two questions: (1) ‘Is the theory correct?’ and (2) ‘Is the description given by 
the theory complete?’.”
As we have seen, completeness is what Hertz and Boltzmann somewhat 
excluded from their theory, and it might have been one of their crucial 
arguments to get rid of continuity physics and its epitomes like ether. 
Maybe Einstein’s recollection has an inkling of that, so he feels he should 
become more verbose now: “Whatever the meaning is assigned to the 
term complete, the following requirement for a complete theory seems 
to be a necessary one: every element of the physical reality must have a 
counterpart in the physical theory.”
I would like to sum up my genealogical review of Hertz by noting that 
Einstein, in his objection to quantum entanglements, re-established 
the horizon of continuity physics explicitly. But this quantum discourse 
emerged from the same scientific work that Einstein owed his early 
theories to—and this work was forced to get rid of all continuity pre-
scriptions epistemologically. Maybe Hertz did that for the sake of a better 
world? We don’t know.
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Discussion with Wolfgang Hagen
Hans Jörg Rheinberger: Thank you very much for this fascinating historical 
path that you have made us follow. When I looked at the translation of 
“innere Scheinbilder,” I found it particularly stupid to call them mental 
pictures. Why didn’t you translate it as internal simulacra?
Wolfgang Hagen: I take the translations published wherever possible, so I 
don’t have to correct them so much. 
HJR: And then the other point is with respect to the introduction to this—to 
Hertz’s textbook—I think talking about these “innere Scheinbilder” 
and taking them as signs, that’s all plain Helmholtz in a way? That’s 
Helmholtz’s sign theory applied to the particular purposes that Hertz 
has in mind there, but he is, if I remember correctly—it’s a long time 
I’ve read this introduction—also making the claim that there is not just 
one consistent set of ”innere Scheinbilder”: you can have many of them 
that can be taken as being equivalent to each other.
WH: It’s not explicitly stated in the preface; maybe he worked on this later, I 
don’t know. 
Eric Winsberg: So what’s the German word for…
WH: “Innere Scheinbilder”
EW: I thought “Gedankenbilder” was the mental picture? 
WH: It’s not “Gedankenbilder,” it ’s just “innere Scheinbilder.” Here we have 
the slide. Some translations used mental images and some used 
symbols. I’ll show you the real source of it—it’s Goethe actually, I found 
out. It ’s from Theory of Colors, obviously.
”I looked on the bright circle five seconds and then having closed the 
aperture saw the colored visionary circle floating before me.“ And the 
colored visionary circle, this is an English translation of Goethe, is in 
German “das farbige Scheinbild.” It ’s actually what you discover when 
you look too long into a very bright light and then close your eyes and 
then you have this…
EW: And that’s the expression Hertz uses?
WH: Yes, “Scheinbild,” which is untranslatable into English because it’s not 
an illusionary picture, it ’s wrong. “Scheinbild,” it ’s a Goethe word, that’s 
all.
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EW: It’s what we call an aftereffect in English?
WH: Yes, but it ’s not an aftereffect because it’s Goethe’s theory of colors. 
It ’s very romantic. 
Anne Dippel: The first time this “Scheinbild” appears is in Plato’s cave.
WH: But not in German.
AD: No, but it would be helpful to look up the Greek word…
WH: Very!
AD: …and then from the Greek word you could come to the…
WH: Goethe.
EW: You have to translate it into “Scheinbilder” okay, from the…
AD: No.
EW: If you translate it from Plato it would be “Scheinbilder.”
WH: The word is seldom used in German. So I looked it up with every tool I 
have, in all the digital libraries, and I only found this Goethe quotation, 
which is cited very often in many other books.
AD: I’m sure you could find it in Hermann Pauli’s Etymological Dictionary or 
in Kluger or in Grimm. I am very, very sure that…
WH: Yes, of course.
AD: … this word is described etymologically and then you find the first time 
it appeared. But double terms in German appear from the sixteenth 
century onwards, so it is a new term, it must appear around 1870.
WH: Interesting, that’s a good explanation. It ’s a very interesting word, 
because it’s so important.
Lukas Mairhofer: So since you betrayed us, I of course have to ask about 
Wittgenstein, and also because when you ended with Einstein I 
thought, well, where is it that this continuum physics comes in again 
on a more epistemological level? Is it maybe with Ernst Mach? Is that 
maybe one of the big frictions between Machian thought and the Boltz-
mann–Hertz approach?
WH: I don’t know, actually. I can’t answer the question because I would 
say that the prominence and the popularity of Wittgenstein and Cas-
sirer—and their relation and reference to Hertz, making him prominent 
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as well—is very important in this context. So Einstein for sure knew 
Wittgenstein and the Frege group and all that, maybe he knew Mach 
better. I don’t know. But either way, the original Hertz was not read 
and the original theory of Boltzmann referring to Hertz was not known 
anymore.
The whole “Scheinbild-Theorie” was kind of thought of in the context of 
Wittgenstein and Cassirer, as it is today. But the most important point 
for me is not the “Scheinbild-Theorie” but the break with continuity 
physics.
John Durham Peters: So, okay, I’m not a physicist, I’m a media theorist…
WH: …like me.
JDP: …and it strikes me that what you found is ground zero of media theory, 
in which all the contradictory notions of media are actually combined 
in Hertz…
WH: …that’s right.
JDP: …whereas before you’ve got the kind of natural element, like the ether, 
after the mass medium of radio, you’re talking about the variety of 
semiotic practices by which we reveal reality. But I think the one you’re 
most interested in is the fact that the medium is something in which 
we intervene and thereby represent at the same time. 
WH: Right.
JDP: And so I guess my question is: what is a medium? And that’ll be the 
question for the previous lecture as well. I’m still confused by this 
question.
WH: But you gave the answer. I mean Hertz’s reflection on what he did is 
in a way media theoretical as well, of course. So you’re completely 
right. And we have—I’ve argued in this direction for a long time 
already—that media theory, which doesn’t exist: media epistemology 
is equivalent to quantum epistemology and even cybernetic epis-
temology, because the figure of feedback mechanism and the figure 
of the self-referential building of not only concepts but the interaction 
between apparatus and nature, which is conceived in cybernetics as 
well, obviously stems from this source.
Arianna Borelli: I usually try to avoid using the term media too much. I 
know enough of media theory to know that there are all new media. 
In this context and sometimes when I present this subject, I like to use 
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this term medium, as you would say, to prompt thoughts to go in a 
direction different than if I would say representation or form, espe-
cially if I’m speaking to historians of science or philosophers, to point 
out that there is some dynamic there in this representation, it ’s not 
passive.
Martin Warnke: Well friends, thank you so much. Now having brought us 
to the point where we just don’t know anymore about the difference 
between theory and simulation, would you still make any difference 
after, say, having given up the continuity hypothesis?
WH: No, epistemologically not, but maybe in a way Eric showed us yes-
terday, practically. Because simulation is a new field of symbolic 
practice, maybe algorithm practice, I don’t know. It has to be defined 
as a new field of practice, and epistemologically it ’s equivalent to 
any mathematical theory of nature. But that is not enough of an 
answer for what is a good simulation. We have to think about a kind of 
taxonomy of simulations; I don’t know. I was not giving a lecture about 
simulations, but there must be a kind of taxonomy or something, a 
kind of logical work on it; the epistemological question you asked 
me—I mean, this seems for me to be answered.
It’s like Hertz says, I mean it’s elasticity, it ’s simulating elasticity.
Frank Pasemann: Yes, I’m a little bit confused by the concept of simulation. 
Of course I would like to discern between simulation in the sense that 
you can simulate something in the world in your brain, from computer 
simulation, which is of course perhaps closer to the media thing. So 
one should keep these as different things, at least for me.
WH: Of course.
FP: Otherwise there is a lot of confusion.
WH: What would you say about quantum simulation in the sense of 
Feynman, done without computers? Done without tool machines?
FP: I mean it’s just to be precise what you mean by that.
WH: That’s what I say…
FP: Otherwise we get confused.
WH: We have to have a kind of taxonomy.
HJR: Right. Exactly, thanks.
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EW: Just a quick comment about the EPR quote that you put up: my memory 
of this is a little bit murky, but I think I remember Arthur Fine (2016) 
saying that that particular passage about elements of physical reality 
was one that Einstein didn’t approve of, it was Rosen’s—he wrote that 
passage I think and it might have been added to the draft after Einstein 
had seen it, before it went to press.
WH: Really? Okay. 
EW: He might not have been a big fan of that.
WH: I mean god is not dicing, right?
EW: What’s that?
WH: God is not dicing.
EW: Yeah, yeah.
WH: Playing with dice, so it’s a continuity statement as well.
HJR: So absolutely, an atomistic statement. Very strange.
AD: I have two questions: I would love to hear something about that ethical 
dimension; and the second, it is very, very interesting what you said 
about the meaning of the image and the “Scheinbild” in mind and 
nature and so on. But when you look at actual physics practice, not in 
quantum mechanics, but in other fields, like high energy physics, the 
image itself is not important anymore as a device inside nature.
WH: But the simulation is important.
AD: The simulation is important.
WH: This is the image part.
AD: So you would just translate the digits and the algorithms and say that’s 
equal to images?
WH: Of course.
AD: …and there’s no distinction between the algorithmic image and the 
visual image, because it seems to me there is a big distinction and 
that humans make sense out of that, and it’s easier for us to somehow 
interpret images compared to letting the machine do the work, the 
medium doing the work of interpretation.
WH: That’s right but we program the machine, as long as we are dealing 
with Turing machines, so there is the image part in it for me. Creating 
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an algorithm is a way of creating images, so to say, because what is 
an image, on the other hand? What is a picture, on the other hand? 
Actually we don’t know.
AD: Okay, got that. The second thing is you mentioned those examples 
from the natural sciences in the nineteenth century where the idea of 
a continuous or unified worldview somehow breaks apart, and that is 
something we observe not only in physics but we observe it in many, 
many other domains, in philosophy and so on. And then you show us 
how this need for some homogeneous description of the world returns 
through this. What kind of symptom is that? Wasn’t it a liberating situ-
ation that Hertz detected, and how do you describe this constant urge 
and need of people to find some unified theory, when the world isn’t 
unifiable according to what Hertz stated from logical reasoning? 
WH: I don’t know. I mean: have a guess! Maybe there are political reasons, 
or maybe economical reasons, to have a separate realm of nature only 
physicists can work on. I mean I don’t know what the reason is to come 
back to continuity, to the physics of continuity or to a nature that is an 
entirety.
AD: Well, that was a power practice then in the end.
WH: Power, power may be one—maybe some other—I don’t know, I mean I 
have to think about that, like you. But what I can say is that Hertz took 
another course and then he died, so to say. I mean that maybe electro-
magnetism as he found it took another course. I would just emphasize 
this Latourian picture of his experiments. You can say electromag-
netism demanded this way of being detected. Know what I mean?
And this is a way we should think in the future, and therefore Karen 
Barad’s approach is so interesting because she, in my view, is one of 
the first who radically thinks in a way that quantum physics and classic 
physics are not the problem, but the nature–culture relation in physics 
in general. So we have to think about that again under this perspective 
and from the start of the history of electromagnetism. Because for me 
electromagnetism makes a great cut into history. This is a real epoch 
break so to say.
There, in 1888, begins modernity, and not earlier, because electromag-
netism is the first force, power, whatever, medium, we can produce in 
interaction with nature, so to say. It changed everything. I mean, just 
on a simple historical level you can see that. The industrial success 
and everything of the western world depended on electromagnetic 
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techniques. And that’s my point. We have to reconsider that under this 
epistemological horizon Hertz gives us. We have to really dig in under 
this horizon, and then we come to the point of ethics. Because there 
is a hidden variable, as I put it, between nature and mind, and there 
obviously is one, because there has to be a conformity, as Hertz says. 
Neumann would have described it—in his measurement chapter, which 
is very interesting—as an exchange of entropy and knowledge. That’s 
his argument. In his measurement chapter, he says we can exchange 
entropy against knowledge. It ’s a very interesting thing. It stems from 
Fechner and this physio-psychological view of the world and things like 
that. Nobody invented something by himself. So, what I want to say is, 
this is kind of a part of physical thinking we should go back to, to dis-
cuss our problem of simulation of nature.
MW: What came back to my mind was that paper by Kittler (1991), where 
he says that computer simulations jump over the category and the 
register of imagination. I don’t know what your opinion on this is. Then, 
we would have a difference between “innere Scheinbilder,” because 
there are no “innere Scheinbilder” anymore, according to Kittler, if we 
would believe him. Because he says this is exactly the very nature of 
computer simulations, that there are no inner pictures anymore, this 
register is jumped over and left out. Would you think this argument has 
some reason to it?
WH: I wouldn’t agree with your statement.
[To Kristel Michielsen and Hans De Raedt] I’m very interested in the 
source code of your simulation. Because I programmed for maybe 7–8 
years in a row for other reasons, and the subjective experience I had 
was that programming is working with “innere Scheinbilder”: you can’t 
create an algorithm without having the imagination to think about how 
the machine works. So, what else is it than an “inneres Scheinbild”? 
Because it doesn’t exist. The computer you’re thinking about—wired 
programming—doesn’t exist. And that’s a problem all the time, but 
you know what I mean. So, the performance of programming is exactly 
creating “innere Scheinbilder” in a mathematical and special structure. 
And, whoever did that, seriously, will agree. Right?
HJR: But I think the really interesting feature of this paradoxical formulation 
of ”Scheinbild” is that it is deconstructive.
WH: Yes, right.
HJR: On the one hand, it says picture; on the other hand, it denies…
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WH: It says “Schein.” Yes, it ’s wonderful. Good remark.
Hans De Raedt: I fully agree with what you said about, say, the practice 
of computer programming and so on. But, maybe I would also like to 
make a bridge to what Martin says because, when we have done this… 
I’m talking about computing on a digital computer, we know that, at 
least in principle—but we can also do it in practice, although it is fairly 
expensive—we can build a, let’s say, Lego machine that does exactly 
the same thing that our program is doing. So then, would you still call 
that a “Scheinbild”? So I have now a mechanical…
WH: That’s an interesting question.
HDR: …device that is doing exactly the same type of thing. I mean, not 
exactly in terms of, say, basic things it does. But the final result is the 
same—things are moving around and so on. So it’s really mechanical. 
We can clearly visualize it. I mean, it ’s a natural thing for us, and it does 
the same thing. So where are the “Scheinbilder” then?
WH: I thought about this tinkering. I mentioned Edison and de Forest, 
successfully, because they are building the radio tubes, which are so, 
so immensely important for the evolution of electromagnetic media. 
But neither Edison nor de Forest knew a thing. Maybe they worked 
with “innere Scheinbilder,” I don’t know. But, the main thing is, they 
worked with material. They did it. They did it somehow. They tinkered, 
they just practiced by playing around with things. This is not “innere 
Scheinbild.” When I programmed, I couldn’t play around with things. I 
would have liked to do that, but what I played around with was some 
things in my head, and I can’t even describe them.
FP: And just as a comment I spontaneously would think the same thing. But 
when I talked yesterday about the explorative simulations, you can 
think about programming, creating new programs, and constructing 
systems you haven’t thought about. And that’s one of the interesting 
things today.
Britta Schinzel: To add to the “innere Scheinbilder” effect from logic 
recursion theory: we know that for every mathematical function, there 
exists an uncountably infinite set of infinite sequences of equivalent 
programs. So, you know that every “innere Scheinbild” produces a 
different program, a different source code.
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HJR: Now things are starting to become messy and complicated at this 
point. Let us stop here, and thank our speaker for this stimulating dis-
cussion. Thank you.
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Intervention
Hans-Jörg Rheinberger
As announced beforehand, I will not be able to present a fitting, full-length 
contribution to this workshop, for two reasons: first, I am not a physicist 
and in particular not familiar with the mathematics involved in most of the 
argumentation of our preparatory reading; and second, I am not an expert 
in computer simulation either. Therefore I am actually here to listen to the 
specialists and learn from them rather than being ready to present my own 
work pertinent to the topic.
What I have always been most interested in as a historian of science is the 
question of how to describe and understand scientific experimentation 
and the shapes it assumes over time. For our purposes, it might be safe 
to start from the observation that the forms of experimentation span 
a broad space between two extremes. On the one hand, we have what 
could be called the demonstration experiment. You trim your experiment 
so that it fits, or fulfils the conditions of, certain theoretical assumptions 
that are being taken for granted. This is the traditional idea of an exper-
iment as a testing mechanism. I myself have been more inclined to look at 
what Friedrich Steinle and others aptly call “exploratory experimentation” 
(Steinle 2005; Waters 2007). Exploratory experiments ideally produce 
knowledge that is not yet to hand, that is, genuinely new knowledge. The 
question is how experiments should be arranged and conducted so that 
they potentially give rise to knowledge that we do not yet have and could 
not even have imagined.
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My interest is thus less in experiments designed to test consequences that 
can be derived from certain acknowledged premises, but rather in exper-
iments that are designed in such a way that they allow for the potential 
detection of things that are not in the realm of the possible consequences 
of our present knowledge. This is precisely what conveys to the sciences 
their intrinsic historicity. Historicity is unthinkable without that element of 
contingency—not pure contingency, but a contained contingency of sorts. 
Let me relate at this point to the title of our workshop: this is exactly what 
I understand by the notion of “event.” Experimentation in this sense is 
“eventuation.”
My question in the context of this workshop is whether this distinction 
maps onto the two kinds of experiments described in the two papers that 
we were given to read. The matter-wave interference experiments might fit 
this latter description (Hornberger 2012). The question is whether computer 
experiments as described in the second paper (De Raedt, Katsnelson, 
and Michielsen 2014), which basically lack the resistance and resilience of 
matter to interact with as in real world experimentation, can do this at all. 
This is one point that interests me here. I would like to learn more about 
the concepts involved with in silico experimentation (see e.g., Gramels-
berger 2010), and in particular the relation between laboratory experiments 
and computer experiments.
There is a longstanding tradition of what are being called “thought exper-
iments.” Does computer experimentation give thought experiments 
a particular shape and power? Or are they simply a means to test the 
consequences of certain mathematical assumptions, or to follow the 
deployment of certain algorithms, a tool to check virtual models as Jülich 
neuroscientist Katrin Amunts recently put it (see Zauner 2016, 16)?
There is another point I would like to briefly address. Reading the paper of 
Hans De Raedt, Mikhail Katsnelson, and Kristel Michielsen on “Quantum 
theory as the most robust description of reproducible experiments,” (De 
Raedt, Katsnelson, and Michielsen 2014) I was intrigued by two things.
First, there is the plain and unmistakable rejection of any ontological 
commitment as far as the quantum behavior of particles—or more 
generally, matter—is concerned. “Quantum theory,” the authors write 
by appealing to Niels Bohr, Max Born and Wolfgang Pauli, “describes our 
knowledge of the atomic phenomena rather than the atomic phenomena 
themselves” (ibid., 46). This is a radically epistemological statement. The 
question is: Can we generalize it? The first step would be to ask whether 
this would also pertain to computer experimentation. Computer models, 
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say, of climate change, would thus describe our knowledge of the dynamics 
of the climate and not of climate change itself. The second step would be to 
ask whether we could include the scientific assessment of any macroscopic 
phenomenon as well, to the extent that any theory scientifically addressing 
the phenomena of our world would describe our knowledge—and test its 
consistency—of these phenomena rather than representing a statistical or 
cause-effect characteristic of the respective phenomena in question.
That would amount to the conclusion that scientific reasoning would be 
radically situated at the level of epistemology, including the measurements 
and counts that are being recorded as the outcomes of an experiment. 
These traces would always already belong to the level of representation, 
with the additional consequence that “representation” would be the wrong 
word to use in that context altogether. Ontologies in science would thus 
have to be qualified as metaphysical, following a tradition that goes at least 
back to Ernst Mach and his peers at the turn from the nineteenth to the 
twentieth century.
This latter point appears to me actually to be implied by the second claim 
of the paper that I found intriguing: that a macroscopic experimental 
setup with the characteristics described in that paper—“There may be 
uncertainty about each event. The conditions under which the experiment 
is carried out may be uncertain. The frequencies with which events are 
observed are reproducible and robust against small changes in the con-
ditions” (ibid., 50)—can be given a quantum theoretical description. And 
in addition, that such a description is postulated to follow from ordinary 
reasoning in terms of logical inference. Does that mean, in the last con-
sequence, that the distinction between a quantum level of description 
and a macroscopic level of description actually collapses? The following 
sentence appears indeed to indicate such a collapse: “Our basic knowledge 
always starts from the middle, that is, from the world of macroscopic 
objects. According to Bohr, the quantum theoretical description crucially 
depends on the existence of macroscopic objects which can be used as 
measuring devices” (ibid., 47). And the accompanying question is whether 
“our basic knowledge” includes “the principles of logical inference” 
(ibid., 46). The overall question is whether the argument can be sum-
marized as follows: take an experimental setup with the above described 
(macroscopic) characteristics, apply the principles of logical inference, and 
you will arrive at a quantum theoretical description of the situation. Formu-
lated otherwise: a quantum theoretical description is implied in and follows 
from a particular kind of experimental situation and the events resulting 
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from that situation. The conclusion is that quantum theory would thus be a 
description of our very experimental way of knowing, if I see it correctly.
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Discussion with Hans-Jörg Rheinberger
Janina Wellmann: Thank you very much. Hans de Raedt, you want to answer 
first to the interventional questions of Hans-Jörg Rheinberger? 
Hans De Raedt: Well, I’m not so sure. Too many questions at the same 
time; there’s a lot of uncertainty here. I think what we try to show in 
the papers and data is that if you have these different uncertainties 
in the problem, and the way of collecting data is statistical, that it 
unavoidably leads to the kind of description that we now characterize 
as quantum mechanical. Whether or not you really then see the effects 
depends on the scale of the uncertainty versus the set of knowledge 
that you have, so to speak, for certain. But the structure of the theory 
is always like that; I think that is true. From a purely logical point 
of view, if you agree with the principles of logical inference, then 
the answer is it has to be the quantum mechanical description as a 
framework. 
Lukas Mairhofer: Although I agree that we should be really careful about 
deriving ontologies from our theories, I have the strong feeling that 
you always have to assume something about the entities that your 
theory’s operating on, that is on the logical level. Quantum theory 
doesn’t tell us about the fundamental entities, what they are. It doesn’t 
tell us, “Well, it ’s a particle.” Or, “Well, it ’s a wave.” But, it tells us that we 
should not think about it as only particles or only waves. That’s what I 
think. And, to come to my question: What do you have to assume about 
your entities to logically infer quantum mechanics from microscopic 
classical physics? Because I don’t think that you can. How do you get 
there? 
HDR: So you have the paper there? 
Hans-Jörg Rheinberger: Yes, I have the paper here. 
HDR: If I remember well, maybe on the first page there’s a quote from Bohr. 
You can read it, maybe, for us about what the aim of physics is sup-
posed to be. 
HJR: Yes. We have here three sentences that are ascribed to Bohr. 
First, there is no quantum world; there is only an abstract physical 
description. Second, it is wrong to think that the task of physics is to 
find out how nature is. Third, physics concerns what we can say about 
nature. 
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HDR: Okay, that’s the one I want to have. So, the starting point of these 
considerations is exactly that we are not asking about what is, but only 
about what we can say. The starting point is the notion of the event, 
and event means the perception of the event that we as humans have. 
And, we can, of course, also start asking what is this? But this question 
we do not ask. 
LM: But why not? Because to have…
HDR: Because we don’t want to. 
LM: But if you have an event, you already… I mean, you already ascribe 
to nature that it ’s possible to affect your senses. That’s already not a 
logical statement. You cannot talk about… I mean, I’m completely with 
you that we should not put everything into ontology and that it is not 
the task of physics to teach us about nature. But, even if it is the task 
of physics to tell us about our perceptions, we have to assume, in our 
theory, some things about nature. I don’t see how we can completely 
get rid of ontology. 
HDR: No, no. But the paper is not against ontology, not at all. It ’s about how 
you reason on the basis of the information that you have about exper-
iments. It is not against ontology. The talk that Kristel [Michielsen] gave 
is much more on the other side than this one. And there is no con-
tradiction. There’s absolutely no contradiction nor a conflict in these 
things. So, this paper is about how we can reason in the presence of 
uncertainty, and that is all it tries to do. And the starting point is then 
the data that we accumulate in the experiment. Where these data are 
coming from and whether there is an ontology behind it, which we 
don’t know in any case, simply doesn’t matter for the description. That 
is the message.
HJR: But the message is also that the kind of uncertainty we have on the 
macroscopic level is not qualitatively different from the uncertainty 
that you have on the microscopic or the atomic level. And that’s a 
strong kind of claim. 
HDR: So the underlying assumption in the whole story, of course, is that 
we never know everything. So, certainty would mean that for a given 
situation we are dealing with, we really know everything about the 
situation. Now, this is an assumption I’m not prepared to make. We 
always deal with situations of uncertainty. I’m not talking about real 
laboratory experiments whatsoever. Not about some mathematical 
theory. Because, in that case, of course we do know everything. It ’s 
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hidden in the axioms. That’s another situation. So we’re not talking 
about this situation, we’re talking about a situation where we have 
data that we accumulate by whatever means, say by looking at it or just 
registered by means of a computer or whatever. We have data and we 
want to make inferences based on these data. And then, completely in 
line, I think, with what Bohr was saying, is that in that case, quantum 
mechanics is exhausted in the sense that you cannot do better. It ’s the 
best inference you can make on the basis of the data that you have. 
In that sense, many of the experiments that are being done today, 
which are, so to speak, quantum experiments, are merely some kind 
of demonstration that people are searching for the conditions under 
which this is realized. And they have to work very, very hard to realize 
these conditions. If you don’t have the right conditions, you’ll also see 
something—why not analyze it? You don’t, because you cannot. You 
see? You have no tools to do that. You don’t see systematics—no. 
Only in special cases you get systematics and so on, and what the 
paper tells you is that this is because it is the best. It is a kind of fixed 
point. It ’s an optimization in terms of theories. That is what the paper 
says, but it doesn’t say anything about ontology. Not at all. 
HJR: That was my addition. 
LM: And I think my question was more directed to this addition. 
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Round Table
John Durham Peters: My question is that if the interaction of object and 
apparatus is at the heart of quantum physics, why is it that popular 
conceptions of what science is are still so connected to just grabbing 
on to reality as such with sense data? Why is that so hard to shake? 
That’s my question. 
Frieder Nake: I don’t have a question. Is it possible for a regular human 
being to understand quantum mechanics?
Thomas Bjørnsten: I’m not sure that I have a regular question, but I can say, 
which some of you already know by now, that one of the reasons that 
I’m here is that I’m interested in the topic, because I’m doing research 
on data visualization. So, for me, a really interesting question con-
cerning what has been discussed here: apart from all the aspects of 
quantum theory and physics that I don’t understand, the interrelation 
of what we conceive of as visualization as opposed to or parallel with 
simulation is a puzzling question for me that I’m dealing with. So it’s 
just to sort of mention that there’s a discussion around this topic. The 
differences, the similarities, between the negotiation of visualization 
as opposed to simulation. This is what I’m bringing with me from here, 
which we may discuss further on at some point.
Lukas Mairhofer: I’m still hooked up a little bit on the discussion from 
before. So the question that’s running around in my head at the 
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moment is where does the uncertainty come from? Does it only come 
from our imperfect knowledge, or does it also come from the other 
side of the cognitive process? Does it come from nature itself? And 
then, of course, is quantum uncertainty really the same as macroscopic 
uncertainty? Because after all, there are very different statistics that 
describe these uncertainties. So where does the uncertainty come 
from?
Mira Maiwöger: Right now I’m mainly wondering about what I’m dealing 
with in my daily life, like my Bose–Einstein condensates in this lab 
together with this machine. What is this? Because after all, they kick 
back sometimes, so this phrase by Karen Barad, the world kicks 
back, which I was thinking about before in the discussion about the 
ontological aspects of us doing science. For me, this is sometimes 
mainly the ontology, I guess. Sometimes things just don’t work out, 
the lab does not work or the experiment does not work. Or it works 
differently. There is this element of surprise.
Stefan Zieme: Okay, maybe I can give an answer now. I think quantum 
mechanics doesn’t make any sense beyond the mathematical frame-
work, and that’s fine with me. I never dare to think about it at all. What 
do I care? It works out perfectly. It ’s the same with quantum field 
theory, and, if you continue that line, it goes into string theory, and 
there you are at a point where you have a purely mathematical frame-
work. You could call it mathematical physics. What drives me is, how do 
you chart new grounds in mathematical physics where you don’t have 
anything? You don’t have any phenomena, you don’t have any settings, 
you don’t have any data, and you don’t have axioms. It ’s not math. It ’s 
something very strange; I don’t know what it is. There’s progress, and I 
don’t know why there’s progress, but I like it.
Eric Winsberg: I think I probably said enough.
Wolfgang Hagen: I don’t know. I’m a little bit struck because of this day, 
and I learned a lot. I’m looking for this question of ethics to answer 
somehow, because I found out that it is very important to talk about 
ethics in the realm of physical knowledge, so to say. And I would rec-
ommend to hold, very soon, a workshop about that.
Jeremias Herberg: I joined in late. It was great to hear you guys speak. One 
thing I can just share to maybe, in some way, contribute: I just wrote 
a chapter in my dissertation on how the notion of fields traveled to 
sociology, and how it became a “Scheinbild,” maybe. And actually 
Round Table 161
occupying an entire area of sociology with only one Scheinbild, Pierre 
Bourdieu, and how you could maybe alternate that with another 
Scheinbild. So that’s only to add to this discussion that we just had on, 
in this case, social ontology maybe, and the way we look at it and the 
interaction between those things. That happens in the social sciences 
in a similar way without, I think, simulation maybe. I mean, sociologists 
today hardly speak about that. That’s it.
Frank Pasemann: Well, I think I don’t want to comment on quantum 
mechanics because I spent too much of my lifetime on that. But I would 
like to comment on something I still believe, and perhaps others also, 
that computer simulations can produce new knowledge. I showed 
you this Fermi–Pasta–Ulam problem as one of the first examples. But 
today, I think it’s very clear why they call it exploratory simulations: it ’s 
that you really find new things. There are a lot of examples. Perhaps I 
can tell about my own way using this approach. As a physicist, looking 
into brain sciences, I saw all these very interesting fantasies about how 
brains work. But coming from outside what you learn first is that brains 
are oscillating and there is a highly recurrent connectivity between 
neurons. Everyone knows it. But the neural network theory was about 
input/output maps. And, of course, if you look at the recurrences and 
knew a little bit from cybernetics, you know that more interesting 
things must happen there, just because of the loop structure.  One 
then may hypothesize that the capacity of biological brains relies 
exactly on these properties. Of course you cannot verify that on anes-
thetized cats or something like that. So I said forget it—I don’t need 
this kind of knowledge. So what is the point? There is a hypothesis: 
Capabilities of brains rely on looping signals. And, of course, then you 
go to simulation and look for systems that have these loops. You then 
realize that there are too many parameters and processes to study, 
that there is no theory, and that mathematics can tell you almost 
nothing about the observed phenomena.
 You only know there are very many interesting phenomena to expect, 
but you don’t know what will be of relevance for brain science. That’s 
why I came to robotics, assuming that to have a brain only makes sense 
if you have to control a body. Very many discussions were about results 
obtained from studies on dead brains, not reflecting the functions 
of living brains. So one may learn lots of things from exploratory 
simulations—for instance, that very different sizes of systems can 
all generate one and the same function. And then you may come up 
with new questions concerning stability of brain processes, plasticity 
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of brain structure and all that. To have a test body for your simulated 
processes you may then use physical or simulated robots in real or 
simulated environments to control the boundary conditions of your 
simulation. Then I know what I’m doing, then I’m not fantasizing. So if 
you implement your results from this type of simulations to something 
which is real world like a robot, I think you can get quite a lot of new 
insights into how brain may work.
EW: Just very quickly, on the point about computer simulations dis-
covering new things, there’s, I think, supposedly announced a dis-
covery yesterday of a new ninth planet. We got rid of Pluto—it’s no 
longer a planet. They think maybe they found a new ninth planet 
using computer simulation. So, it seems pretty clear that computer 
simulation is…
SZ: Well, I guess we should pass it on, but I have strong objections to that. 
Just to put it on the list that you say there’s a computer simulation 
on something. I mean, in 1846 Le Verrier did the very same thing. So 
what’s not a simulation? You solve Newton’s equations with some 
perturbations, and the solution doesn’t work out, so he had a world 
view, he had a paradigm. He made a choice, he followed the path, 
something was left over, he experimented—with a mathematical tool, 
of course—but, to my belief, this is not a simulation. If you put it on a 
computer, you can do it on pen and paper when you’re good, or you 
can put it on a computer. That’s your choice. But I wouldn’t call that a 
simulation. 
Kristel Michielsen: Okay, so I have a question, and maybe it is more to the 
historians of science. My question is, I have the impression that, at this 
moment, the atmosphere, at least in quantum physics, is such that 
experimenters are trying to measure what theory predicted or has 
given, and unknown facts are simply thrown away because they don’t 
have an explanation for them. And, as a consequence of this, by doing 
computer simulations, by playing around with computer simulations, 
we could maybe find new things. But the atmosphere is such that 
they’re then considered to be strange, even not willing to test because 
they do not fit into the picture. So, my question is, why is this? Was this 
also the case maybe when they started to think about quantum theory 
as a new theory?
Hans De Raedt: Did you see similar things in biology?
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KM: Yeah, because you have a very nice example that you suddenly find 
something new. But you proceed and do experiments in computer 
simulations to just verify some experiments or try to prove them in a 
more material type of sense. 
Hans-Jörg Rheinberger: I think the basic question for the history of 
science—if you take the history of science in the broad sense and 
include not only physics but the other areas of working “scientifically” 
as well—then, of course, you realize that the kind of paradigms that 
we observe in the development of physics, and in particular during 
the twentieth century, are not at all characteristic of most of the 
other areas where science is being practiced. The conundrum, or the 
difficulty, is that philosophers of science have always been taking 
physics as the paradigm of what it means to do science. This brings 
with it a distortion, I would say, that prohibits us from seeing the entire 
complexity of scientific activity, be it if you go into the depth of history 
or be it if you spread out in all these different areas where scientific 
activities are going on. And I think we need a way and also a place to 
kind of bring this complexity to the table, and also take it seriously.
Angela Gencarelli: I’m a literary scholar and I only have a vague idea 
about quantum physics, but right now I’m working on a project about 
the narrativity of physical texts. So, my question would point to the 
direction of the history of science: How are we able to construct and 
reconstruct scientific processes through texts?
HJR: So this is actually the question we just had on the table, asked on 
another level. Can you really learn about the dynamics of science by 
stepping from one published paper to the other? I don’t think that it 
works—it gives you an distorted vision of how science is proceeding. 
So we need to take into account not only the text but also the context 
to play with this kind of distinction, I would say. And, in the way of 
how we are able, or could, or should, construct our narratives about 
science, historically, there is no royal path to go. I think if you try to 
recount a shorter episode in the history of experimental science, 
to describe the trajectory of an experimental system is a possible 
narrative. But, if you, say, follow the history of physics over 150 years, 
you will probably not be able to choose such an entity as the point 
that can give you a consistent narrative. So you have to think about 
narrativity if you do history of science.
WH: Just one other short hint: maybe you should read one of the most 
important texts in the history of philosophy. And this is the “Crisis Text” 
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by Husserl from 1935 [The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental 
Phenomenology]. It ’s an attempt to think about the possibility of a 
history of science, actually, and how Husserl worked it out. From the 
method, not in the philosophical arguments itself, it ’s very interesting, 
and will take you far beyond the concept of a text.
Janina Wellmann: Working on the history of biology and on processes, i.e. 
processes in general and modern attempts to create a digital embryo 
in particular, I am interested in the question how one transfers the 
reductive methods of mathematics onto living organisms. What 
happens to the liveliness of the organism when you work with a 
computer? What is life when it gets into the computer? And can you 
use the same methods for particles and for the living? We study a 
dead brain and even when we study organisms in vivo we do not know 
exactly to what extent they are still alive and how to detect or quantify 
or define the liveness of what we experiment upon.
HDR: So maybe I’ll try to paraphrase John von Neumann. He said at some 
point, “If you tell me what intelligence is, I will put it on the computer.” I 
think it’s the same here. So, if you would give us precise criteria of what 
you think life is, then that means you’ll specify certain rules by which 
we can identify what it means to be alive. And then you can put them 
into the computer as rules. 
JW: I want to give you an example. Usually when you have these exper-
iments on embryos, they are kept alive. It ’s a very difficult process, 
but it ’s never described what exactly it means that they are alive. 
What are the criteria? I just had a very interesting discussion with an 
embryologist who is working on apoptosis, programmed cell death, 
who said, “When you actually study these embryos that are still alive, 
99% of the cells are dead. They are in a state of apoptosis.” So the 
question arises: What is the living part of the organism? Usually, this 
is the part that is never described in scientific publications for these 
experiments, for example. It ’s just taken to be something obvious, 
taken for granted, but it seems to be much more difficult.
Arianna Borrelli: I would like to say something that connects both to the last 
presentation and to a question at the core of this conference, which is 
the atmosphere that apparently reigns at present in quantum physics, 
and which makes discussion of non-mainstream approaches like that 
of Hans and Kristel very difficult. 
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Certainly the fact that the development of physics is in some sense 
extraordinary and is taken as a paradigm of how science works 
plays a role. The formalism of quantum mechanics and its standard 
Copenhagen interpretation are a successful paradigm not to be 
challenged. In the history of physics and other exact sciences one can 
find different examples of this kind of situation. Yet what historians 
often see, and what we have seen very well in the last presentation, is 
the importance of plurality. We just had a very beautiful example: an 
experiment was made with great investments, resources, conviction—
and it was a dead branch, a blind alley. On the other hand, there was 
a simpler experiment that worked. Now, you could ask: What did 
some do “right” and the others “wrong?” But, actually, the important 
message in the example is the role of plurality: in another discipline, 
outside of the paradigm, different experiments were being made. 
And in that specific case it might just have been chance that there was 
plurality, but the fact remains that if you don’t have plurality then you 
may remain with only a blind alley.
And now we come to the question: Why is plurality not there in some 
cases? Why is there resistance against it? Of course it is also a ques-
tion of science politics, of competition for resources, but in my opinion 
in physics and the exact sciences there is an additional factor: math-
ematics. Mathematics, and more precisely symbolic mathematical 
formalism, is a very, very powerful medium, if I may use this term. I 
speak here of medium because I think in the case of mathematical 
formalism one may have an effect similar to what McLuhan calls 
“narcosis”: where the medium becomes transparent, so that what it 
mediates appears as an immediate reality.
In this way, mathematics rules, in a sense. Through the Schrödinger 
equation the formula of a wave function becomes an entity. And the 
possibility of “mathematizing” more and more phenomena brings the 
idea that we have to have unification of all natural laws in a formula. 
I’m not saying that this vision is necessarily wrong—in the question 
of ontology, I don’t think one can say that it ’s right or wrong to think 
of wave functions as entities or not, but it ’s good if there are different 
people thinking about different entities, or not thinking about entities 
at all. And, in the end, you can get more tension and therefore more 
progress. 
But, as I said, this specific element, mathematics, which is so 
apparently universal, can be an obstacle to plurality. And this despite 
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the fact that if you look at the specific cases, the illusion of universality 
disappears. If you look into how precisely the Schrödinger equation 
is formulated and employed in various areas of quantum mechanics, 
diversity of formalisms and techniques rules. My presentation was an 
attempt to contribute to raise awareness of this question.
Britta Schinzel: What I have to say was already said. I’m thrown between the 
observation that computation and simulation can bring you insights, 
for example, those observed in computational neurology, which is 
able to implement a kind of extrapolated Gedankenexperiment, which 
couldn’t be done in reality, and on the other hand, that method might 
produce a lot of Scheinbilder, which are wrong, because it more and 
more dissociates itself from reality. Also the observation that nearly all 
science is now doubled with the prefix computational, most profoundly 
by physicists, with always the same method—differential equations—
and whether that’s not a narrowing of mathematics, MATLAB and so 
on. All these methods are used now without rethinking whether it ’s 
adequate and whether we also wouldn’t need a broader approach.
Martin Warnke: Yes, it ’s a bit about what Britta just said. What I noticed 
in my being a student of physics, the main slogan was “Shut up and 
calculate,” because our professors did not actually want to talk about 
the justification of anything they told us. It was just there and it 
worked, so do it and don’t ruin your career in doing, say, for instance, 
history of science. And after these two days, I have the impression that 
we are almost at the point of saying, “Shut up and simulate,” which is 
equally non-satisfactory. So, what I really wanted to know is whether 
there is more, say, methodological evidence and method, in a way, to 
come close to the certainty that we had from mathematics in the field 
of simulation, not to then tell all our students they should shut up, but 
that we all knew better what it ’s about with simulation, as compared 
with math.
Anne Dippel: First of all, I have to say, at the beginning, I hoped we would 
create an imaginary arena and we would discuss. I have to say, 
we all here behaved like rubidium—well-behaved—we’ve all dis-
cussed and I’m very happy that we created a little thought collective. 
Because, at the beginning, I fantasized you could really scream at each 
other maybe, and have very, very different positions. I’ve observed 
screaming physicists in laboratories already several times. So I 
expected the worst, and I’m very, very pleased to see how respectfully 
you can reason and argue. So, on the one hand, there is Kristel who 
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says, “Why don’t we use simulations to really explore new sides of 
physics, to tinker in a way with the computer?” And then there’s, on 
the other hand, Mira who says, “Reality kicks back, and the experiment 
shows something new.” And then there is Stefan who says, “Math-
ematical arguing produces completely new knowledge,” and all those 
three spheres, somehow, are puzzling spheres for us as humans to 
reason about nature. I would like to know if, for example, you could 
imagine that the work that is done by Kristel and Hans could be of 
any use, if there’s any need for it, or if it could help that there is some 
interaction between the works at the fringes? Because, currently, you 
all work in your little bubbles and there is no real communication, and 
this is one of the few spots, here, where there is communication. But 
maybe it is not at all possible, or even necessary.
LM: So, Martin said when I did my presentation that we are measuring 
things that the theorists cannot calculate. So maybe the simulators can 
simulate, or can, in their simulations, find effects that we then could 
try to find in our experiments. I’m sure that this could be productive. 
But, Martin also has pointed out that we are working together with a 
group of theorists who try to at least model what is going on in our 
interferometer. But I think if you’re able to simulate what is going on in 
our interferometers and find effects that we didn’t expect, or that you 
wouldn’t expect from our theory, I, for sure, would be happy to try to 
reproduce them in the experiment. Why not?
KM: So, I ask the question to you, because you asked us as theoreticians 
to make a theory or theoretical description of what is going on in 
the experiment. And, for you, it would also be wonderful if we as 
theoreticians find some new effect based on the theory, and then you 
are going to search for it. By itself, that’s nice. But, what we like from 
experimenters is that you give us data that do not comply with the 
theory and do not throw it away or say, “Yeah, but this is because it’s 
in the transient region and not yet in the stationary state,” and so on. 
Because we love to analyze these things and then simulate. 
LM: I think for this, I maybe have to pass the microphone to Mira, because, 
in our experiment, there were very few free parameters. And, I mean, 
if we don’t see interference, it ’s usually because the machine is com-
pletely misaligned and not because something strange is going on.
KM: Maybe. Maybe.
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LM: But I think that we are open… So, if I see interference that looks 
different from what I would expect, we, for sure, do not throw this 
away.
MM: So, my data are not yet collected. I am still figuring out how to debug 
my machine. But my colleague has stated that she does not under-
stand them at all, and she’s currently on the search for theoreticians 
who can try to explain them to her.
KM: But she did the experiment for somebody, so she had some 
expectations?
MM: Yes, yes, but her results are not matching the predictions at all. There 
is a collapse to a steady state that was not expected. So, no matter 
what she does to the atoms in the double well, it ’s always going to the 
same fixed point.
KM: But, by itself it ’s an interesting result.
MM: Yes, of course, but there is no explanation for it yet.
KM: But now, the next question: Can she publish it?
MM: She’s working on the analysis—really trying to fit her data and really 
trust her data. She even phrases it this way, “I want to trust my data 
first.” But yes, this is in development.
KM: Then the next question: If she can publish it, can she publish in Nature 
or Science? Because if you find an interference pattern, you can publish 
in Nature. 
MM: I think she’s afraid that she will not be able to publish it as it is now.
KM: I can imagine, yes.
MM: She needs an explanation or theoretical framework for it.
KM: And that was the atmosphere I was talking about. So if you find these 
interesting things in the meantime, you are not allowed to speak about 
it.
EW: I sort of want to respond to that. You have to be careful what you wish 
for. Experimental data that don’t match our expectations are easy to 
find. We had people saying they had neutrinos going faster than light: 
“Oh, it was a loose cable.” We had people saying they had cold fusion: 
“Oh, no, it was a bad detector.” We had people saying they found 
gravity B waves: “Oh, no, it was dust.” Experiments that find unusual 
Round Table 169
and unexpected things are a dime a dozen. You have to have some 
argument that the data you’ve collected are trustworthy, and I think 
that means they either conform with existing theory or, if they don’t 
conform with existing theory, there’s a really, really good reason to 
think that what you found is stable and reproducible, and going to be 
found in a robust variety of different contexts, such that theoreticians 
should spend their time paying attention to it. You don’t just find new 
data and then publish it in Nature because it doesn’t conform with 
expectations. That would be pandemonium, right?
KM: No, but that’s the first thing she should do. Is it reproducible?
EW: Yeah, but just reproducible—just in the exact same way that you 
produced it the first time—might not be good enough to get into 
Nature or whatever.
HDR: Sorry, I want to comment on this, because it is a little bit strange to 
me. I think in present situations, it ’s almost impossible to get money to 
repeat an experiment somebody else did. So if he does an experiment 
with his molecules, I would like to repeat it just for fun, let’s say. Or to 
establish whether this is okay or not. It ’s impossible. Even if I will never 
get it, right? If I read a proposal saying I’m going to…
EW: The problem goes both ways. For example, now it’s a widely discussed 
crisis in social psychology, something like 70 or 80%—I forget the 
number—of published results, when people try to reproduce them, 
they fail. But, of course, I mean…
HDR: Okay. Let’s take it a step further. Let’s take the experiments they do 
in CERN [European Organization for Nuclear Research]. They’re simply 
impossible to repeat.
EW: Well, there’s two groups.
HDR: Yeah. And, even so, I mean, I know of experiments done a long time 
ago trying to establish whether it was supersymmetry and things like 
that. And some people asked for the data in order that they could 
evaluate…
EW: That’s a scandal. I agree with you that’s a scandal.
HDR: Okay. So I’m just finishing the story for people who don’t know it. 
The data are just gone. So the experiment was done, and the data are 
no longer available for re-analysis. This is what they call in science 
“scientific practice.”
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EW: No, that’s a common practice. I mean, the data should always be…
FN: This sounds like art.
AB: On the Large Hadron Collider (LHC), even without the scandals, it ’s a 
fact that the two groups—this they say explicitly—when they think 
they see something and they start having some certainty, they make 
informal contacts between the two groups before they make an official 
announcement to be sure no one… I mean, they meet openly, so it ’s 
a question. But I want to ask another question about this fact you 
cannot publish in Nature, say, some experimental results that are not 
interpreted, and you say it’s a good thing because you would have 
a flood—maybe. But, then I’m asking you, is it okay to publish some 
complex mathematical theory beyond the standard model? It ’s not a 
problem—I’m just wondering. I’m just saying, because you say these 
experiments are a dime a dozen. They are not so cheap if it ’s a well-
funded experiment that costs a lot of money. It ’s not “I’ll try to publish 
something I did in my backyard.” And also, among these theories, they 
are speculative, there are a lot. Once, I asked some theorists, “How 
do you know that that published paper is not, for example, math-
ematically wrong?” And the answer was, “I don’t know. Nobody knows.” 
If it ’s very interesting, the result, maybe somebody will compute it. So 
I’m just asking why there is this difference in treatment.
EW: I don’t think it’s that different. The same thing happens in math-
ematics. People make claims of having proved things… For example, a 
few years ago somebody claimed to have proven that arithmetic was 
inconsistent. And everybody doubted this, but the proof was fairly 
sophisticated, so the blogs and Listservs were buzzing about it. And it 
took several weeks, I think, for someone to find the flaw in the proof. 
The LHC story… ATLAS (A Toroidal LHC Apparatus) and CMS (Compact 
Muon Solenoid) were two different groups that were independently 
looking for evidence of the Higgs. A friend of mine told me the 
following story—this was before the Higgs discovery was announced, 
and both groups were trying to get to a five-sigma level of evidence. 
My friend was visiting members of one of the groups when word got 
out that the other group had apparently reached three sigma. And 
the response from the first group was, “We need to turn up our sigma 
dial.” I mean, they just very self-consciously said: “We need to just 
estimate the sigma a little bit more liberally because we don’t want to 
be behind.”
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AD: I’ll try to mimic now what one of the physicists of the ATLAS group 
said to me, if somebody says something like you said, like that. 
You know what you do? “Hahaha!” You turn around and you laugh, 
because when you see… That’s one of my main studies—I’m studying 
the ATLAS and CMS groups and how they produce knowledge. The 
different hierarchical things that go on in there and so on and so on. 
The only difference is that ATLAS is much more filtered with checks and 
balances systems, and less hierarchically organized than CMS. That 
means that in order to come to a point where they say that knowledge 
is true, as you said right here now, it passes many more bureaucratic 
hurdles, and that’s why it takes longer to come to a point. But it would 
be really, in a way, “vermessen,” as we would say—I don’t know how 
you say this in English—ridiculous to do something like what you said 
right now, tweak the sigma and they go from three to five and they 
were just cheating it up. You know what I mean? As Arianna said, “They 
don’t do this in a backyard.” It costs €6 billion, and they are very much 
aware that the epistemic stakes are very high. And that’s why they 
wouldn’t do this. They may joke here and there about that, and that’s 
just the typical way of joking at CERN. I would relay this anecdote 
more into a narratology amongst physicists dealing with the epistemic 
burden they have in order to produce that knowledge, because the 
whole world looks at it and questions what they do.
HDR: I would like to make a comment on the context of simulation and what 
you said about arithmetic not being consistent or whatever. If we do a 
simulation, we work with inconsistent data methods all the time.
EW: Sure, but I mean there’s still an open question about whether 
arithmetic is consistent or not, right? We want to know. It might be 
okay if it ’s inconsistent… 
HDR: But if you work with a digital computer, we know it’s not. We don’t 
have to discuss it. We know it. And it’s not the point.
EW: Just in response to that, nobody meant to suggest that they could just, 
on a flip of a switch, go from three sigma to five, but there are various 
places along the chain where judgments are made. So for example, 
right at the detectors, huge amounts of data are produced and not all 
of them can be stored. So people right there have to make judgment 
calls about whether they’re going to count something as a possible 
event and record it or not. And how liberal you are about making that 
judgment or not is going to affect your sigma. So, if the word gets 
around that the other group has gotten ahead and the people at those 
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stations start hitting the mouse a little bit more frequently, sigma goes 
up—though not from three to five, of course.
AD: First of all, humans may sit at the trigger desk and the data acquisition 
desks, but it ’s the simulations that are done in advance, in dry runs, to 
test it out and see what you want to see. And, yes, 99.8% of the data is 
getting thrown away in the simulation, which makes visible what you 
want to see. But, actually doing that fieldwork at CERN and seeing how 
those people… Maybe they migrate knowledge from A to B, and, yes, 
maybe people marry in CMS and ATLAS, but even married couples tell 
the same story. And I think that’s very important: they take this as a 
challenge. They are scientists. They are not doing fake experiments in 
order to become famous. They do not even have that need to become 
famous because there are 3,500 people working in a collective. So, they 
are really trying to take those sister experiments, as Karin Knorr-Cetina 
named them first, in order to really come to a point, because you can’t 
reproduce the experiment because it’s so expensive. That is ethics and 
science. And if you question that kind of ethical stance of somebody 
who stands in the control room in ATLAS or at CMS, you’re, in a way, 
saying they might be unethical in their behavior. But I can assure you 
that if there are two unethical people, there will be 15 ethical people 
behind them, and they will argue.
EW: It’s not at all a claim about them being unethical. It ’s a claim about 
them having to exercise judgment; they have to, it ’s unavoidable. And 
how you exercise the judgment affects the sigma. That’s all.
AD: For example, also something: before the run was starting, everybody 
received a note entitled, “Be aware of the ‘Look Elsewhere Effect.’ Take 
care that you do not see things that you want to see.” And that’s a very, 
very funny paper because it starts with: you might sit there in the lab 
and you have your second gin and you want to see something, and 
then you see “Be aware.” It ’s not about not drinking gin, it ’s about…
EW: Why do you think they need to caution about this? Because it’s a real 
thing.
AD: Because people want to see something new. And that’s something 
everybody discusses here. They want to see something new. They want 
to find something new. Theoreticians, simulationists, experimentalists, 
because that’s something…
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EW: They’re not cautioning about that because they’re worried that their 
workers are unethical. They’re cautioning about it because it’s a 
normal, real feature of science.
AD: But that’s also something where we actually differ, because you are not 
in the field. You are not empirically seeing how they do and practice 
science, and that’s something I would really stress to everybody who 
says they do mere semiotics there, and that this is just playing with 
science and so on. It ’s not just a mere play with science that doesn’t 
matter. There’s maybe something fundamentally wrong, but it ’s not at 
all… I can’t even judge this.
MW: So, may I ask Wolfgang what the horizon of any symposium about 
ethics now would be if you’re here to listen to all of that?
WH: First of all, we have to recognize that all people coming from literary 
studies and humanities say, “Oh, quantum physics. Oh, quantum 
physics.” So, the first thing is to tear down the barriers between 
natural science, in the way we have talked about it in these two days, 
and humanities. This is very important. There are academic traditions 
in the world, especially in the USA, where this barrier is huge. And 
there are some other traditions where the barriers are not so big, 
and we have traditions in France, for example, and in Germany. We 
should follow up, too, I think. This is the reason I would recommend 
a workshop about the ethics of simulation, because there are ethical 
questions in the simulations, if you grab deep enough. Ethics is the 
philosophical discipline that is so important, even in America now, and 
very lively now. I mean, in all areas, they talk about ethics, and ethics I 
mean in the tradition of Aristotle and in the reception of Lacan, and in 
the way Blumenberg dealt with it, the German philosopher. Not ethics 
in a pseudomoral way, just ethics as in the very strong understanding 
even of analytical philosophy, which has a branch in America now. 
They call themselves “Ethic of Design,” for example. And this is very 
important, to talk about ethics, because of this new branding, “Design 
Thinking,” and things like that. So we want to have another workshop 
in Lüneburg, “Design in Simulation,” because design is very important 
as a concept already in this field; we didn’t talk about that at all. 
This is my background and the horizon for my question. After having 
read the Karen Barad book, we should invite her, because she and 
Donna Haraway and all the guys there in Santa Cruz would be very 
interesting to talk with because they obviously thought about that 
from a gender studies perspective, from a post-colonial perspective, 
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from a complete cultural studies perspective. I mean, it would be 
really interesting to get them known in this field as an enrichment of 
our discourse. Again, with the aim to tear down the barrier between 
natural science and the humanities, because this is a barrier of power, 
actually. It ’s a barrier of economic power, it ’s a barrier of political 
power, it ’s a barrier of social power, and we have to deal with that now. 
I mean, seeing all the problems we have in nature, so to say, it ’s also an 
environmental discourse we’re talking about. And, at least this point 
should be worthy enough to talk about—this tearing down the barrier.
LM: I would just like to add something to that. Because, for me, this is 
absolutely not about some philosophers coming and telling people 
how to do ethical research. It is much more about the ethical 
implications of our theories. This became, suddenly, very clear to 
me when I worked on a very different project that was far outside of 
physics. And I stumbled upon a discussion that Hans Reichenbach 
had with Bertolt Brecht when they were both in exile in America. So, 
they were discussing uncertainty in quantum physics—that’s actually 
where I think you’re totally right. Uncertainty is not limited to quantum 
physics; it ’s something that is there in our everyday experience. 
And Brecht, he was describing his situation as a refugee by saying, 
“I am living in a huge casino, and I have to act as a gambler who can 
never predict what the outcome of the bet he’s placing is.” And then, 
I read a lecture that Reichenbach gave at the same time, and in this 
lecture Reichenbach says, “Well, in the times of quantum physics, the 
physicists act as gamblers who only place a bet on the outcome of the 
experiment, and they choose their bet such that they are most likely 
to win.” And then, I suddenly realized that at the same time John von 
Neumann was publishing his theory of game and economic behavior. 
So, there was a completely new ethics derived from the uncertainty 
that was encountered in quantum physics, and, as well, in the everyday 
experience of these German exiles. So I think that’s maybe what ethics, 
or what the relation between ethics and physics, could be.
MW: Almost an abstract for the next symposium, maybe?
HDR: So maybe I can say something about uncertainty from our per-
spective. I think the question is not where does it come from—the 
question is where does your certainty come from? Uncertainty is 
everywhere, and it’s part of, say, the way we process our information 
that we get from our senses and so on. Nothing is certain. I mean, 
we can talk about going out, but maybe there is no door when we 
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get there. But, of course, our brain somehow builds a picture of the 
environment and so on. And we live in the picture, and the picture 
that we create is probably reduced to the part that is most certain. 
Otherwise, I don’t think we could survive. The whole way of thinking 
and processing this information is derived from the desire to survive, 
I think. Evolution has done this for us. I mean, I don’t know how this 
works, but, in some way, it did it, and it also dictates how we think and 
reason about things. So, uncertainty itself is something we have to 
deal with from the start, and I think the major problem with quantum 
mechanics, when it was somehow created, was that physicists had 
been thinking always in a world in which everything was taken to be 
certain. And then they were faced with the situation of “we really have 
to get rid of this idea.” And that was, of course, a big shock for them. 
But, once you realize that uncertainty is everywhere, I don’t think it 
should be a shock. In that sense, I would say, everyone can understand 
quantum mechanics. Apart from the mathematics perhaps.
FP: What’s the origin of certainty? For me, nature is noisy. Everything is 
noise. So, if you can be certain about something, it must be stable for 
some time. So you are studying stable situations, and then you learn 
nothing is stable in this world. That’s how to think about it. It ’s just 
an approach to get to stable things, or realizing stable things. And, 
because there’s so much noise, it depends also on your techniques, 
how to identify these stable situations. So there are different points 
for this uncertainty, of course. If it ’s part of the object, if it ’s part of 
your reception, if it ’s part of your own receivers. And this, of course, is 
difficult to disentangle, I think. I haven’t read about it so far.
HJR: This reminds me of a very nice book, which is now almost 40 years 
old. The title is La Nouvelle Alliance. It was written by Ilya Prigogine and 
Isabelle Stengers. The main message of the book is that physics, for 
centuries, has been looking for the situations that are, more or less, in 
one way or the other, stable. But what physics should really be inter-
ested in is learning about how things change. 
MW: So we are now absolutely into the philosophy of nature, and we, as 
organizers, took another resort, which was to bring up the media ques-
tion, as one way to avoid this, or to put it into another perspective. 
Anne, I think, would like to make a short remark on that.
AD: Yeah. As you said, nature is noise. I’m, of course, stumped after 
thinking about Shannon’s paper. And even 80 or 90 years ago, the idea 
of noise, or message carriers, would not even be thought possible 
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to have allegories. And that shows how much our current media are 
determining the way we use our vocabulary for nature. What you 
said about uncertainty and certainty reminds me that that might be 
one of the deep gaps between humanities and social sciences on the 
one hand, and physics or natural sciences on the other. When I teach 
anthropology, I say, “The goal of studying anthropology, at the end of 
the day, is to have a fundamental uncertainty about things.” And when 
physicists teach the goal today, most of them, it ’s to find a fundamental 
certainty. And what Hans-Jörg Rheinberger just mentioned would be 
one of the possible ways of bridging the gap from the physics side, if it 
could come to the point to look for the uncertainty. It would be lovely.
MW: So, phew! We are back to media cultures, and maybe even to computer 
simulations again. Anne and I propose to give in to our exhaustion and 
our puzzlement and end this symposium.
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